


30 July 1982



USSR Report

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No. 1692

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No. 2, February 1982

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CPSU INFLUENCE ON STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES NOTED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 3-11

[Article by Col Gen A. Lizichev: "CPSU Leadership -- The Main Source of the Strength of the Soviet Armed Forces." Passages printed in boldface in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] This month the Soviet people and their fighting men are festively celebrating the anniversary of the 26th CPSU Congress and the 64th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy. Addressing the congress, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, on behalf of all the delegates warmly congratulated the glorious defenders of the homeland, highly praised the results of their military service, and expressed confidence that they would continue in the future reliably standing guard over the peaceful, productive labor of the Soviet people.

A consistent love of peace is inseparably linked in the policy of the CPSU and Soviet State with concern for defense of the socialist homeland. This was once again clearly manifested during examination, at the November (1981) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation, of draft state plans of economic and social development of the USSR for the current five-year period and for 1982, as well as this country's budget for 1982. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed in his speech at the plenum that in these plans "is affirmed the party's course of policy aimed at increasing this country's economic potential and improving the efficiency of the nation's economy.... The needs of defense are being reliably secured."¹ These plans became law at the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Where do the sources of the might of the USSR Armed Forces lie? /In CPSU guidance and in the advantages of our socioeconomic political system, the world's most advanced -- socialism./ The Soviet Army and Navy are developing on its indissoluble principles.

The socialist mode of production is the /economic foundation/ of organizational development and strengthening of our Armed Forces. It provides an unprecedented development of productive resources, science, technology, growth of the economy, and offers incomparably greater opportunities than in conditions of capitalism

for creation of economic potential and mobilization of all material resources essential for strengthening this country's defense capability in peacetime and repelling the aggressor in case of war.

The Soviet societal and governmental system, which is characterized by a firm alliance between the worker class, the peasantry and the people's intelligentsia, by a continuously growing social, political and ideological unity of the Soviet society, an indissoluble fraternal friendship among the nationalities and peoples of the USSR, and by steady development of socialist democracy, constitutes the /sociopolitical foundation/ of organizational development and further evolution of the USSR Armed Forces.

/The theoretical basis/ of Soviet military organizational development is the revolutionary ideology of the worker class, which has today become the ideology of the entire Soviet people, as well as Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, and Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist homeland.

Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army is the immediate theoretical and methodological foundation of Soviet military doctrine, of our military science and art of warfare, and of forming the indestructible morale of the Armed Forces.

The potentials of this country's defense might -- /economic, scientific, moral-political, and military proper/ -- are created on the economic, sociopolitical, and theoretical foundations of socialism. They constitute sources of the might of the USSR Armed Forces, and in time of war become factors in their victory over aggressors. /An army of a new type has been created and is being perfected on these realistic foundations, the objective laws and scientific principles of socialism, under the guidance of the CPSU./ This army differs radically from the armies of exploiter societies. The Soviet Armed Forces defend the interests of the worker class and of all working people, and serve the people. In this country the armed force of workers and peasants, emphasized V. I. Lenin, "is not separated from the people, as was the force of the old regular army, but is most closely bound to them...."² This bond becomes particularly indissoluble in conditions of developed socialism. "The Soviet Army," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "is a part of our people, living a common life with them.... The Soviet people highly value and love their army, realizing that as long as forces of aggression continue to exist in the world, a well-equipped army is indispensable."³

/A close, inseverable bond between the Soviet Army and its great people is one more life-giving source of its power and invincibility./

Thus the socialist system and its root advantages over the capitalist system create objective preconditions for strengthening the defense might of the Soviet State and for creating strong fighting potential on the part of the USSR Armed Forces. Possibilities are not transformed into reality spontaneously, but through the conscious, multifaceted, titanic activities of the Communist Party, directed toward strengthening this country's defense capability and improving the army and navy. /It is precisely the Communist Party which implements all the advantages of socialism in the process of military

organizational development. Its leadership is a most important principle of Soviet military organizational development and the main source of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces./

Thanks to the guiding, mobilizing and inspiring role of the Communist Party, the Soviet people and their army gained brilliant victories in the civil war.

Our world-historic victory over Hitlerite fascism and Japanese militarism is inseparable from the multifaceted, purposeful guiding activities of the Communist Party. During the Great Patriotic War the Communist Party became a genuinely fighting party. It inspired, organized, and united the multinational Soviet people, mobilized it for defense of the homeland, and transformed the country into a unified fighting camp. Immense work was accomplished to shift the nation's economy over to a war footing, to achieve an unprecedented displacement of productive resources, accelerated development of the war economy, establishment of an extensive partisan movement behind enemy lines, creation of an anti-Hitler coalition and a united front of peace-loving peoples against fascist Germany.

Using all means of ideological and political indoctrination work, the party explained to the masses the just, liberation character of the Great Patriotic War and indoctrinated Soviet citizens in a spirit of patriotism, friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and proletarian internationalism.

The Communist Party devoted special attention to guidance of the armed struggle against the enemy, strengthening of the armed forces, improvement of party-political work, and strengthening of party influence among the troops.

A total of 13,850 leadership-echelon party workers were mobilized into the Armed Forces during the war years.⁴ Party organizations, political workers and Communists conducted enormous ideological indoctrination work among military personnel, united them behind the party Central Committee, inspired them to perform feats of arms, and summoned them to victory. Communists were to be found in the most difficult and dangerous areas in the fighting, raising the soldiers' fighting spirit by means of personal example, heroism, courage, staunchness, and bravery, and leading them to valorous deeds. Discussing the role of the Communist Party in achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted: "...The Central Committee was that headquarters from which top-level political and strategic guidance of military operations was exercised. It was precisely the party which organized and unified tens of millions of people, directing their energy, their will and actions toward a single goal -- toward victory."⁵

Carrying out V. I. Lenin's behest /to be alert and to increase the fighting efficiency and combat readiness of the army and navy,/ in the postwar peacetime years as well the Communist Party has constantly devoted and continues to devote unabating attention to strengthening the country's defense capability and the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Party activities aimed at increasing this country's defense capability and the combat power of the army and navy are multifaceted. We can specify in these

activities (conditionally, of course) two interrelated directions:

/1) Strengthening the foundations of organizational development of the Armed Forces and development of sources of the might of the army and navy; 2) Further improvement of the Armed Forces proper./

The first area is linked first and foremost with /comprehensive development of the socialist economy./ V. I. Lenin stated that "in today's war... economic organization is of decisive significance" and that "it is impossible to make a country defense-capable without the greatest heroism on the part of the people, who are accomplishing great economic reforms in a bold and resolute manner."⁶ Grandiose plans of national industrialization and collectivization of agriculture were being elaborated and carried out, and a cultural revolution was accomplished, all under party guidance. Enormous attention was devoted to efficient distribution of productive resources over this country's territory. New branches of industry were created by the heroic labor of Soviet citizens, headed by the Communist Party, and new giants of industry were built, such as the Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk metallurgical combines, the Moscow and Gor'kiy automotive plants, the Stalingrad, Khar'kov, and Chelyabinsk tractor plants. A modern defense industry was created by decision of the party and its Central Committee; an aircraft industry, tank industry, and naval shipbuilding were developed, as was the production of artillery and other weapons. Supported by massive economic potential, during the Great Patriotic War the Soviet people provided the army and navy with everything they needed for victory over Hitlerite Germany, for which the industry of almost all the capitalist countries of Europe was working.

The CPSU has shown in the postwar years and continues to show continuous concern for growth of the economic and scientific-technological potentials of the Soviet State. A scientific and technological revolution is being carried out in this country under its guidance. Production of arms and combat equipment, meeting the most modern demands, has been achieved on a scale requisite for reliable defense, on the basis of outstanding achievements by the Soviet economy and advances in science and technology.

Guidance of the national economy today continues to be the most important item in party activities. It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress that in the area of the economy the foundation is being laid for accomplishing social tasks and strengthening the nation's defense capability, as well as the foundation for an active foreign policy. The productive resources of the Soviet society have attained a qualitatively new level. Such modern industries as nuclear machine building, space technology, the electronics and microelectronics industry, laser technology, the manufacture of synthetic diamonds and other new materials have experienced further development or have been created from the ground up on the basis of the achievements of /science./ Large changes are taking place in the distribution of productive resources. Powerful territorial-production complexes are being formed in the European part of the RSFSR, in the Urals, Siberia, in the Far East, in Kazakhstan, and in Tajikistan.

The USSR presently possesses mighty economic and scientific-technological potentials. This is of enormous defense significance. "...The economy, science and technology in our country," noted D. F. Ustinov, "are currently at such a high

level that we are capable of rapidly developing any type of weapon on which the enemies of peace would place their hopes."⁸

The plans of economic development for the 11th Five-Year Plan and for the period up to 1990 expand these capabilities to an even greater extent. At the November (1981) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated that in 1981-1985 "industry and agriculture will develop at a dynamic pace.... A large new step is being taken in the development of Siberia and the Far East. The economy of each union republic will experience further development."⁹

At all stages of building socialism and communism the CPSU has devoted and continues to devote great attention to /improvement and development of the Soviet societal and governmental system, socialist democracy, and strengthening of the social and ideological-political unity of our people./

"Our goal," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev at the 26th CPSU Congress, "is the creation of a society in which people will not be divided into classes. And we can state quite definitely that we are advancing slowly but surely toward this great goal."¹⁰ He stressed that the worker class has been and remains the guiding force in the establishment of a classless structure of society. Its revolutionary ideology and morality, its collectivist psychology, its interests and ideals are today becoming the property of all strata of the Soviet society.¹¹

From the very first years of Soviet rule the party's economic and social policy has been directed toward strengthening the fraternal friendship of all the peoples of our multinational homeland, toward increasing the material and spiritual potentials of each Soviet republic, and toward boosting as rapidly as possible Russia's former backward ethnic outlying regions to the level of development achieved by the central region of Russia. And this task has been successfully accomplished.

The CPSU and its Central Committee constantly devote unabating attention /to the innovative development of Marxist-Leninist theory and improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work./ As a result of profound synthesis of the new phenomena of Soviet realities, an orderly concept of developed socialism has been elaborated in party guideline documents and scientific research, a concept which has enriched the science of the laws and mechanisms of development of a new socioeconomic system, on the pathways of building communism, on transformation of the party of the worker class in the process of building developed socialism into a party which constitutes the vanguard of the Soviet people, on development of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat into a state of all the people, on the Soviet people as a new historical community, plus others.

Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army has experienced further development. Lenin's ideas on the dialectics of war and peace, war and politics, war and ideology, and teaching on defense of the socialist homeland and revolutionary achievements has been innovatively developed and concretized applicable to the contemporary era. An important thesis on transformation of the army of a state of a dictatorship of the proletariat into an army of a state of all the

people was formulated on the basis of a profound analysis of the objective mechanisms of development of the Armed Forces. Investigation of the characteristic features of the Armed Forces of developed socialism, theoretical and practical problems of Soviet military organizational development is being successfully conducted.

All these new theses and conclusions are of inestimable ideological and methodological significance for further elaboration of military policy, military doctrine, development of the art of warfare, solution of many complex problems of military organizational development, training of military cadres, instruction and indoctrination of personnel.

Innovative development of Marxism-Leninism, improvement of ideological and political indoctrination work, and reorganization of many of its areas and domains, being carried out in this country pursuant to a decision of the 26th CPSU Congress and CPSU Central Committee decrees, promote growth of the /moral-political potential/ of the Soviet State and beneficially influence the moral-fighting qualities of servicemen.

A second area of guiding activity of the Communist Party pertaining to strengthening this country's defense capability is directly connected /with development and improvement of the Armed Forces proper and with increasing their combat power./ It should be examined at two levels: theoretical and practical. The theoretical level specifies /elaboration of the sociopolitical and organizational principles of organizational development of the Armed Forces, the principles of training and indoctrination of personnel./ The historical credit for this goes to V. I. Lenin. Directing the armed defense of the victorious socialist revolution, establishment and strengthening of the Red Army, he substantiated and elaborated the basic principles of Soviet military organizational development.

The Communist Party determines a scientifically substantiated military policy. This complex phenomenon encompasses many problems, but a central position within it is occupied by questions pertaining to /development and strengthening of the Armed Forces./ The essence of Soviet military policy is specified in the CPSU program: "...As long as there continues to remain a military danger proceeding from the imperialist camp, until such time as total and universal disarmament is achieved, the CPSU considers it essential to maintain the defense might of the Soviet State and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level ensuring the decisive and total defeat of any enemy who dares encroach upon the Soviet homeland."¹²

In the conditions of the present international situation, which has become greatly complicated through the fault of aggressive U.S. and NATO circles, the military policy of the Soviet State has been defined in the materials and decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, and in the writings of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. They stress that the intrigues of imperialism and other enemies of peace demand constant vigilance and all-out strengthening of the defense capability of our nation, in order to thwart the plans of imperialism to achieve military superiority and to carry out a worldwide dictate. Replying to questions put by the editors of the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated that "it would be better to

abandon dreams of achieving military superiority over the USSR. If it becomes necessary, the Soviet people will find the capability to undertake any additional efforts and to do everything necessary to ensure the reliable defense of their country."¹³

Our party and government devote enormous attention /to elaboration of contemporary Soviet military doctrine./ Military doctrine is the system of views, adopted in a country at a given time, on the aims and character of a potential war, on preparation of the country and its armed forces for war, as well as on the modes of conduct of such a war.¹⁴

Bourgeois propaganda, seeking to justify an unprecedented arms race in bourgeois countries, the course of policy taken by the U.S. administration which aims at military superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, and U.S. claims to world leadership, disseminates threadbare myths about a "Soviet military threat" and ascribes aggressive aims to our military doctrine.

This is a monstrous lie from beginning to end. Many party documents and statements by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and our military leaders emphasize that Soviet military doctrine is of a defensive character. The Soviet Union has not and does not threaten anybody. "...We," stated Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "never have sought and do not now seek military superiority. We are not proceeding and have no intention of proceeding further than concern for reliably guarding the security of our country and the security of our allies. The Soviet Union constantly appeals to refrain from the development of new, even more terrible weapons. But I shall state in all frankness: we shall not be indifferent toward the appearance of such weapons in the arsenals of the United States and other NATO members. If this happens, the Soviet Armed Forces will have at their disposal a suitable counterweight to such weapons."¹⁵

/Development of Soviet military science/ is one of the most important directions of CPSU activity in the area of theory. Theories of art of warfare, military organizational development, military training and indoctrination, military economics and rear services develop under the direct guidance of the Central Committee. In the postwar years Soviet military science successfully solved many pressing problems connected with providing the army and navy with nuclear missile weapons, improving their organizational structure, harmonious development of all Armed Forces branches of service and combat arms, the search for new forms and modes of conduct of combat operations, operational-tactical troop training, increasing combat readiness, and improving training and indoctrination of personnel.

At the practical level Communist Party guiding activities pertaining to strengthening the Armed Forces are aimed at /implementation of the points of military science for improving the organizational structure of the army and navy, comprehensive development of all Armed Forces branches of service and combat arms, improved efficiency of the system of troop command and control, and improvement in selection, placement and indoctrination of military cadres, especially at the highest echelon./

The Communist Party and its Central Committee devote principal attention to /increasing the combat potential of the Armed Forces./ As was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, /a high level of technical equipment, military expertise, and indomitable morale/ are the principal components of combat potential.

V. I. Lenin stated that in war "victory is won by he who has the greatest technology, organization, discipline, and the best machines...."¹⁶

Following Lenin's instructions, the CPSU took vigorous measures to /provide the army and navy with new weapons and combat equipment./ Thanks to its titanic efforts, today our Armed Forces possess everything necessary to offer a devastating rebuff to any aggressor. The 26th CPSU Congress emphasized that the Central Committee will do everything to ensure that this continues to be so in the future as well.

The combat potential of the Armed Forces is directly dependent on /the degree of training of personnel, knowledge and skillful employment of weapons and combat equipment, on the level of tactical and operational training of military cadres./ V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party always attached great importance to study of military affairs and improving military expertise. A resolution on the military question adopted at the 8th Congress of the RCP(b) [Russian Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] stated that the army should be trained, armed and organized according to the latest in military science.¹⁷

Training of military cadres was always an object of particular concern on the part of the party and CPSU Central Committee. For example, the ACP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee decree of 5 June 1931, entitled "On Command and Political Personnel of the Workers and Peasants Red Army," stressed that a decisive increase in the military technical knowledge of command personnel, their consummate mastery of combat equipment and the complex forms of contemporary combat constitute a decisive task in the area of further increasing the army's war-fighting capability. Military-technical improvement of the commander should become a most important element of the work of all command personnel and all army organizations.¹⁸

An orderly system of military educational institutions has been established and is being improved through the efforts of the party and the Soviet State. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War cadres for the army and navy were being trained by 19 academies, 10 military faculties at civilian higher educational institutions, and at seven higher naval schools. By the summer of 1941 there were 203 military schools and 68 advanced training courses in operation in this country, in which more than 300,000 students were enrolled.¹⁹

After the war, in connection with the revolution in military technology, re-arming of troops with nuclear missile weapons and highly complex equipment, as well as change in the modes and forms of warfare, the importance of military expertise grew immeasurably. The work of military educational institutions was reorganized in connection with this and is being continuously improved, and the forms and methods of training troops were changed. Carrying out the behests of V. I. Lenin, the demands of the party, and the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, servicemen in all Armed Forces branches of service are working

persistently to master weapons and combat equipment as well as the complex art of winning. The level of skill of personnel has risen appreciably, field, air and sea proficiency have improved, as has the tactical coordination of units and combined units, military discipline has grown stronger, and the level of combat readiness is higher.

Soviet servicemen graphically demonstrated these excellent qualities at the "Zapad-81" [West-81] exercise, which was conducted on the territory of the Belorussian and Baltic military districts and on the Baltic Sea.

The level of combat and political training and success in accomplishing the tasks assigned to the troops depends on /the morale of personnel,/ which is one of the most important component elements of combat potential. V. I. Lenin emphasized that in any war victory is determined in the final analysis by the spirit of those masses which are shedding their blood on the field of battle. This Lenin thesis was convincingly confirmed by the Great Patriotic War.

The role of morale has increased immeasurably today. This is due to the evolution of weapons and combat equipment, the nature of modern combat, its unprecedented intensity, decisiveness, the complexity of performance of alert duty missions and other types of military service activities, and by the necessity of maintaining continuous Armed Forces combat readiness.

Therefore one of the tasks which always was and continues to occupy the attention of the Communist Party and its Central Committee is /strengthening of the morale of army and navy personnel, and precise organization of ideological and political indoctrination work in the military./ These questions have been reflected in many documents. On 21 January 1967 the CPSU Central Committee adopted a decree entitled "On Measures to Improve Party-Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," which pledged the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, military councils, commanders, political agencies and party organizations to raise party-political work in the Armed Forces to the level of today's party demands.

Enormous importance is attached to strengthening the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces and increasing the fine traditions of the army and navy in the CPSU Central Committee decree of 26 April 1979 entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." "Soviet servicemen," it states, "should be deeply cognizant of their duty to secure the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and to defend the cause of peace and socialism."²⁰ Party documents, especially the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, focus on reorganization of many areas and domains of ideological work and the principal directions it should take. The activities of military councils, commanders, political agencies and party organizations are directed toward implementation of these party demands.

The guidelines of the 26th CPSU Congress and the CPSU Central Committee are being successfully implemented. The style of guidance of ideological work is being improved. Top-echelon command-political personnel are increasingly more actively participating in the indoctrination process. A unified political day is being conducted in the units in an interesting and purposeful manner. Party

organizations are devoting considerable and ever increasing attention to the ideological-political indoctrination of Communists and all military personnel, as well as to party instruction. The pertinence, scientific character, efficiency, concreteness, and aggressiveness of agitation and propaganda are increasing. Individual work with servicemen has improved, and greater concern is being shown for them.

All topic schedules and curricula in the area of Marxist-Leninist training, political instruction, and the work of universities of Marxism-Leninism and evening party schools have been reworked at the Main Political Directorate in a spirit of the new demands of the Communist Party. These programs specify thorough study of the proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the November (1981) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, and the documents of the Sixth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th Convocation.

Measures taken in the army and navy to achieve further increase in the effectiveness of ideological indoctrination work have a positive influence on strengthening troop morale, accomplishing combat and political training tasks, and on strengthening the indoctrinational role of military service.

The Soviet Army and Navy are carrying out their duty to defend peace and socialism within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces. One of the sources of their combat power is the /indestructible friendship among the servicemen of the armies of the socialist nations./ Our party is doing everything necessary to strengthen in the future as well the Warsaw Pact, its military organization, and comprehensive cooperation with the brother countries.

Thus CPSU guidance of the Armed Forces and enhancement of the role and influence of party organizations in the army and navy constitute the basic foundation of Soviet military organizational development and the main source of the might of the Soviet Armed Forces. All life and activities in the military, training and indoctrination of personnel are permeated by the beneficial organizational and ideological-political influence of the CPSU and its Central Committee. There is not a single area of military affairs, stresses Comrade D. F. Ustinov, in which is not manifested the collective genius, guiding and mobilizing role of our party's Central Committee and its Politburo, headed by Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. The role of this guidance is constantly increasing.²¹

Enhancement of the leadership role of the CPSU in the Soviet society and in all areas of building communism is an objective pattern. It also applies in full measure to the Armed Forces. This is dictated by a number of objective factors: an international situation which has become greatly complicated through the fault of reactionary imperialist circles and the Beijing hegemonists; increased demands on combat and political training of personnel and army and navy combat readiness; the increased scale and complexity of the tasks facing the Armed Forces at the present stage and expansion of their international mission to provide reliable defense, together with the armies of the brother socialist nations, of the achievements of world socialism; by the complexity of military organizational development in conditions of contemporary advances in science

and technology and rapid development of military equipment and weapons; by enhancement of the moral factor in war and the necessity of further improving all ideological and political indoctrination work in the military. Army and navy Communists comprise a fighting detachment of our Leninist party which is totally dedicated to the cause of communism and the Soviet people. By their selfless labor they are making a worthy contribution to the sacred cause of defense of our socialist homeland.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 17 November 1981.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 34, page 304.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, pp 262-284.
4. See "Partiya i armiya" [The Party and the Army], Moscow, Politizdat, 1980, page 179.
5. Brezhnev, op. cit., page 380.
6. Lenin, op. cit., pp 194, 197.
7. Footnote omitted.
8. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 319.
9. PRAVDA, 17 November 1981.
10. "Materialy XXVI s'yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 52.
11. Ibid., pp 53-54.
12. "Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, page 111.
13. PRAVDA, 3 November 1981.
14. See "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" [Soviet Military Encyclopedia], Vol 3, Voenizdat, 1977, page 225.
15. PRAVDA, 8 September 1981.
16. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 36, page 116.
17. See "KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1981" [The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union. Documents, 1917-1981], Voenizdat, 1981, page 53.

18. Ibid., page 263.
19. See "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily" [The Soviet Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1978, page 247.
20. "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Sbornik materialov" [On Further Improvement of Ideological, Political Indoctrination Work. Collection of Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 21.
21. Ustinov, op. cit., page 422.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN TROOP COMBAT TRAINING BEFORE OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 12-19

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War and in the Postwar Period," by Professor and Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences Col I. Ladanov, Doctor of Historical Sciences Col R. Portugal'skiy, and Docent and Candidate of Pedagogical Sciences Col V. Demin: "Forms and Methods of Troop Combat Training Before Operations." Passages printed in bold-face in source are enclosed in slantlines.]

[Text] A high degree of moral-psychological preparation, solid military knowledge, and the ability to conduct combat actions in the most complex situation will be demanded of Soviet servicemen in today's highly mobile and continuous combat operations. Considerable assistance in preparing them can be given by study and innovative application of the experience acquired during the years of the Great Patriotic War. "Presently coming into the Armed Forces," noted USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov in 1978, "are officers who were born after the victory. They are accepting as a priceless relay baton combat experience, knowledge and skill from their older comrades and are endeavoring innovatively to apply all this to troop training."¹

The aim of this article is to show the characteristic forms and methods of combat training of rifle, armored, and mechanized troops on the eve of offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War.

* * *

/Organization of combat training of troops had the following specific features./ During the first months of the war units frequently were compelled to conduct continuous combat actions. In these conditions training of conscripts was accomplished on a shortened timetable. For example, of 43 draft companies selectively taken from the Moscow Military District, 12 worked on combat and political training for a period of 5-10 days in September-October 1941, 15 worked for 20 days, and 16 companies for 30 days.² As a rule even less time was allocated for putting together reserve units and combined units. They would be moved up to the line and engaged immediately in the most important sectors and areas.

But even in this situation every opportunity to hold training classes and drills was utilized, and ways were sought for studying the immediate adversary and the specific features of combat operations applicable to the conditions of the terrain on which they would be fighting. Just prior to the counteroffensive at Moscow, Lt Gen A. M. Vasilevskiy, deputy chief of the General Staff, in a conversation with Col Gen I. S. Konev, commander of the Kalinin Front, stressed the request by the Supreme Commander that "Maslennikov's (29th Army -- Ed.) combined units which had not yet been in action be given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the situation at the front during a period of at least two days."³ On the basis of these instructions practical training drills were held in the armies, to study weapons, operation and maintenance of equipment in winter conditions, firing weapons and grenade throwing. The companies held daylight and night tactical exercises, and a number of subunits arranged training drills at which personnel fired antitank rocket launchers at captured tanks. In the divisions of the 1st Assault Army and 16th Army of the Western Front (Lt Gens V. I. Kuznetsov and K. K. Rokossovskiy, commanding), demonstration classes were organized for platoon, company, and battalion commanders on control of subunits and for personnel on actions involved in assaulting the enemy's main line of resistance. Previous combat experience was widely disseminated in talks, newspapers and leaflets.

The activities of commanders and staffs in the area of organizing troop combat training stepped up sharply toward the winter of 1941. Training began as troops were proceeding by rail to their assigned location (combat area). The men were addressed by combat veterans and read leaflets and instruction pamphlets. Tactical and battle drills were held on the march and in day's halt and rest areas. During lulls between operations, scheduled training exercises would be held for all personnel and staffs: in November they ran three days in the 37th Army and two days in the 54th, lasting from 10 to 12 hours each day. Main attention in training subunits and units was devoted to practical work on advancing to the attack position, deployment into combat formation, assault of the forward positions, and fighting to take a strongpoint. At headquarters particular importance in training activities was attached to troop control. Thus in spite of the difficulties of the first period of the war, combat training of troops immediately prior to operations comprised one of the most important problems. "The bitter experience... of 1941," commented Mar SU K. A. Meretskov, "taught us a great deal. We had already adopted the following rule: no matter how great was the need for troops, prior to combat arriving replacement personnel and newly arriving units were to go through training centers or to receive a familiarization briefing directly in the combined units on the specific features of conduct of combat actions..."⁴

In subsequent years combat training began to be of a more scheduled and purposeful character. It was conducted in parallel with planning and organization of an operation and encompassed the entire personnel of large strategic formations, combined units, and units. The principle of teaching troops and staffs modes of most efficient execution of assigned missions in forthcoming combat actions on the basis of creating and playing out possible situation versions in the forthcoming operation became the main principle in training. The commander of the front (army) would determine the objective, tasks, order and sequence, and timetable for organization and conduct of training in the

formations (combined units). Headquarters and the directorate (departments) would plan the subject matter, communicate the instructions of the commanding general, and monitor their execution. Training drills would be rigorously tied in with the character of the forthcoming actions. On the eve of the counter-offensive at Stalingrad, for example, in the 65th Army (Lt Gen P. I. Batov, commanding) 240 hours were allocated to combat and political training. Individual training of arrived replacements was completed by 24 October 1942, and the units proceeded to develop cohesiveness of squads (crews) and platoons. Company and battalion battle drills were conducted on the first days of November, and on 3 November the commanding general of the army held a regimental tactical exercise. Division and regimental headquarters staffs worked on problems of tactical control at command and staff exercises and radio drills.⁵

In preparing for operations, the possibility of utilizing more diversified training methods (explanation, lecture, talk, demonstration, practical work by trainees, self-preparation) and forms (practice drill, battle drill, exercise, live firing) was provided away from active combat operations or during lulls. Emphasis was placed on making training tasks as close as possible to actual combat and on working on training items in a practical manner. Activities pertaining to checking and assisting subordinates were stepped up. Typical in this regard were preparations for the Belorussian offensive operation. Prior to conduct of this operation, for example, headquarters of the armies of the First Baltic Front (Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan, commanding) planned combat training for 20 days (from 1 through 20 June 1944). Units and subunits in a defensive position would be withdrawn into the second echelon and would train on a five-day program, while those which had accomplished redeployment would train for 10 days in their assembly areas. At that same time three-day training conferences for commanders and chiefs of staff of divisions and regiments were held in the large strategic formations, for battalion commanders in the corps, and for company (battery) commanders in the divisions. Preparation of specialists would be accomplished at training conferences in the units. Army Gen A. P. Beloborodov, former commander of the 43d Army, stresses in his memoirs that "officers were dispatched from the army echelon to each division to assist the troops in preparing for an operation.... Exercises were held with the headquarters staffs of rifle corps, divisions and regiments... they sought forms of teamwork and coordination which best met the conditions of combat on marshy woodland terrain.... Exercises would end with a demonstration of practical actions by rifle battalions"⁶ in carrying out the forthcoming combat missions.

Replacements arrived at the Third Belorussian Front (Col Gen -- Army Gen effective 26 June 1944 -- I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, commanding) on the eve of the offensive; only some of these replacements (up to 33-35 percent of enlisted personnel, noncommissioned officers, and officers)⁷ had combat experience. Therefore main attention in training was devoted to familiarizing personnel with the combat situation and study of the specific features of the enemy's actions and local conditions and their influence on the offensive capabilities of the subunits. At the regiment-company level a number of topics pertaining to the offense would be worked on with officer personnel on maps, on the terrain, and on terrain models. At this same time a program of individual training and internal coordination of squads (crews), platoons, companies and

battalions was being organized in the units and combined units. On the Vitebsk axis exercises in the 39th Army (Lt Gen I. I. Lyudnikov, commanding) were held on specially prepared training grounds which were similar in terrain and defensive fortification to that on which the troops would be fighting. Rifle units, self-propelled artillery and tank subunits worked on deploying into combat formations, matters of teamwork and cooperation were coordinated, and methods of penetrating the enemy's tactical zone of defense involving a river-crossing operation were sought. Rifle subunits learned to fight as tank-borne infantry.⁸ This approach to organization of combat training greatly helped achieve successful accomplishment of combat missions.

Preparing for the East Prussian Operation of 1945, Lt Gen K. N. Galitskiy, commander of the 11th Guards Army, conducted drills with the commanders and chiefs of staff of the divisions and corps, commanders of the combat arms and chiefs of services, at which they considered the procedure of coordination of men and weapons when bringing support echelons into action. An army command and staff exercise on the terrain, using communications gear, was also held. Questions pertaining to organizing penetration of a prepared enemy defense were worked out at this exercise. Participating staffs were withdrawn 60-80 km to the rear for this purpose. In addition, 76-hour courses of instruction were organized for officer-specialists of the combat arms. Personnel were trained to storm the Koenigsberg stronghold in conformity with the specific features of the forthcoming offensive. As was specified in army headquarters methods instructions, following were the principal tasks: for rifle subunits -- to teach personnel to execute swift rushes and crawl undetected, negotiate ditches, fences, barricades, enter windows and breaks in walls, deliver fire while moving, kill the enemy from defilade and in buildings, and to consolidate captured strongpoints; for artillery -- to deliver direct fire, continuously to support infantry, swiftly to concentrate fire in the required sectors, and to work in coordination with infantry and tanks; for tank and self-propelled artillery subunits -- to negotiate all types of obstacles, to deliver accurate fire on firing ports, windows and doors of fortified buildings, and to knock out attacking enemy tanks; for combat engineers -- to negotiate and destroy all types of obstacles, to clear the way for infantry, artillery and tanks, and to consolidate captured strongpoints and buildings.

Seven days were allocated for practical work on all these items, with training running 8 hours each day. The time was distributed among training subjects as follows: political training -- 4 hours, tactical training -- 30 hours; weapon training -- 12 hours, and field engineering training -- 10 hours.

Assault teams worked on the tactics of one or several of the following missions in a combined manner, together with attached and supporting personnel and weapons; assault of a fortified enemy position (two drills -- 8 hours), a cluster of buildings from the street side with a simultaneous flanking movement through the backyards (two drills -- 8 hours), a block of buildings from the street and through breaches in the walls (two drills -- 10 hours), and a night assault on a fortified enemy building (one drill -- 4 hours). To aid in training the troops, Gen K. N. Galitskiy ordered that in each unit a defensive position be set up consisting of trenches and permanent-type defensive positions protected by wire entanglements and minefields, as well as a built-up

area with reinforced masonry structures, a system of structural demolition rubble and barricades. Battle drills and exercises were to be held on terrain similar to that occupied by the enemy, with designation of enemy personnel and weapons.⁹

Training facilities fostered to a substantial degree improvement in troop combat training. According to the figures of more than 20 rifle divisions, in 1944-1945 each set up 2-3 training grounds and firing ranges, 5-9 battalion obstacle courses and 1-3 regimental chemical training facilities. Training centers were established in the armies. In the 5th Army, for example, such a center was readied in the course of four days by order of the army commander, Col Gen N. I. Krylov. It contained all models of the weapons and combat equipment of the Soviet Army and the enemy, troop control facilities and gear, special areas for demonstrating flamethrowing and demolition, a fortified infantry battalion defensive area, plus well trained instructors for teaching the trainee groups arriving from the line units, and had a sufficient number of training manuals and exhibits so that each group could go through drills at all training stations in six hours, including all categories of personnel.¹⁰ The training center consisted of 14 units: artillery, enemy equipment, tanks and self-propelled guns, communications gear, chemical, troop engineer equipment, antiaircraft artillery, etc, as well as a training ground (500 meters from them). At the training stations there were a large number of all kinds of display stands, illustrations and other visual aids (maps, tables, diagrams, charts, and posters, showing the combat experience of leading units and sub-units). All this made it possible to accommodate up to 30 training groups of 30-40 men each, that is, up to 1200 men daily. All the army's officers and a significant percentage of noncommissioned officers and enlisted personnel received training. Just in the period from 20 September through 5 October 1944, more than 10,000 officers and noncommissioned officers spent time at the training center.¹¹

/Organization of combat training in the combined units and formations of armored and mechanized troops was characterized by a certain uniqueness./ It was determined, first of all, by location -- they were most frequently located in an area 40-50 km from the forward edge of the battle area; secondly, by the missions they would be performing; and, thirdly, by their composition and frequently the availability of greater time for combat training than was available to rifle troops (from 15 to 40 days). This made it possible to prepare training grounds in advance, to plan and conduct sequential training of troops.

Thirty days were allocated for combat training, for example, in preparing the 2d Guards Tank Army for the Vistula-Oder Operation. On 25 November 1944 the acting commander, Lt Gen A. I. Radziyevskiy, issued an order¹² which specified training tasks and timetable, topic items for troop, command and staff exercises, as well as training exercises for officers. Commanders of combat arms were to draw up detailed instructions on combat training for subordinate units, while corps commanders were to submit by 30 November a combat training plan for December and a summary schedule of training activities for the units and officer personnel for the first 10 days of the month. Training activities were conducted in the units and subunits in the course of the month in conformity

with the schedule and topical plan worked out by army headquarters; up to 70 percent of the time covered by these training activities was allocated to improvement of personnel field proficiency and weapon skills. Political, drill, engineer, chemical and technical training was organized during the remaining hours. Training conferences for specialists lasting from 2 to 3 days were held, plus a number of command and staff exercises with communications gear, half of which were held at night, as well as daily 2-hour staff drills for the purpose of individual training of staff officers in their area of specialization.

The following combat missions were assigned to the combined units of the 3d Guards Tank Army in this operation: advance to a depth of up to 500 km, and penetrate through seven defensive lines set up for the most part along rivers. In preparing for this operation, considerable attention was focused on working at battalion exercises on march and meeting engagements, and advance by tank and motorized rifle subunits in coordination with artillery and air support against a defending adversary, river-crossing operations, and conduct of combat actions as elements of forward detachments. Drills were conducted with tank crews, at which they practiced various modes of crossing rivers: on the ice, fording, across bridges, and employing assault crossing equipment. They worked on full interchangeability of tank crews. The principal forms of training troops in these conditions were battle drills and exercises on terrain similar to that on which combat actions would be fought. The corps and brigades held command and staff exercises on the topic "Actions by armored and mechanized troops combined units with exposed flanks and separated from the main forces." Officer personnel studied communications equipment. Their ability to utilize this equipment was tested (especially radio). More than 10 radio drills were held in the field.¹³ Troop combat training took place during the war in a close link with operational training of general officers, officers and staffs of large strategic formations and combined units, which included study of the fundamentals of operational art, study by assigned personnel of guidance of preparation for and conduct of operations, as well as performance of duties involving maintaining a high degree of troop combat readiness. Command and staff exercises and war games became the principal form of training of command and control agencies during the war. A three-day map war game was conducted at the end of December 1944, for example, at headquarters of the First Belorussian Front. In addition to the front command authorities, participants included commanders, chiefs of staff and artillery commanders of armies, and commanders of independent corps. On the first day the commanding generals of the armies would specify the general plan of the operation, procedure of employment of tanks and organization of teamwork and cooperation with tank armies, as well as the offensive artillery support plan, while on the second day penetration of the defense with subsequent offensive exploitation would be played out on the basis of scenario instructions. On the third day problems of coordination and troop control would be worked on. Devoting special attention to preparation of those battalions designated for conducting reconnaissance in force, as well as assault detachments, the commanding generals of the armies held demonstration exercises with these units as well as methods drills.

The main thing in preparing for the Khingan-Mukden Operation (August 1945) was study of the probable adversary and familiarization with the theater of

military operations, as well as with the experience of combat operations on the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the war with fascist Germany. These tasks were accomplished at training conferences at which lectures were presented, staff drills, command and staff exercises, visits to the field, troop and demonstration exercises were held, and weapons were exhibited, including Japanese. A portion of the time was allocated for independent training of officers and general officers with assignments worked out by the front headquarters staffs. Methods classes were also held on organization of troop combat and political training. Get-togethers were held with the command authorities of the frontier military districts by Generals P. I. Zyr'yanov, A. A. Nikiforov, and others. Pacific Fleet Headquarters held an operational game jointly with First Far Eastern Front Headquarters on the topic "Landing an Operational Assault Force and Fire Support to the Flank of the Maritime Army."¹⁴

/From the very first days of the war it became extremely important promptly to synthesize combat experience and to incorporate it into practical troop training./ Characteristic in this respect are the activities of Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] and the General Staff. Their directives and orders analyzed many questions pertaining to employment of forces and weapons, revealed causes of setbacks, and elaborated demands on the activities of commanders and staffs. Similar work was being done in the fronts and armies. The military council and headquarters of the Western Front, for example, put out in 1941-1942 more than 25 directives, orders, and instructions on adoption of combat experience.

The war provided a great diversity of forms and methods of work on synthesizing and utilizing combat experience. At the field directorate of the Third Belorussian Front, for example, during preparation for the forthcoming combat operations, a conference was held in November 1944 for top-echelon army and corps personnel. The commanding general of the front presented a report at this conference, and the commanders of the combat arms spoke on the results of the Belorussian operation. Questions pertaining to employment of the combat arms were examined in greater detail at training conferences held by the front's commanders of artillery (in October) and armored and mechanized troops (in November), by the rear services chief and chief of engineer troops (in October). The front senior signals officer and chief of chemical troops held conferences based on the materials of past combat engagements.¹⁵

Beneficial conferences were held to synthesize experience in the First Ukrainian Front (6-8 June 1944), the 1st Guards, 2d (October 1944) and 3d Guards Tank (May 1944) armies. Battlefield tours of sites of past battles were effective. At one of these conferences, in September 1944, Col Gen Tank Trps P. S. Rybalko, commander of the 3d Guards Tank Army, discussed for a period of 72 hours the course of combat actions in the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation with corps, brigade and army unit commanders, revealed mistakes and noted positive aspects of commander decisions, and issued appropriate instructions.¹⁶

/Moral-psychological preparation of personnel was a component part of training during the war years./ It was precisely for this reason that the training programs for reserve units and tactical training methods instructions specified

holding periodic "training activities in each regiment on the topic 'Movement into the attack by a reinforced rifle company behind a moving barrage' also in artillery and mortar live-fire areas, with the aim of teaching Red Armymen to operate under shells in flight close to burst points (at a distance of 250-300 meters); teach the men to destroy enemy tanks. For this purpose roll tanks over personnel. All tactical exercises shall end with negotiating obstacles."17

Alongside organization of troop combat training, the military councils of fronts and armies devoted much attention to maintaining a high state of political consciousness, morale, and aggressiveness in personnel, this is logical, for as we know, the following thesis formulated by V. I. Lenin is a universal law of warfare: "Victory in any war is determined in the final analysis by the morale of those masses which shed their blood on the field of battle."18

* * *

Analysis of the experience of training troops, officers, general officers, command and control agencies immediately prior to operations in the Great Patriotic War suggests the following conclusions.

First of all, training constituted an organized and purposeful process of transmission to and assimilation by military personnel of military knowledge, development in them of the skills requisite for practical activities, as well as training and internal coordination of military collectives for the most efficient conduct of combat actions. Its principal organizer was the commander, supported by his staff, political and other control agencies. Training was inseparably linked with military indoctrination.

A trend toward combined training of all combat arms experienced development during the war, which proceeded from the increasingly more complex character of combined-arms combat.

Secondly, training of troops when preparing them for combat actions was grounded on an entire system of principles. The most important of these were the following: Communist party-mindedness and scientific character, teaching that which is necessary in combat, a close interlink between operational training of command personnel and combat training of troops and staffs at the tactical echelon, conscientiousness and aggressiveness, clarity, systematicness and sequence in communicating knowledge and developing skills, and understandability. This presupposed employment of diversified forms and methods of training, taking into account the concrete conditions and specific features of forthcoming combat operations.

The following proved to be the most effective forms in preparing for operations: with command personnel -- brief tactical exercises, officer training exercises, demonstration and instruction methods exercises; with staffs -- staff drills, command and staff exercises; in the line units -- battle drill, specialist training conferences, training activities on specific training topics, and various tactical exercises, including with live firing. Drills (exercises),

practical work, and oral presentation (explanation) were acceptable training methods. One should particularly emphasize that even in conditions of limited time available for preparing troops and staffs, practical exercises in the field were extensively employed.

Third, an important place in practical training of troops and staffs was occupied by comprehensive synthesis and prompt communication to all personnel of combat experience obtained in preceding battles and engagements, as well as accomplishment of tasks of moral-psychological preparation of fighting men.

The experience of the war clearly demonstrated the relationship between the outcome of combat actions and the level of preparedness of participants in an operation. Well-organized military training promoted to a substantial degree the results of combat operations, an increase in the rate of advance, firmness in the defense, and reduction of losses. Confirmed in this connection is the acute need for and practical possibility of organization of combat training of troops and operational training of officers, general officers and staffs in all situation conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. D. F. Ustinov, "Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i" [Selected Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1979, page 38.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 56, List 19176, File 19, Sheet 197-198.
3. TsAMO, Fund 213, List 2003, File 21, Sheet 76.
4. K. A. Meretskoy, "Na sluzhbe narodu" [In the Service of the People], Moscow, Politizdat, 1968, page 237.
5. TsAMO, Fund 220, List 451, File 56, sheets 137-139.
6. "Osvobozhdeniye Belorussii" [The Liberation of Belorussia], 1944, Moscow, Nauka, 1970, page 309.
7. TsAMO, Fund 241, List 2656, File 13, sheets 215-243.
8. Ibid., List 2593, File 509, Sheet 231.
9. For orders on combat training of the troops of the 11th Guards Army prior to the East Prussian Operation, see "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War], Issue 1, Voenizdat, 1947, pp 93-100; Issue 14, 1951, pp 43-46.
10. TsAMO, Fund 241, List 2593, File 513, Sheet 261.
11. Ibid., Sheet 269.

12. Ibid., Fund 307, List 4148, File 191, sheets 181-185.
13. Ibid., File 412, sheets 16-19.
14. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Vol 11, Voenizdat, 1980, page 211.
15. TsAMO, Fund 241, List 32647, File 1, sheets 53-57; List 13834, File 76, sheets 167-183, 225-238.
16. Ibid., Fund 236, List 40394, File 45, sheets 1-17; Fund 315, List 4440, File 212, sheets 1-14.
17. Ibid., Fund 32, List 11318, File 45, Sheet 68.
18. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 41, page 121.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE IN THE USE OF ENGINEER OBSTACLES

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[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War and in the Postwar Period," by Professor and Doctor of Military Sciences Col (Ret) M. Zlatkovskiy and Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col V. Sidorov: "The Employment of Tactical and Operational Obstacles Based on Wartime Experience"]

[Text] In the prewar years considerable attention in Soviet military science was focused on problems of employment of tactical and operational obstacles. Many prominent military engineers and scientists took active part in elaboration of theory of artificial obstacles, including G. G. Nevskiy, M. P. Vorob'yev, and D. M. Karbyshev. The principal points of this theory were reflected in the draft 1941 Field Service Regulations and in manuals on fortifying field positions and constructing operational obstacles.

Employment of artificial obstacles in defensive operations in the prewar years was predetermined by the necessity of having a defense disposed in depth, capable of withstanding attacks by large enemy forces with saturation numbers of artillery and tanks. In a shift to the defense by army front large strategic formations, a forward operational obstacle zone 25-50 km in depth was prescribed, as well as construction of tactical obstacles in the tactical zone of defense and operational obstacles at operational depth. Their total extent (in depth) was to be 100-200 km. In addition to mining the terrain in important sectors, it was necessary to prepare for demolition all roads, man-made structures, industrial enterprises, etc.¹

The volume and character of operational obstacles was to be determined by a plan ratified by the army (front) commander in conformity with the general plan of the operation.

It was recommended that mobile engineer reserves, which were an element of artillery-antitank reserves, be employed to beef up obstacles in the course of the engagement and operation.² Questions pertaining to their employment, however, did not go beyond the framework of theoretical recommendations. In the offense problems of utilization of obstacles were settled taking into account the character of the offensive operation in depth. It was believed that as a

result of deep penetration to operational depth of the enemy's defense, it was necessary to establish a zone of obstacles on the flanks of the army (front) breakthrough exploitation echelon. It was stated in a number of documents that obstacles can also be employed in the final stage of an operation when consolidating seized positions.

As a result, prior to the war Soviet engineer troops had a sufficiently elaborated theory of obstacles. The commencement of the Great Patriotic War signalled the beginning of a new and important stage in development of theory and practice of employment of engineer obstacles, both in defensive and offensive operations of Soviet forces.

Resolution of the problem of employment of obstacles in defensive operations during the war years found expression in creation of a powerful and highly effective system of artificial obstacles, which was defined as the aggregate of minefield, nonexplosive and composite obstacles constructed in the defensive zones of combined units and large strategic formations in conformity with the general plan of the operation.³ Its development is closely linked with the evolution of forms and modes of conducting defense, increase in the capabilities of industry to mass-produce landmines and other engineer explosive devices, and with amassing of experience in employment of obstacles during military operations.

At the beginning of the war, when the fronts and armies were shifting to defense on a broad front, and when there was an extremely limited availability of engineer personnel and equipment, all troop efforts, including engineer troops, were focused on holding the tactical zone. In these conditions construction of obstacles at operational depth was in certain instances carried out on the orders of higher command authorities. For example, construction of obstacles in important defensive sectors of the Western Front from the end of June to mid-July 1941 was accomplished by the resources of three obstacle construction detachments, assigned by order of the chief of the Main Military Engineer Directorate of the Soviet Army.

Subsequently, in order to achieve more efficient employment of engineer personnel and equipment, matters pertaining to employment of obstacles began to be reflected in plans of defensive operations and other guideline documents of the fronts and armies. The plan of the defensive operation of the Western Front drawn up in September 1941, for example, specified mining roads to the depth of the tactical order of battle of the armies, and construction of obstacles in the defensive areas of the forward-echelon combined units in the security zone and ahead of the forward positions. It was not possible, however, to accomplish all tasks pertaining to constructing obstacles. Due to a lack of time and engineer equipment, obstacles at operational depth had not been adequately developed by the commencement of the enemy's offensive on Moscow.

The obstacle system at Moscow was improved in November 1941. Particular attention was focused on achieving maximum saturation of the tactical zone with obstacles of all types, with the aim of making penetration more difficult. Toward this end, obstacles were constructed ahead of the forward positions and to the depth of the forward-echelon regiments by the personnel and resources

of the units and combined units of the principal combat arms and combat engineer subunits, and by the personnel and resources of army engineer units at defense depth of the forward-echelon divisions.

An important role in constructing operational obstacles, which were built up in the course of the defensive battles at Moscow, was played by two operational engineer groups formed by decision of Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] effective 17 November 1941. They contained 15 engineer and combat engineer battalions.

Preparations to demolish road structures on the main highways in the operational rear of the front to a depth of up to 50-70 km were conducted by the personnel of 10 obstacle construction detachments specially formed in Moscow (50 men each).⁴

In constructing obstacles in the course of the defensive battles at Moscow, principal attention was focused on massing them on the main axes of the enemy's advance. This, in conjunction with other measures, made it possible sharply to reduce the enemy's rate of advance and to contain his mobile forces. At the same time we should note that the density of mining of likely lines of tank approach was low even in the zone of the Western Front (not more than 150-200 mines per kilometer of frontage.)⁵ The shortage of landmines, however, was compensated to a significant degree by the construction in the defensive areas of combined units and large strategic formations of a large number of ditches, sidehill cuts, abatis and other unmined obstacles.

In the first period of the war command-fire mines, command-fire antitank and antipersonnel minefields, and electrified obstacles were successfully employed on a number of fronts in the tactical and operational obstacle system. The tasks of constructing, maintaining and operating them were assigned to special mine-laying platoons and electrotechnical companies. During the period of the defense of Moscow, a Special Operations Directorate was formed, which joined these subunits and performed important tasks pertaining to construction of command-fire obstacles on all main roads approaching Moscow from the west. Subsequently special-purpose RSHC [Reserve of the Supreme High Command] combat engineer brigades handled these tasks.

Employment of obstacles in the defensive period of the battle of Stalingrad was of a unique character. Obstacles, for the most part minefields, were constructed in the forward defense area to a depth of 20-25 km and ahead of the main line of resistance. Additional construction of obstacles at operational depth was performed during the defensive battle by the manpower of RSHC and front operational obstacle construction groups.

The scale of employment of obstacles in preparing for the defense at Stalingrad is evident from the following figures. By 30 July 1942 the 62d Army had placed 31,000 antitank and 20,000 antipersonnel mines. Average mine density in the army's defensive area was 345 antitank and 217 antipersonnel mines per kilometer of frontage.⁶

An important role in thwarting attacks by the enemy's 4th Panzer Army was played by the RSHC operational engineer obstacle construction group. In the

course of the month of August this group, consisting of four combat engineer battalions, laid 140,000 mines, 80 demolition charges, and blew up 19 bridges. The enemy lost 53 tanks and a large quantity of other combat equipment in minefields laid by this group.⁷

In the second period of the Great Patriotic War, employment of tactical and operational obstacles in defensive operations of Soviet forces experienced further development. The multifaceted experience of their employment was synthesized and formally presented in the draft Field Service Regulations of 1943, the General Staff instructions on reconnoitering and construction of defensive lines dated 27 April 1943, and the Hq SHC order entitled "On Employment and Crossing of Minefields," dated 2 July 1943.

These documents stipulated that when fronts shifted to the defense, it was mandatory to design and construct formidable artificial obstacle systems to the entire depth of their tactical order of battle. The front's obstacle system began to be sharply divided into three zones -- tactical (tactical obstacles would be constructed in this zone), army and front (operational obstacles would be placed in these zones). The depth of these zones was as follows: tactical -- 25-30 km; army -- 30 km; front -- up to 90 km. In connection with a sharp increase in the production of engineer munitions, especially antitank and antipersonnel mines, mine obstacles became the principal obstacle system, in the form of multiple-row and deep antitank and antipersonnel minefields, which would be laid primarily ahead of the main line of resistance. In particularly important sectors, in order to knock out heavy tanks, minefields would be laid in the form of clusters consisting of two or more mines. In the combined units and operational formations, mobile obstacle construction detachments (MOD) would be formed in advance, containing the following: in the regiment -- up to a combat engineer platoon; in the division -- up to a combat engineer company; in the army -- up to an engineer battalion; in the front -- up to a brigade. They became an integral element of the combat formations of units and combined units and the tactical order of battle of large strategic formations.

This obstacle system experienced its fullest practical embodiment in preparing for and in conduct of defense in the battle of Kursk. At the beginning of the defensive battle, for example, 237,000 antitank and 162,000 antipersonnel mines, 146 delayed-action mines, 63 command-fire mines, and 305 km of wire entanglements had been placed in constructing tactical and operational obstacles in the defensive zone of the Central Front (300 km).

Mine density on the axes of anticipated enemy attack reached the following overall densities in the zone of the Central Front: 1600 antitank and up to 1000 antipersonnel mines per km of frontage, and in the defensive zone of the Voronezh Front -- 1400 antitank and 1200 antipersonnel mines per kilometer of frontage.⁸

Enemy losses caused by obstacles in the zones of the two fronts totaled as many as 630 pieces of armored equipment. The tactical and operational obstacle system in defensive operations in the battle of Kursk ensured to an adequate degree a high stability of the defense and its capability to withstand attacks by formidable enemy tank forces.

Tactical obstacles were constructed by front-line and army engineer units and (to a significant degree) by forward-echelon combined unit reinforcement units.

Operational obstacles were constructed and maintained by units and combined units of the engineer troops of the front (army) and RSHC.

In the third period of the war, when the strategic initiative was completely in the hands of the Soviet Army, Soviet troops would shift to the defense as a rule following completion of major offensive operations, with the objective of consolidating achieved success and amassing men and equipment for the succeeding offensive. In these conditions the system of tactical and operational obstacles of the fronts underwent certain changes. They consisted in reducing overall system depth and scale of advance mine laying at operational depth. For example, the obstacle system of the Second Ukrainian Front in the summer of 1944 was prepared to the depth of the tactical order of battle of the forward-echelon armies (up to 25-30 km), and minefields in the tactical zone were laid only in the main defensive zone.¹⁰ If it became necessary rapidly to build up obstacles in threatened sectors, the main grouping of engineer troops of the armies and fronts would be extensively enlisted in addition to mobile obstacle detachments. This made it possible, for example, in the course of the Balaton defensive operation to increase density of antitank mines from 870 to 2700, and antipersonnel mines from 646 to 2500 per kilometer of frontage.

In the course of the Great Patriotic War, tactical and operational obstacles were also extensively employed in the offensive operations of Soviet forces.

The first substantial experience in employment of obstacles within the framework of engineer support of offensive operations was obtained in the course of the counteroffensive and general offensive at Moscow. At this time offensive operations of Soviet forces were conducted as a rule in conditions of aggressive enemy actions. The presence of panzer combined units in the defending enemy force groupings enabled the latter to execute swift maneuver in order to mount counterthrusts into the flanks of our forces. Therefore when turning to the offensive, the commanders of the armies and fronts were forced to take measures to achieve rapid consolidation of attained positions and to cover the flanks of the advancing troops against counterattacking enemy tanks. In particular, the commanders of a number of armies of the Western Front were compelled to accomplish such tasks. For example, two engineer battalions, which laid 15,000 antitank and antipersonnel mines, were employed in the 16th Army to cover the left flank of the battle group.¹¹ The army commander had in reserve a "mobile army consolidation group," consisting of an army engineer battalion. Its mission was to construct obstacles in the system of strongpoints constructed for the purpose of consolidating our position at important points as the army combined units advanced.

We must emphasize that in the course of an offensive obstacles would be constructed essentially only during the period of penetration of the enemy's tactical zone of defense. When large strategic formations shifted to pursuit of the retreating enemy, established reserves of obstacle construction materiel would remain in the rear due to a lack of motor transport and shortage of engineer personnel for performing obstacle clearing and road repair and construction operations.

In the second period of the war such problems as the following arose and required solution: employment of obstacles in repelling enemy counterattacks and counterthrusts during penetration of the defense and engagement of mobile groups of armies and fronts into the breach, during combat with relieving and encircled enemy forces, and during consolidation of occupied positions in the concluding stage of offensive operations.

Mobile engineer reserves consisting of 1-2 combat engineer platoons per division, formed in the forward-echelon divisions of the armies, were enlisted in the course of penetration of the enemy's tactical zone of defense to construct obstacles with the objective of repulsing counterattacks; these reserves frequently operated jointly with the forward-echelon rifle regiments of combined units.

The problem of protecting with obstacles the flanks of mobile task forces of armies and fronts was not yet fully resolved in the second period of the war. In the counteroffensive at Stalingrad, for example, in most cases the engineer units assigned to these missions fell behind due to lack of motor transport.

In this period of the war valuable experience was acquired in employing obstacles in the concluding stage of operations conducted with the objective of circling large enemy force groupings. Of the greatest interest in this respect is the Soviet counteroffensive in the Battle of Stalingrad.

On the inner perimeter of encirclement boundaries between rifle divisions and armies were protected by minefields, which contained 85,000 antitank and anti-personnel mines. Mobile obstacle detachments, transporting by truck the required number of mines and explosives, were organized to maneuver obstacles.

On the outer envelopment perimeter, obstacles were constructed as troops shifted to the defense. By 1 December 1942 more than 20,000 antitank and anti-personnel mines had been laid for this purpose just by the 44th Special-Purpose Engineer Brigade of the Southwestern Front.

During combat with the relieving enemy force, the main efforts of the engineer troops of the Stalingrad Front were concentrated on beefing up obstacles in the threatened sectors. In the defensive area of the 51st Army, for example, in the Kotel'nikov sector, during the course of repelling enemy attacks engineer troops laid 13,800 antitank mines, more than 2000 antipersonnel mines, and 1150 demolition charges.¹² The constructed obstacles helped the defending troops inflict substantial casualties and equipment losses on the enemy and sharply to reduce the enemy's rate of advance. This made it possible to concentrate in a timely manner the operational reserves required to rout the penetrating enemy force.

Questions pertaining to employment of engineer obstacles in offensive operations were resolved most fully in the third period of the war.

As experience showed, the scale of employment of obstacles in penetrating the enemy's defense and engaging mobile task forces of armies and fronts was determined by the strength and aggressiveness of the enemy's tactical and operational

reserves and by the degree to which they were effectively hit at the first stage of the operation.

During the third period of the war, strong forward echelons of operational formations, capable of successfully repulsing counterattacks by enemy reserves, were employed to break through the enemy's tactical zone of defense. Therefore in most cases the employment of engineer assets of the divisions and corps was sufficient for maneuvering obstacles at this stage of operations. In the East Prussia Operation, for example, during penetration of the tactical zone of defense, combat engineers of the combined units of the battle group of the Second Belorussian Front laid approximately 3000 antitank mines.¹³

When committing mobile task forces of fronts to battle, it was important to protect their flanks with obstacles. In the L'vov-Sandomierz Operation of the First Ukrainian Front, for example, the flanks of the 3d Guards Tank Army, when it was engaged into the breach, were protected by mobile obstacle detachments of the front (the 42d Motorized Combat Engineer Brigade) and the 60th Army (engineer and combat engineer battalions). These detachments placed on the flanks of the large strategic formation 11,500 antitank mines, 117 command-fire mines, and 9 kilometers of electrified obstacles.

During preparation for the Vistula-Oder Operation, the First Ukrainian Front ordered the 42d Motorized Engineer and 16th Assault Combat Engineer brigades to move forward and construct operational obstacles on the flanks of a mobile task force consisting of the 3d Guards and 4th Tank armies.

Tactical and operational obstacles were also extensively employed in combat against encircled and relieving enemy forces. Mobile obstacle detachments and engineer reserves of the armies and fronts were enlisted to perform these missions. In the East Prussian Operation, for example, the 33d Motorized Engineer Brigade was redeployed at the beginning of February 1945 to the zone of the 5th Tank Army of the Second Belorussian Front, with the mission of thwarting attempts by the enemy to break out of encirclement by attacking from the Braunsberg area in the direction of Elbing. The engineers of this brigade laid 24 minefields. In the course of this operation a total of 20,000 antitank and 1500 antipersonnel mines were laid, 27 km of electrified obstacles were constructed, and 27 bridges were prepared for demolition in the zone of this front on the inner perimeter of envelopment.¹⁴ As a result the enemy sustained heavy losses. His attempt to break out of the noose of encirclement was thwarted.

The most complex problem proved to be the construction of obstacles when repulsing enemy counterthrusts in the concluding stage of offensive operations. This was due to the fact that mobile obstacle detachments had fallen behind (as a consequence of the low degree of their motorization) and by inadequate quantities of engineer munitions in the forward echelon of advancing formations. In these conditions, after the forward detachments had reached the assigned objective, those mines available in the combined units were employed for the most part to lay minefields on determined axes of enemy counterattacks and counterthrusts, with mines removed and shifted again and again (when needed) to new axes. When large strategic formations shifted to the defense upon

conclusion of an offensive operation, the principal manpower of their engineer troops would be engaged in constructing obstacles at the attained point.

In summarizing, we should first of all stress that during the years of the Great Patriotic War efficient employment of tactical and operational obstacles was one of the most important tasks of engineer support of troop combat operations.

The artificial obstacle system was continuously being improved both in the defense and offense. Its development in the course of the war proceeded in the direction of massing obstacles on the main axes of advance of enemy force groupings; expansion of the scale of maneuver of obstacles (especially landmines) and employment of mobile obstacle detachments which, beginning with the battle of Kursk, became an integral element of the tactical order of battle of large strategic formations and of the combat formation of units and combined units; increase in the density of mine laying; decrease in the overall depth of construction of obstacles when large strategic formations were shifting to the defense after completion of an offensive operation.

Control of engineer troops enlisted to construct tactical and operational obstacles, both in the defense and offense, was centralized beginning in the middle of the first period of the war. In the front they were controlled by the headquarters obstacle department, in the army -- by the engineer troops deputy chief of staff, and in the combined unit and units -- by the appropriate engineer chiefs. A shift from battalion to brigade organization of engineer troops helped increase efficiency of control of engineer troops personnel and equipment.

Many of the principles of employment of tactical and operational obstacles in the war years have retained their pertinence in present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Instruktsiya po ustroystvu operativnykh zagrazhdeniy" [Instructions on Construction of Operational Obstacles], Voenizdat, 1941, page 5.
2. V. M. Balabanov, "PTO v osnovnykh vidakh boya" [Antitank Defense in the Principal Types of Engagement], Voenizdat, 1941, page 143.
3. "Sbornik boyevykh dokumentov Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Collection of Combat Documents of the Great Patriotic War], Issue 5, Moscow, 1947, page 48.
4. "Inzhenernyye voyska v boyakh za Sovetskuyu Rodinu" [Engineer Troops in Battles for the Soviet Homeland], Voenizdat, 1970, pp 97, 99.
5. Ibid., page 95.
6. Ibid., page 129.

7. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 69, List 14069, File 117, Sheet 11.
8. "Inzhenernyye voyska...", op. cit., pp 157-158.
9. Footnote omitted.
10. TsAMO, Fund 69, List 12114, File 666, sheets 3-4.
11. Ibid., List 12111, File 715, sheets 106-107.
12. "Inzhenernyye voyska...", op. cit., pp 143-144.
13. TsAMO, Fund 69, List 383818, File 17, Sheet 87.
14. Ibid., List 12111, File 3590, Sheet 93.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE ON COOPERATION WITH PARTISAN FORCES

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[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War and in the Postwar Period," by Candidate of Historical Sciences V. Perezhogin: "Cooperation of Partisans with troops in the Battle of Moscow"]

[Text] Thanks to the selfless work of the Communist Party, the partisan movement took on from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War an organizationally defined and purposeful character. The civilian population in the occupied areas was rising up increasingly more aggressively to a dedicated struggle against the fascist invaders. By the beginning of the defensive battle at Moscow, the partisan movement had become considerably strengthened. In fascist-occupied areas of Smolenskaya Oblast, partisan strength had tripled by this time, for example, had more than tripled in Orlovskaya Oblast, and had almost doubled in Belorussia. More than 26,000 partisans were operating on occupied territory in Kalininskaya, Moskovskaya, Smolenskaya, Orlovskaya, Tul'skaya, and part of Kurskaya Oblast. More than 40,000 fighting men battled in that same area during the Soviet offensive. Underground oblast, district, rayon, and city party committees directly guided the partisans.

Simultaneously with growth in numerical strength, there was taking place a strengthening of partisan detachments, their organizational structure was being improved, and direction of partisan units was being concentrated in the hands of an integrated command. This gave partisan combat actions greater organization and purposefulness.

In the fronts and armies, military councils directly handled organization and leadership of the partisan movement locally. In August-September 1941 departments were established under the political directorates of the fronts, and sections under the political departments of the armies; these directed party-political work among the civilian population, partisans and Soviet Army units operating on enemy-held territory. Army agencies of command and control of the partisan movement and oblast party committees collaborated closely with one another: party oblast committees maintained representatives at political agencies, and in addition a number of oblast committee secretaries served as members of military councils of fronts and armies. All this created conditions for closer and more extensive coordination between partisans and Soviet Army units.

The weakest link in organization of coordination was communications. Due to a shortage of portable radio sets, communications between partisan detachments and regular forces were maintained primarily by couriers who periodically crossed the battle lines. Numerous detachments operating deep behind enemy lines were forced, due to lack of communications with the Soviet-held heartland, frequently to fight without adequate coordination with the plans of the front command authorities, guided only by the general missions assigned to the partisans by the Communist Party and Soviet Government.

In the period of defensive engagements at Moscow, the main efforts of the partisans were focused on killing enemy personnel and destroying combat equipment, as well as conduct of reconnaissance. More than 30 partisan detachments, for example, were operating in the defensive area of the 16th Army. The army command recommended that partisans concentrate main efforts on disorganizing movement of enemy troops by rail lines and highways leading to Moscow. Communication codes were prepared, frequencies and transmitting times established for detachments possessing radios. Communications were maintained only by couriers, however, with the majority of party agencies and partisan detachments.¹

Carrying out the tasks assigned by the command authorities, sabotage groups of partisan detachments initiated aggressive activities. On 20 October, for example, demolition personnel of the 3d Partisan Detachment of Ostashevskiy Rayon (V. F. Proskunin, commanding; A. V. Goryachev, commissar) blew up the Stanovichchenskiy bridge, as a result of which the forward movement of enemy columns was halted for four days. The 2d Partisan Detachment of Ostashevskiy Rayon, under the command of I. Ye. Shaposhnikov, mined the Ostashevo-Kuz'minskoye road, and two German armored cars and a staff bus, which were attempting to reach Volokolamsk by a circuitous route, were destroyed. On 11 November partisans of that same detachment, setting up an ambush between the villages of Akulovo and Sudnikovo, attacked with grenades a truck filled with soldiers, an armored car, and three motorcycles. Spotting on 14 November an enemy motorized infantry column advancing toward Moscow, they not only stopped it but inflicted heavy damage.²

Approximately 80 partisan detachments and groups were operating in the zone of the Kalinin Front.³ Their actions were being coordinated by representatives of the Kalininskaya Oblast party committee attached to front and army headquarters. In November the front command held a special conference for oblast party organization leaders, at which they summarized accomplished results and specified further measures to expand the popular struggle on occupied territory in Kalininskaya Oblast.

Only three of the 72 partisan detachments operating on occupied territory in Orlovskaya Oblast had radios. More than 100 couriers, carrying specific instructions from the front command authorities and the Orlovskaya Oblast party committee were sent behind enemy lines in the zone of the Bryansk Front to strengthen control of partisan combat actions on the enemy's lines of communication.⁴ Carrying out assigned missions, in October the men of the Klintsy partisan detachment demolished two bridges and a ferry on the Iput' River, and derailed two enemy trains plus an armored train on the rail line between

Novozybkov and Unecha. Partisans of the Ul'yanovsk detachment (A. D. Andrianov; commanding; I. I. Soldatov, commissar) destroyed all bridges on the Zhizdra, Vytebet', and Resseta River, and mined the roads leading to Bryansk, Orel, Zhizdra, Kozel'sk, and Sukhinichi. As a result the Hitlerites were forced to place signs along some road stretches, bearing the warning: "Do not proceed, partisans in the area."⁵

The partisans also greatly assisted the troops of the Soviet Army by the fact that, penetrating into the enemy's troop dispositions, they obtained intelligence on the deployment of the enemy's units, headquarters, airfields, and supply depots. They sent back through the front lines captured headquarters documents, diagrams of defensive works, as well as captured Hitlerites. For example, partisans in Mozhayskiy Rayon continuously informed Western Front Headquarters on enemy troop movements along the Minsk-Mozhaysk-Moscow main highway. They succeeded in spotting a large concentration of panzer troops in the Klement'yev-Gorbovo-Ruza area. On the basis of intelligence provided by the Volokolamsk partisans, on 18-20 October the artillery of the 16th Army delivered several periods of heavy shelling on a concentration of enemy tanks which had halted in Stanovishchi and Ostashev due to lack of fuel.⁶

By the commencement of the counteroffensive at Moscow, Orel partisans had collected and transmitted to the Soviet command authorities intelligence on 148 locations where enemy troops were disposed and concentrated, on the location of dozens of airfields and landing strips, as well as the location of headquarters of enemy combined units and units.⁷ Tula partisans reported the concentration of enemy motorized units and supply trains in 365 inhabited localities, the deployment of repair and fueling facilities at 34 locations, as well as the location of 16 airfields and airstrips and a large number of headquarters and weapon emplacements.⁸

News that the Soviet Army had commenced a counteroffensive at Moscow brought the partisans a new infusion of energy. In order better to coordinate their combat actions and to organize coordination with the advancing troops in conformity with the altered situation, the military councils of the fronts and armies dispatched to them a group of party and military officials. In mid-January 1942, for example, the military council of the 10th Army infiltrated behind enemy lines an army political department official, battalion commissar M. I. Chazov. On 28 January he held in the community of Ivot a conference of commanders and commissars of partisan detachments of Dyat'kovskiy Rayon, which was attended by 12 persons. The army representative informed the partisan leaders on the state of affairs on the front and briefed them on the missions assigned to them by the command authorities. A plan of joint actions was formulated at the conference. All rail lines and highways running from Bryansk to Zhizdra, Bukan', Lyudinovo, Dyat'kovo and Roslavl' were assigned to separate partisan detachments. An integrated headquarters of partisan detachments, headed by N. M. Sentyurin, commander of the Dyat'kovo detachment, was formed to coordinate the combat actions of the detachments and to organize teamwork and cooperation with the regular units.⁹

A similar conference was held on 31 January in the community of Bytosh', attended by the commanders and commissars of the Bytosh', Zhukovskiy, Lyudinovskiy,

Rognedinskiy and other partisan detachments in Orlovskaya and Smolenskaya oblasts. Each partisan detachment received specific combat missions at this conference. For example, the detachment of N. V. Kulikov and the Zhukovskiy partisan detachment were to operate along the Bryansk-Roslavl' highway, the Bytosh' and Lyudinovskiy detachments were to sever the enemy's avenues of approach and retreat from Lyudinovo to Zhizdra and Dyat'kovo, while the Rognedinskiy and Butchinskiy detachments were to shut off enemy avenues of retreat along the Kirov-Roslavl' rail line. All detachments possessing radios were briefed on maintaining radio communications with army headquarters. These measures helped increase the activeness of partisan detachments.¹⁰

In January and at the beginning of February 1942 political directorate officials battalion commissars Razgovorov and Anan'yev were infiltrated behind enemy lines by Western Front Headquarters to organize coordination with partisan detachments in Smolenskaya Oblast; these two officials, together with authorized agents of the Smolenskaya Oblast party committee, held conferences with commanders and commissars of partisan detachments and briefed them on missions connected with the landing of an airborne assault force in Znamenskiy Rayon.¹¹

In April 1942 the commander of the Western Front informed the Supreme Commander that communications had been established with 51 partisan detachments totaling approximately 19,000 men. Army Gen G. K. Zhukov reported to Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC] that headquarters had been established in order to improve control of the detachments: under Colonel Moskalik, combining the FD and Lazo regiments; under Capt G. I. Orlov, joining the Dyat'kovo detachments; under Capt A. N. Galyug, combining the detachments of Kirovskiy Rayon. For this same purpose a special section was established at front headquarters, maintaining communication with the Smolenskaya and Orlovskaya oblast committees of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and other interested agencies.

The following missions were assigned to the detachments: to operate on the enemy's lines of communication, to attack individual installations and sub-units, and to mount raids for the purpose of thwarting the transport and concentration of troops and to destroy equipment and kill enemy personnel. In addition, the detachments were assigned intelligence-gathering missions.¹² On the whole the partisans successfully accomplished the assigned missions.

More than 70 partisan detachments from Kalininskaya, Smolenskaya, and Vitebskaya oblasts worked in coordination with the advancing troops of the Kalinin Front. On the instructions of the command authorities of the 22d Army, the Andreapol' partisan detachment (I. M. Kruglov, commanding; I. S. Borisov, commissar) performed acts of sabotage on enemy-controlled highways and rail lines. On 3 January 1942 partisans blew up a bridge at Toropetskiy Bol'shak and destroyed five trucks; on 4 January they derailed a military train 4 kilometers from Andreapol' Station, and on 5 January they destroyed a bridge across the Western Dvina by the village of Kozlovo. The detachment assigned guides, who knew the area well and who during the offensive led Soviet Army units to the Hitlerite dispositions. Partisans fought side by side with the regular troops in engagements to capture the villages of Zakhar'ino, Velichkovo, and Dugi. A partisan detachment entered Andreapol' at the same time as the regular troops.¹³

Organization and execution of teamwork and cooperation between the Smolensk partisans and the group of forces under the command of Gen P. A. Belov are of considerable interest.

In January 1942, at the moment the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps entered Smolenskaya Oblast and an airborne assault force was dropped (two battalions of the 201st Airborne Brigade of the 5th Airborne Corps, and the 250th Rifle Regiment), 67 partisan detachments totaling approximately 17,000 men were operating in the oblast. At the request of the corps command, partisans assumed the task, jointly with paratroopers, of securing the boundaries of a triangular area running Vyaz'ma-Smolensk-Zanoznaya station, within which were disposed the troops of Gen P. A. Belov's group, which were preparing for an offensive on Vyaz'ma.

The territory occupied by regular units was more than 400 km in perimeter. On the north it was protected by detachments from the Vadinskiy and North-western partisan regions, on the south by Yel'ninskiy region detachments, and on the west and east by detachments from the Dorogobuzhskiy region. The Hitlerites repeatedly tried to capture liberated areas. Combat continued without a halt on the boundaries of the partisan regions. The partisans held their positions, however, as long as P. A. Belov's group was behind enemy lines. This facilitated accomplishment of the principal mission by the regular units.

Prolonged close coordination between partisans and regular troops influenced the partisan forces control system as well as their organizational structure. In order to improve coordination of combat operations of regular troops and partisans, by decision of the command authorities of the Western Front and the Smolenskaya Oblast party committee, all partisan detachments in the area south of Vyaz'ma were placed under the command of Gen P. A. Belov. Larger units began to be formed in place of the great many small detachments and groups: the V. I. Voronchenko division (5200 men), partisan regiments imeni S. Lazo (V. V. Kazubskiy, commanding; 2100 men), imeni 24th anniversary of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (F. D. Gnezdilov, commanding; 2300 men), a regiment under the command of Maj V. V. Zhabo (1600 men), etc.¹⁴

Joint combat operations by partisans and the troops of General Belov's group were quite diversified. For a period of five months the partisans, together with cavalymen and paratroopers, were fighting offensive engagements and repulsing enemy attacks, smashing enemy headquarters and garrisons, and destroying lines of communication. On 10 February 1942, for example, they captured the Morshanovo-Dyagilevo area and overran the headquarters of the German 5th Panzer Division, while in mid-March they encircled a large enemy garrison at Ugra Station. To wipe out this garrison, the group command re-deployed part of its forces and organized a joint attack. The enemy sustained heavy losses. As a result of systematic acts of sabotage along rail lines, rail traffic between Zanoznaya Station and Vyaz'ma was totally interdicted for four months -- from early in February to the end of May. The stretch of rail line between Zanoznaya and Smolensk was also frequently put out of commission, as a result of which it was little used by the enemy.

The extended presence of a 7000 man group of Soviet forces behind enemy lines and intense combat operations required replenishment of personnel and resupply of weapons and ammunition, rations and animal feed. Partisans and underground party agencies were enormously helpful in accomplishing these tasks.

When the command authorities of the Western Front gave Gen P. A. Belov permission partially to bring the corps divisions up to strength with partisans and civilians from the occupied areas, reestablished local agencies of Soviet authority in liberated areas energetically set about a mobilization effort. As a result 11,000 replacements were obtained for the regular units. The personnel of the "Northern Bear" partisan detachment, numbering 861 men, all joined the 329th Rifle Division.¹⁵

Thus partisan combat activities in the course of the battle of Moscow were subordinated to accomplishment of the missions which were being performed by the regular troops. These activities included both fighting joint engagements, providing the troops with intelligence, and disorganizing enemy transport movements. The enemy was forced to assign considerable forces to combat the partisans and to guard military installations. Close coordination between partisans and regular units of the Soviet Army was greatly facilitated and influenced by the fact that the bases of the partisan detachments were frequently located close to the forward positions of the combat-engaged troops.

Partisan combat actions revealed the enormous potential for utilization of partisan forces for the benefit of regular troops. In six and a half months of intensive fighting in the Moscow area, the partisans of Kalininskaya, Smolenskaya, Moskovskaya, Tul'skaya, Orlovskaya, and Kurskaya (in part) oblasts killed more than 30,000 enemy officers and men and destroyed more than 2000 trucks carrying military supplies, more than 200 tanks and armored vehicles, approximately 70 artillery pieces, 66 aircraft, blew up 170 supply depots containing arms, ammunition and food supplies, more than 400 bridges on enemy lines of communication, and derailed 40 enemy trains carrying personnel and equipment.¹⁷

Experience in coordinating actions between partisans and regular forces indicated that direct subordination of partisan detachments to commanders of regular units and their employment as regular troops are not always warranted. "The most expedient is the second mode of cooperation, where partisan detachments operate independently within a specific area, performing a single general mission assigned by the highest command echelon. With this arrangement they are not bound in their actions, employ methods of combating the enemy which are characteristic of them alone, and display much greater initiative and resourcefulness in carrying out their assigned missions."¹⁸ This conclusion was reached, for example, by headquarters of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Practical combat experience showed that precise direction of partisan detachments was organized only when they were equipped with radio communications gear. Communications by messengers in offensive operations in conditions of bad or impassable roads and rapid troop advance failed to produce positive results. Detachment commanders were being faced increasingly more persistently with the question of the necessity of centralizing direction of the partisan movement. The experience of the fighting at Moscow greatly promoted creation

of new forms of organization and control of partisan forces. On 30 May 1942 a Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement was formed under Hq SHC, while partisan movement front headquarters were established under the military councils of the fronts.

The homeland highly praised the contribution made by Soviet partisans to the defeat of the German-fascist forces at Moscow. At that time 463 partisans from Moskovskaya Oblast were awarded medals and decorations. Six Soviet patriots -- M. A. Gur'yanov, Z. A. Kosmodem'yanskaya, I. N. Kuzin, S. I. Solntsev, Ye. I. Chaykina, and A. P. Chekalin -- were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 208, List 2526, File 75, sheets 155-156.
2. "Narodnyye mstiteli" [People's Avengers], Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1961, pp 47, 184, 204, 205.
3. TsAMO, Fund 213, List 2016, File 91, Sheet 320.
4. TsPA IML [Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism], Fund 69, List 1, File 61, sheets 1, 11, 12.
5. TsAMO, Fund 202, List 36, File 80, Sheet 248.
6. "Narodnyye...", op. cit., pp 60, 90.
7. TsPA IML, Fund 69, List 1, File 61, Sheet 8.
8. "Bitva za Tulu" [The Battle of Tula], Priokskoye Kn. Izd-vo, 1969, page 217.
9. TsAMO, Fund 353, List 5879, File 4, Sheet 251.
10. Ibid., File 99, sheets 39, 91, 92.
11. TsAMO, Fund 32, List 11289, File 247, Sheet 143.
12. Ibid., Fund 208, List 2513, File 213, Sheet 4.
13. Ibid., Fund 213, List 2016, File 110, sheets 141, 142, 169.
14. TsAMO, Fund 208, List 2513, File 213, sheets 1-4.
15. P. A. Belov, "Za nami Moskva" [Behind Us Lies Moscow], Voenizdat, 1963, pp 259, 264.
16. Footnote omitted.

17. Calculated according to figures in "Narodnyye...", op. cit., pp 128, 129; "Bitva za Tulu," op. cit., pp 233, 234; "Partizany bryanshchiny" [Partisans of Bryanskaya Oblast], Priokskoye Kn. Izd-vo, 1970, page 120; "Kurskaya Oblast v period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov" [Kurskaya Oblast in the Period of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945. Collection of Documents and Materials], Vol 1, Kursk, 1960, page 239; TsAMO SSSR, Fund 213, List 2016, File 91, sheets 329, 393.
18. TsAMO, Fund 208, List 2511, File 1461, Sheet 199.

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WARTIME EXPERIENCE ON TANK UNIT BREAKTHROUGH OPERATIONS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 33-40

[Article, published under the heading "Soviet Art of Warfare in the Great Patriotic War and in the Postwar Period," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Col N. Kireyev: "The Employment of Tank Subunits and Units in the Penetration of the Enemy Defense"]

[Text] During the years of the Great Patriotic War tank units and subunits amassed a wealth of experience in penetrating a prepared and hasty enemy defense. In the postwar period this experience was extensively employed in practical troop training, and modes of penetration experienced further development. This was dictated by a number of objective factors. They include first and foremost: development of more sophisticated weapons and combat equipment; changes in the modes of conduct of combat, as well as improvement in the organizational structure of troops, and especially organization of tank subunits and units proper; development of weapons and modes of organization and conduct of defense in the armies of our potential adversaries.

We must note, however, that the influence of each of these factors varied from one period of postwar development of military affairs to another. In the first period (1945-1953) there did not take place any radical changes in employment of tank subunits to penetrate a deliberate and hasty enemy defense. And this is an objective, logical phenomenon, since subunits and units were essentially armed with the same weapons and combat equipment as during the Great Patriotic War, while training of our army's personnel was organized on the basis of experience amassed in the course of this war. As nuclear weapons and new models of conventional weapons became operational, substantial changes took place in the modes of actions of tank subunits in penetrating an enemy defense, changes which signified a qualitatively new stage in development of theory and practice of this problem.

In the first postwar year the armies of capitalist countries devoted special attention to development of the tactical zone of defense. In comparison with the past war, its depth increased from 15-20 km to 20-25 km, densities of defending personnel and weapons increased by 50 to 100 percent, and field fortification of positions and areas improved. Plans called for fully preparing defense in antitank, antiaircraft, antiartillery, and antichemical respects. Defending-force support echelons and reserves designated for

mounting counterattacks on a penetrating enemy force were specified as primarily tank in composition. Great importance was attached to holding the first (main) defensive zone, including employment not only of corps but army reserves as well.

The increased degree of field fortification of positions and areas was dictated by a role of delivery of effective fire onto the enemy defense which was even greater than in the past war. Troops designated for penetrating such a defense were to possess greater striking power than in the past. It was required that they be continuously supported by artillery fire and airstrikes. In addition, considering increased densities of personnel and weapons in the enemy's defense, it had become necessary to increase the density of attacking troops in order successfully to accomplish penetration and to create favorable conditions for subsequent offensive exploitation. In the new conditions there were greater demands imposed on ensuring close and continuous teamwork and cooperation, stable and flexible troop control.

Based on the experience of postwar exercises, the main attack, just as during the war years, was to be directed against the weakest point in the enemy's defense, into the boundaries and gaps between his subunits and units. But sometimes the situation required delivering the main attack against a strong enemy force, when it was necessary to tie that force down and prevent it from waging aggressive actions, or when an offensive was initiated from prior-seized riverbank bridgeheads.

In connection with an increase in the combat capabilities of units and subunits, there occurred an increase in the depth of missions in penetrating a deliberate enemy defense. During the war years, for example, the immediate objective of a tank battalion was penetration, operating jointly with infantry and artillery, of the first two trenches of the first position in the main defensive zone (depth 0.4-0.6 km), while the subsequent mission was penetration of the entire first position (depth to 1.5 km). In the postwar period the depth of the immediate and subsequent missions of the regiment and battalion increased by 50 to 100 percent. The immediate objective of the battalion was penetration of the first position (2-2.5 km). The immediate objective of the regiment changed. The width of the zones of advance of tank subunits and units in penetrating a deliberate defense changed insignificantly. Nor did their combat formation undergo radical changes. The presence of medium tanks in the first line and heavy tanks or self-propelled artillery in the second line helped give the combat formation considerable firepower and striking power. At the same time the depth of the combat formation increased by approximately 50 percent, which was dictated by the necessity of a continuous buildup of efforts by the forward-echelon subunits in order successfully to accomplish penetration of the defense. In connection with this there arose the objective need to have support echelons which were stronger than in the past war.

In view of the fact that when close-support tanks took up their attack positions, which during the war years were designated at a distance of 1-3 km from the main line of resistance,¹ the enemy frequently spotted their movement forward, in connection with which the element of surprise was lost in actions by friendly forces, after the war these positions were no longer designated.

In order to deceive the defending forces regarding the time at which tank subunits and units were committed to action, they began to be designated as assembly areas 6-8 km from the forward positions of friendly forces. Tanks were to advance to the line of deployment for commencing the assault during the period of artillery and air preparation for the assault (Diagram 1 shows the sequence of advance).




Diagram 1

Key:

- | | |
|------------------|-------------------|
| 1. Enemy | 3. Tank platoon |
| 2. Rifle company | 4. Tank company |
| | 5. Tank battalion |

The experience of field exercises confirmed the expedience of such a mode of action. Beginning in 1950 it became a regular component of practical training. In the course of organizing penetration of a deliberate defense, particular attention was focused on comprehensive study of the terrain and the adversary. For this purpose commanders of rifle units and subunits would conduct thorough personal reconnaissance, mandatorily accompanied by commanders of tank units assigned the close-support role, as well as commanders of other attached and supporting subunits. Right here, on the terrain, unit and subunit commanders would formulate their plan, allocate combat missions, and organize teamwork and cooperation.

After being assigned a combat mission, commanders of tank subunits and units would personally conduct reconnaissance with subordinates. The following would be thoroughly studied at this stage: routes (paths) of tank advance from the assembly area, lines of deployment of battalion (company) columns into company (platoon) columns, procedure and sequence of deployment into combat

formation, terrain and directions of movement of tanks during assault of the enemy main line of resistance. Personal reconnaissance conducted by the tank battalion commander would include the presence of his deputies, executive officer and company commanders, and by a tank company commander -- the platoon commanders and certain tank commanders. Following plan formulation, a verbal operation order on the terrain would be given.

An important element in preparing for an offensive action was organization of coordination of tank subunits and units with infantry, artillery, engineer subunits and air. We should particularly stress that there was worked out with each close-support tank coordination with its rifle subunit, close-support gun and combat engineers clearing lanes through hostile minefields. This entire work would be concluded with specifying signals for commencing advance from the assembly area, movement from columns into deployed formation, combat formation, signals for commencement of movement into the assault, request, shift and cessation of artillery and mortar fire. The required signals warning of the appearance of hostile aircraft and tanks and of chemical attack were also specified.

Control of tank subunits and units in the period of preparation for combat actions was handled by wire communications, with the aid of liaison officers, messengers, and in the process of personal communication between commanders and subordinates. Operation of radio equipment was absolutely forbidden during this period.

The following rule would be rigorously followed in the course of preparing for preparation of a deliberate defense: conduct reconnaissance with all available manpower and means, without exception, continuously, day and night. As was indicated by the experience of tactical exercises, the most important duty of tank subunit and unit commanders was organization and guidance of antitank defense, the principal mission of which was to reduce tank losses and thus to maintain the fighting efficiency of the subunit and unit. This would be achieved by effective combat against the enemy's antitank weapons, artillery, tanks, and self-propelled guns.

The assault phase would be executed by tank subunits and units in close coordination with infantry, artillery, air, and combat engineers. It would be executed swiftly and without a halt. Obstacles forward of the enemy's main line of resistance would be crossed through gaps or lanes in a sequence indicated by the subunit commanders. Tanks were to maintain a close distance from the shellbursts.

A tactical exercise in the tank battalion of officer T. Galkin, for example, was conducted in an instructive manner. Prior to the attack, the battalion commander personally reconnoitered the terrain and the "aggressor" and directed the attention of his company commanders to the fact that each crew should be thoroughly briefed on the location of the antitank weapons of the defending force, the probable disposition locations of enemy reserves, and where counterattacks might originate. He thoroughly thought through possible details of the forthcoming engagement.

Following a brief but heavy artillery preparation, the battalion commenced the assault. Forward of the "aggressor's" main line of resistance the subunits encountered an antitank ditch. It did not delay the tankers' advance, however. The battalion commander swiftly and skillfully organized crossing of the obstacle. He had foreseen in advance that this might occur.

The tankers continued their swift advance. As they were about to reach the first trench, "aggressor" antitank guns which had not been neutralized in the course of the preliminary bombardment commenced delivering heavy fire on the battalion's right flank. Estimating the situation, officer Galkin immediately requested fire by supporting artillery and ordered his right-flank company to lay down a smoke screen in order to blind the "aggressor." These measures proved effective. The battalion smashed the resistance of the defending force, broke through the first position, and continued advancing.

The tankers encountered a strongpoint deep in the defense. They were unable to overrun it without a halt. Motorized riflemen hastened to their assistance. Mounting a combined attack frontally and from the flanks, the tankers and motorized riflemen captured the strongpoint.

Thus the tank battalion, working in close coordination with artillery and infantry, successfully accomplished the assigned mission.

In the first postwar period (1945-1953) penetration of a hasty defense by tank subunits and units was as a rule to be accomplished without a halt. Regulations and manuals specified that a penetration mission should be assigned on the approaches to a defensive line, in the course of offensive exploitation. Based on the experience of tactical exercises, a combat mission for a tank subunit or unit operating in the advance guard would be assigned at a distance of 10-15 km from the line which was to be penetrated. This was done in order that the commander could additionally send out a reconnaissance party, formulate a plan on the map, communicate the mission to his subordinates, and issue requisite instructions pertaining to coordination.

Upon approaching the enemy's defense, the commanders of tank subunits and units, provided cover by battle outposts, would advance as close as possible to the defensive line onto the main axis of advance, would refine on the terrain the plan formulated by map, would direct from this point the combat actions of their subunits, and would refine and detail their combat missions. The assault phase would be preceded by a brief but heavy delivery of artillery fire and airstrikes on the defending force. Under cover of this bombardment, the attack-echelon subunits would move forward toward the defense, deploy into combat formation, and commence the assault.

The combat formation of tank subunits and units would consist of one or two echelons and a reserve. If insufficient intelligence was available on the enemy's defense, an arrowhead formation would be employed, or else echelon right (left). If the requisite information was available, tank subunits would deploy into an extended line.

In cases where penetration without a halt could not be accomplished, a short period of time would be provided for preparation. The duration of preparation would be determined by the time required to organize teamwork and cooperation and artillery preparation for the assault phase. Based on the experience of field exercises, one and two hours respectively would be expended in subunits and units on preparation for combat.

When troops began training in conditions of employment of nuclear weapons (beginning in 1954), efforts were made to find the most effective modes of waging combat. At first troops were guided by previous regulations and manuals. Therefore no fundamental changes occurred in views on employment of tank units and subunits in penetrating a defense. The new weapons, however, resulted in increased depth and content of combat missions when tank units and subunits were fighting in a sector where nuclear strikes were delivered.

In subsequent years, when tactical nuclear weapons appeared, modes of employment of tanks subunits and units in penetrating an enemy defense experienced substantial changes. Now, when a defense could be successfully neutralized simultaneously to its entire depth, tank units and subunits, pursuant to the new manuals, were to be employed in the first echelon of the advancing troops, in order more effectively and promptly to exploit the results of nuclear strikes. However, when nuclear weapons were not allocated for conduct of combat actions or were allocated in insufficient quantity, tank subunits and units would be employed jointly with infantry as close-support tanks at field exercises in penetrating a deliberate enemy defense.

As was indicated by the experience of exercises held in the Belorussian (1957) and the North Caucasus (1960) military districts, tank subunits and units advanced on a defending "aggressor" force in the forward echelons, as a rule without a halt in attack position and at high speed. The depth of their combat missions increased somewhat in comparison with the preceding period and frequently coincided with the combat missions of the subunits (units) of which they were a component. The battalion and company would be assigned an immediate objective and direction of subsequent advance.

In conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, subunits and units were to conduct offensive actions in wider zones, with specified gaps between subunits.² At a tactical exercise in the Carpathian Military District, for example, tank battalions attacked a defending force on a frontage of up to 2.5 km.

The mode of penetration (breaching) of a deliberate enemy defense changed radically during these years. There was now the possibility that both sides would employ nuclear weapons. Penetration without a halt in attack position, With troops advancing from depth, as a rule from an assembly area, became the principal mode. In connection with this, it was no longer necessary to assign subunits narrow zones of advance and breakthrough sectors, or to establish high densities of personnel and weapons on the main axis of advance. Therefore the principle of dispersing personnel and weapons prior to commencement of the attack became one of the important factors ensuring preservation of the fighting efficiency of units and subunits.

Since the dynamic character, intensity and decisiveness of troop actions had increased sharply in conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, while seizing and holding the initiative had become the most important factor in successful accomplishment of combat missions, tank subunits and units began frequently to be designated to operate as forward detachments during penetration (breaching) of the defense. They would be assigned missions to capture important positions, installations and areas within the enemy's tactical zone of defense.

Increase in the combat capabilities of troops, continuous development of modes of conduct of combat operations, and increasing sophistication of views on the employment of nuclear weapons in combat exerted an appreciable influence on modes of penetrating a deliberate enemy defense in general and on employment of tank subunits and units in particular.

Defense also experienced further development in the armies of the capitalist countries. Depth of defense increased. Establishment of a strong security area was specified, in which various obstacles would be constructed. A forward defensive area would be established behind this area, in which battalions could fortify areas up to 3000 meters in frontage and up to 2500 meters in depth.⁶ The defense capabilities of the potential adversary increased sharply in connection with arming troops with qualitatively new antitank weapons, which can successfully engage tanks on the battlefield at close, medium, and long (up to 5000 meters) range. Such antitank guided missiles as the TOW, Dragon, Swingfire, and MILAN, which boast a high target kill probability, are particularly effective.

As was indicated by the experience of local wars, especially in the Near East, these antitank weapons are employed in mass quantities in the defense in combination with other antitank weapons -- tanks and artillery. Therefore a new and important problem arose in connection with penetrating an enemy's defense -- combat against antitank weapons. This problem can be successfully solved only by means of skilled utilization of artillery fire, air, tanks, self-propelled artillery, and other weapons.

Since the beginning of the 1960's our military theory and practice have allowed for the conduct of combat operations with employment of conventional weapons only, but with the constant threat of enemy employment of nuclear weapons. This circumstance dictated the necessity of determining modes of employment of tank units and subunits in penetrating a well-prepared enemy defense in conformity with the new demands. A large number of demonstration, tactical and other exercises as well as military scientific conferences were conducted. The experience of penetration of a deliberate enemy defense obtained during the years of the Great Patriotic War began to be more extensively utilized.

In conditions when employment of nuclear weapons was not called for, once again areas began to be assigned to tank subunits and units advancing in the attack echelon, with the aim of breaking through the defense on a narrow frontage, with a subsequent attack toward the flanks. At field exercises tank subunits of motorized rifle units were employed to penetrate an enemy defense in close coordination with motorized riflemen and artillery, operating like close-support tanks during the war years.

Detailed organization of combat against hostile antitank weapons was a characteristic feature of preparation for penetration.

Modes of employment of tank subunits and units as forward detachments were improved. In contrast to the first postwar period, in the second period forward detachments, pursuant to the experience of field exercises, commenced their actions not from the point at which they were brought into action during penetration. They would advance toward the enemy defense ahead of the main forces, supporting the advance of the latter and commencement of the assault phase. In a number of cases, depending on the situation, forward detachments would advance (as a rule to the line of deployment into combat formation) during the night prior to shift to the offensive by the main forces.

In connection with an increase in the role of the security area in the enemy's defense as well as the presence of a large number of diversified minefields and obstacles in the defense, tank subunits were sometimes designated to be employed as special forward detachments. In this case their principal mission was to capture and destroy weapons and control facilities for barriers of fire established in this zone, aggressive penetration and capture of tactically important installations and positions, with the objective of creating the requisite conditions for the main forces to advance to the forward edge of the enemy's main defensive area and to penetrate it.

Defensive lines deep in the enemy's defense were to be overrun without a halt, in dispersed approach march formation, and sometimes in march columns as well. Penetration was to be accomplished primarily by advance guards or forward detachments, while the main forces were to penetrate this defense at a rapid pace, as in a conventional offensive operation.

Tank subunits and units pursuing the enemy as advance guards or forward detachments were to be assigned the mission of penetration at a distance as a rule of 15-25 kilometers from the defensive line which was to be penetrated. In these conditions the battle plan would be formulated on a map, and combat missions would be assigned to subunits by means of brief instructions by radio, and sometimes in person. In view of the importance of reliable delivery of effective fire on the defending enemy force, attached artillery was to be moved forward, and in a number of instances tank subunits were to be enlisted to deliver fire for effect on the enemy. Additional reconnaissance entities would also be dispatched directly from the subunit or unit, with the mission of aggressively penetrating to the defensive line and reconnoitering it on a broad frontage. The procedure and sequence of advance, sequence and extent of work performed by the tank battalion commander are shown in Diagram 2.

The tactical exercise held with the tank battalion of Capt V. Brilev is an example of skilled actions by tank subunits deep in the enemy's defense. This battalion was instructed to advance from the support echelon, penetrate the "aggressor's" defense without a halt, and exploit to depth.

The tankers swiftly attacked the "aggressor." The latter, however, offered stubborn resistance. He disabled several tanks with antitank weapons fire. The attack was about to stall. At this point the battalion commander ordered




Diagram 2.

Key:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Assault phase. Control of subunits, maintenance of co-ordination, refining of combat missions, issuing of necessary battle instructions 2. Deployment of companies into combat formation 3. Monitoring of performance by subordinates and assisting them. Securement of swift advance by subunits to final coordination line 4. Allocation of combat missions and coordination instructions | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Mission briefing, situation estimate, plan formulation on map 6. Enemy 7. Minus tank platoon 8. Reserve, tank battalion commander <p>mp. Tank company</p> <p>mb. Tank battalion</p> <p>mn. Tank regiment</p> |
|---|--|

the attached artillery battalion to hit the defending force. Tanks took part in the shelling. After this Captain Brilev brought his reserve into action. As a result of prompt and aggressive actions, the battalion inflicted considerable losses on the "aggressor" and commenced successful deep exploitation.⁷

Thus modes of combat employment of tank subunits and units during penetration of the enemy's defense improved continuously in the postwar years. The principal development trend was a constant endeavor to accomplish penetration of the defense at a rapid pace, swiftly, in order to create favorable conditions for rapid advance to depth. As was indicated by practical combat training activities, success would be achieved by reliable and skilled delivery of effective fire on the defending enemy force simultaneously to the greatest possible defense depth, by precise and continuous coordination of subunits and units of the various combat arms, as well as by flexible and stable control.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Stroitel'stvo i boyevoye primeneniye sovetskikh tankovykh voysk v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Organizational Development and Combat Employment of Soviet Tank Troops During the Years of the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1979, page 107.
2. "Boyevoy ustav Sukhoputnykh voysk (batal'on-rota)" [Field Service Regulations of the Ground Forces (Battalion-Company)], Voenizdat, 1964, Article 2.
- 3-5. Footnotes omitted.
6. VOYENNY ZARUBEZHNIK, No 11, 1962, pp 15-16.
7. VOYENNY VESTNIK, No 3, 1979, pp 16-19.

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WARTIME OPERATIONS: AIR SUPPORT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 46-51

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Col (Ret) P. Plyachenko*: "On Czechoslovak Soil"]

[Text] On the evening of 6 April 1945 Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, representative of Headquarters, Supreme High Command [Hq SHC],¹ informed the Supreme Commander on Soviet air activities supporting ground forces operations on the territory of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

I. V. Stalin instructed him to tour the Fourth Ukrainian Front and settle on the spot all questions connected with air combat activities in the operation to liberate the Moravska Ostrava industrial region and to ensure that airstrikes did not damage plants, open-hearth furnaces, coal mines and worker communities situated in this and other Czechoslovakian industrial centers.

...Marshal Vorozheykin's airplane landed on the morning of 7 April at the airfield of the 8th Air Army, situated near the town of Rybnik. The Hq SHC representative and the officers accompanying him, including myself, headed for the air army headquarters without delay. For more than two weeks its units and combined units had been assisting the combined-arms armies of the Fourth Ukrainian Front in seizing and enlarging bridgeheads on the left bank of the Oder River. They were forced to operate under the difficult conditions of forested mountainous terrains. At the same time the front was making preparations to deliver a new, massive attack aimed at liberating the Moravska Ostrava industrial region from the fascist invaders. The tense situation demanded of the commanders and staffs of the aviation units and combined units the closest contact with the troops engaged in battle and continuous presence wherever the fate of battles was being decided. Therefore none of the ranking officers were to be found at 8th Air Army Headquarters. The commanding general, his deputies, political workers and many officers were at the front's command post, in forward units and at airfields.

* In the described period P. F. Plyachenko was a special assignments officer under GHQ [Stavka] representative Marshal of Aviation G. A. Vorozheykin.

"We shall not waste time," stated Vorozheykin, "we shall determine certain details here, and we shall leave today for the combined-arms armies. We shall learn on the spot how air support of ground troops is being handled and what they need. Order two liaison aircraft!"

Prior to departure the marshal gave me the following order: "While I visit the line units on the bridgehead, I want you to visit the 18th Army and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps. Obtain a detailed briefing on the air situation. Direct special attention toward how coordination between aviation, army and corps combined units and units is being handled and what effectiveness is being achieved in destroying and suppressing targets by aircraft in conditions of forested mountainous terrain. Find out what the troops need from us aviators."

"Everything will be done, comrade marshal!"

By the afternoon of 7 April I was in the zone of advance of the forces of the 18th Army near the town of Ruzomberok. Having located headquarters, I headed for the operations officers, from whom I obtained a detailed briefing on the ground and air situation. It was extremely difficult here. The troops of the 18th army and the Czechoslovak 1st Army Corps, which were advancing south of the combined units of the 1st Guards Army, were operating on rugged forested mountain terrain, which was extremely difficult to negotiate. The enemy was skillfully utilizing it for defense. From commanding heights the Hitlerites had a good view and field of fire not only along the forward positions of our forces but also the avenues of approach to them. Mountain roads, passes, valleys, and especially tank-accessible locations were mined and covered by heavy fire. The fascists had turned every hilltop and every populated locality into powerful strongpoints and centers of resistance, heavily saturated with large numbers of weapons. Our forward subunits and units had encountered this strong defense, and enemy aircraft were delivering continuous attacks on logistical support units.

"What we are doing is chipping our way through a powerful fortified area," commented one of the operations officers and related in detail how air support was helping the army's troops accomplish their assigned missions. I also obtained needed information in the Czechoslovak army corps.

Immediately upon returning from the line units, I reported to Marshal Aviation Vorozheykin on the results of my tour of the 18th Army and on the state of affairs regarding air support of the troops of this army and the Czechoslovak corps.

The marshal discussed this matter with the commanding general of the front, and then had a meeting with the commander of the 8th Air Army, Lt Gen Avn V. N. Zhdanov, and the deputy commander for political affairs, Maj Gen Avn A. G. Rytov, and gave them instructions regarding air support of the troops of the 18th Army and the Czechoslovak 1st Corps.

Also discussed that day was the question of organization of air combat actions in conformity with the plan formulated by the commanding general of the front in

the zones of advance of other armies in the course of the Moravska Ostrava offensive operation. As we know, the Moravska Ostrava Operation commenced on 10 March 1945. It pursued the objective of defeating in detail the enemy's army group Heinrici and occupying the Moravska Ostrava industrial area. Our troops were advancing, heavily engaged, breaking the enemy's stubborn resistance. The pace of advance was comparatively slow. Nevertheless between 10 March and 5 April the front's units and combined units liberated hundreds of towns and villages in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

By this time the troops of the First and Second Ukrainian fronts had accomplished a deep advance westward. In view of this circumstance, Hq SHC made changes in the original plan of defeat of the enemy in the eastern regions of Czechoslovakia. The Fourth Ukrainian Front would now be mounting the main attack with its right side along the Oder River, in the general direction of Olomouc, with the forces of Gen P. A. Kurochkin's 60th Army (it was transferred from the First Ukrainian Front on 6 April 1945), Gen K. S. Moskalenko's 38th Army, and the 1st Guards Army of Gen A. A. Grechko. The offensive was to be resumed on 15 April. Preparing for the forthcoming combat operations, the Hq SHC representative focused particular attention on logistical support of the aviation combined units and provision of aircrew personnel.

Specific air missions in the new operation were then refined and detailed. The commander of the 8th Air Army reported his preliminary offensive air support plan. The army commander stressed that many enemy installations and targets had already been spotted by all categories of reconnaissance and that they would be destroyed and suppressed by our bombers during the period of preliminary airstrikes for the offensive.

Marshal Vorozheykin noted that it was mandatory to destroy permanent-type weapon emplacements in the breakthrough sector. But what about reserves? He pointed to the map. It clearly indicated that the tactical reserves of the Hitlerite forces were deployed in the vicinity of industrial installations.² It was essential to bomb the enemy here with a high degree of accuracy.

"Front and army political agencies have already done a great deal of work," stated General Rytov, "on this question. In all aviation units political workers, party and Komsomol organizations have briefed personnel on the meaning of the liberation mission of our forces and on how they should act on Czechoslovak soil. The aviators clearly understand their mission and will do everything they can to save non-military installations from destruction."

General Zhdanov added that inasmuch as the commanding general of the front had selected a very narrow breakthrough sector northwest of Ostrava, where there were neither plants, nor mines, nor built-up areas, but only defensive works, there would be no threat to civilian installations during preliminary aerial bombardment prior to the breakthrough.³

The Hq SHC representative stated in conclusion: "So the pilots are thoroughly briefed on their mission and, I hope, will carry it out well."

On the morning of 8 April detailed offensive mission briefings for the units and combined units were given at 8th Air Army Headquarters.

"Fascist aircraft," the marshal aviation demanded, "shall not penetrate through into the Czechoslovak industrial area. Enemy bombs shall not be permitted to injure the industrial heart of this country which is our friend!"

In short, preparations for the offensive were in full swing. Each and every item, each and every detail were painstakingly thought through.

...We got practically no sleep on the night of 15 April. In pitch blackness, G. A. Vorozheykin drove out to the forward command post of the commanding general of the Fourth Ukrainian Front. The offensive commenced at dawn. Large numbers of flares soared skyward. Immediately the rumble of Katyushas could be heard, signaling the commencement of massive preliminary bombardment. Guns and mortars barked into action, and groups of ILs appeared in the sky. The thunderous roar continued for quite some time. Finally the assault began. Steel juggernauts of tanks and infantry proceeded to surge toward the enemy. Czechoslovak tankers, infantrymen and pilots fought bravely, shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet fighting men.

The offensive was taking place in an exceptionally difficult situation. On the approaches to Ostrava the Hitlerites had excellent conditions for defense. The city is situated at the confluence of three rivers -- the Opava, Oder, and Ostravice, in a very narrow, extremely difficult-access valley, crowded by hills on both sides. The "Moravian gate" guarded Czechoslovakia's northern frontier. The nearby border between Czechoslovakia and Germany was strongly fortified by reinforced concrete pillboxes. The enemy's ground forces, supported by a powerful defense, were offering fierce resistance. They were being supported by large groups of aircraft.

Nothing, however, could stop the onslaught of the Soviet forces. Mass heroism was displayed by the men of all units and combined units. The fighter pilots of the 8th Air Army and the Czechoslovak 1st Aviation Division, which had been formed on Soviet soil in December 1944, covered themselves with unfading glory in the skies over Moravia. They bravely fought off fascist bomber attacks and delivered precision strikes on the enemy.

Our bombers and ground-attack aircraft were performing difficult and critical missions. Supporting friendly troops, they destroyed and neutralized enemy personnel and combat equipment. On 16 April 1945 the group of ground-attack aircraft under Capt I. Nizhnyanskiy, getting past heavy antiaircraft fire, smashed fascist troops massed by the Oder crossing near the mouth of the Olsa. On 17 April a bomber group led by Maj G. Osipov, in spite of fierce counter-measures by enemy fighters, inflicted heavy casualties and losses on enemy tanks and motorized infantry in the vicinity of Opava.

Soviet and Czechoslovak aviators fought the enemy courageously, boldly, selflessly shedding their blood and risking their very lives. In the skies over Moravia the feat of Captain Gastello was repeated by the crew of an IL-2, which included Czech pilot Capt Ya. Bozik and gunner-radio operator Russian Sgt V. Dorofeyev, Capt F. Maihran and Sgt S. Ponomarev.

Our forces liberated Moravska Ostrava on 30 April. On that same day Communist Party leaders and government officials of the Czechoslovak Republic arrived in the city. They accepted from the hands of our warrior-liberators, as it were, safe and sound, everything which had been created by the working hands of Czechoslovakia's ordinary people over the course of many years. The residents of liberated Moravska Ostrava warmly thanked their liberators, shook their hands, embraced them, and presented flowers. In response our fighting men gave their Ostrava friends whatever they could. The children particularly like the little five-pointed stars.⁴

On one of the first days following the liberation of Moravska Ostrava, at a meeting of industrial area specialists, the text of a letter to the soldiers of the Fourth Ukrainian Front was enthusiastically adopted. It read as follows: "Czechoslovak mining and metallurgical engineers of the Ostrava coal basin, participants in the first meeting of mining and metallurgical engineers in Moravska Ostrava following its liberation, give thanks to the valiant troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Front for the fact that throughout military operations here the mining and metallurgical industry of our basin has remained totally undemolished and the Czechoslovak Republic has not been deprived of its principal industrial base....

"Hail the eternal friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic!"⁵

The offensive by our forces into the Czechoslovakian heartland was continuing successfully.

...On the morning of 19 April several passenger cars were moving swiftly along the highway running along the Danube from Vienna to Bratislava. Marshal Aviation Vorozheykin and I were traveling in the lead vehicle. First we were to visit the headquarters of Hq SHC representative Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko, located near Bratislava, after which I was to proceed alone to Cifer, where the headquarters of the 5th Air Army was located. Cifer is a small town 30-40 km northeast of Bratislava.

"As soon as you reach Goryunov's headquarters," the marshal instructed me as I was departing, "go immediately to the operations and intelligence officers for a situation update briefing. Tell Colonels Grechko and Abalakin to maintain continuous air surveillance of the Brno area today, tomorrow, and on the following days. They should take particular note of approaching enemy reserves, chiefly tanks. From air army headquarters proceed to Marshal Timoshenko's command post; I will be there. Bring me fresh air reconnaissance data and information on the effectives and numerical strength of all aviation combined units of the 5th Air Army."

"Yes Sir, I understand, it will be done!"

Our car was proceeding along a road running south of the Danube on Hungarian soil. The road ran alternately along and away from the river. From time to time we passed through small villages, in which there were neither people, domestic animals nor poultry in evidence -- not a sign of life. Many houses

had either been burned to the ground or demolished. The war had left its sinister mark everywhere. But it was beautiful country, and we could not help but admire the beauty.

I glanced back, but could not see the vehicles behind us. They had fallen back, for our car was traveling at high speed.

"Slow it down a little," the marshal reluctantly ordered. He liked driving fast. His driver, V. Balykin, was aware of this, which was why he was going heavy on the gas pedal. The driver slowed the vehicle down, and soon the other vehicles caught up with us.

Suddenly the driver shot the car abruptly forward, clutching the wheel, his body tense. He was gazing upward.

"Look! Look!" he shouted. "The wall is collapsing."

"What the hell?" the marshal exclaimed. "We've got to get past it! Get moving, Vasiliy."

The vehicle shot forward at breakneck speed. We noticed that ahead of us, on the left side of the road, the high wall of a half-demolished building had suddenly fractured in two and had begun collapsing onto the street -- right on to us. But we got by a fraction of a second before it struck. It was as if the wall had been pushed by some mysterious force. We could hear enormous blocks of brick and cement striking the pavement. Tiny fragments of brick were beating a tattoo on the roof of our car. A cloud of dust rose. Everything around us was plunged into gloom. But our vehicle continued tearing down the road. Finally the village street was behind us.

"Stop, Vasiliy!" the marshal ordered.

We quickly got out of the car. Just in case, I held at the ready position a submachinegun and a grenade. "A chance collapse or sabotage?" A troubled inner voice asked.

"Where are the other vehicles?" asked Vorozheykin.

"I don't see them. Apparently they were unable to get past."

"Quick, let's help them!" the marshal commanded and dashed off into the thick cloud of dust. We followed behind.

One vehicle had been hit by the collapsing wall. Fortunately nobody was killed. We gave assistance to the injured. The saboteurs were apprehended (it had in fact been sabotage). They were disarmed and taken away. Our party continued on its way.

Sitting in the vehicle, I thought about what had happened. I had on numerous occasions observed the marshal in difficult situations. No matter how difficult the situation, he had always remained calm and had coolly given orders and instructions. It seemed that he had no sense of fear whatsoever.

His self-control had time and again helped him get out of difficult situations with honor.

From the headquarters of Mar SU S. K. Timoshenko, I headed for Cifer, to the headquarters of the 5th Air Army. Having collected information, I took it to Mar Vorozheykin. The information helped him make the right decision on air combat actions on the succeeding days.

During the night of 22-23 April 1945 Hq SHC representatives S. K. Timoshenko and G. A. Vorozheykin, accompanied by Col P. G. Tyukhov and other officers, plus a security detail, departed by automobile for the forward command post of the Second Ukrainian Front, which was situated southeast of Brno. That morning the offensive was to recommence in this area. We traveled the entire way with headlights out, observing precautionary measures, traveling along narrow, dark roads which ran through forest and towering vineyards. It was difficult for us to get our bearings, but nevertheless we arrived safe and sound. At the designated point our column was met by an officer -- a representative of the commanding general of the front, to escort the Hq SHC representatives to the command post. Our column picked up speed.

Finally we reached the hill on which the front's forward command post was sited. S. K. Timoshenko and G. A. Vorozheykin entered the dugout of the commanding general of the front. I proceeded to the forward command post of the 5th Air Army. It was sited on the reverse slope of the same hill. Col S. N. Grechko and a group of air officers were at this command post. They had a radio set. All preparations were completed for the commencement of air combat actions. I received a briefing on the schedule of preliminary airstrikes for the offensive and air support of the assault phase, the number of bombers and ground-attack aircraft assigned to the ground troops support role on the first day of the operation, the procedure of obtaining new intelligence on the enemy from air reconnaissance crews, plus other matters. I took everything carefully down in a notebook.

I then proceeded along a long communication trench to the point where the Hq SHC representatives were located. The marshals were standing in a deep trench position and observing through a stereoscopic telescope the terrain which a few minutes hence would become the site of a fierce battle. But at that moment it was a quite peaceful stretch of landscape. Nothing indicated that there lay concealed here large numbers of personnel, tanks, guns, mortars, machineguns, and other enemy weapons.

Vorozheykin listened intently to my report. When I specified the air army manpower and equipment assigned to attack enemy targets in the vicinity of the city of Brno, his face became troubled.

"Remind Colonel Grechko," he said, "that all attacks in the Brno area must be only against installations and targets which are clearly visible from the air."

On the morning of 23 April the weather was clear and cloudless. Visibility was steadily improving. Massive preliminary bombardment and airstrikes commenced at the designated time. The enemy defense was hit with a massive stream of

fire and metal. The assault phase then commenced. Our infantry and tanks, provided with air support, were successfully advancing toward Brno. The enemy was offering stubborn resistance, especially in areas where his strongpoints had survived, and was constantly mounting counterattacks. But they were thwarted by powerful blows delivered by our infantry, tanks and artillery, as well as bombers and ground-attack aircraft, groups of which were appearing over the battlefield one after the other.

In this highly complex and extremely tense situation, it became incredibly difficult to direct numerous groups of aircraft operating in the air simultaneously. But air army headquarters successfully accomplished this task. The many years of war experience proved useful.

My duties included maintaining continuous communications with the air army's command group and simultaneously informing the Hq SHC representative on air actions in the zone of advance of each corps and even division, and reporting fresh intelligence obtained by air reconnaissance, the results of bombing attacks, ground-level airstrikes, etc. Very frequently I had to run headlong out to the field to obtain new intelligence from the aviators or to give them new instructions, and immediately to return to my post.

Exploiting their successful advance, units of the 53d Army, the 1st Guards Mounted-Mechanized Group and the 6th Guards Tank Army of Gens I. M. Managarov, I. A. Pliyev, and A. G. Kravchenko, air-supported by groups of ground-attack aircraft and bombers, on the second day captured the Pracenske Hills, near the city of Brno. Engaged in heavy fighting, the Soviet forces were able to rescue from destruction historical monuments on these hills. They included the monument to the Russian soldiers who fell in battle on the fields of Austerlitz in 1805, as well as a small building housing a museum established in honor of this famous battle.

By the evening of 26 April the German-fascist troops in the Brno area had been routed, and the city had been fully cleared of enemy forces.

Soon the Prague offensive operation began. Mobile task forces were formed from tank and mechanized combined units of the Second and Fourth Ukrainian fronts; with active air support by units of the 5th, 8th, and 17th Air armies, these task forces proceeded to advance swiftly toward Prague, toward the troops of the First Ukrainian Front.⁶ Soviet tanks and infantry were rolling like giant waves toward the enemy, toppling his rear guards and wiping the fascist scum from Czechoslovak soil. They crushed the Hitlerites' personnel and equipment, but leaving civilian installations unharmed.⁷

The troops of three Ukrainian fronts began aggressive concluding actions to achieve final defeat of the enemy on the Prague axis. where substantial enemy ground and air forces were concentrated. Ground troops actions were actively air-supported by the air forces of the front and the Czechoslovak composite air division.

On 4 May 1945, acting on instructions from Hq SHC representative Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, I departed from Trnava airfield for the headquarters of the 5th,

8th, and 17th Air armies, which were taking part in the Prague offensive operation, where I was to give the appropriate command personnel documents specifying the actions of aviation units and to obtain from them information required for a report to Hq SHC. This was the last urgent mission I was assigned in the Great Patriotic War. In carrying out this mission, I toured a large area by air and saw Golden Prague.

The road to the capital of Czechoslovakia was difficult. The Hitlerite troops, doomed to destruction, offered desperate resistance. But the Soviet forces, working in close contact with the Czechoslovak people and the fighting men of the armies of friendly countries, smashed the enemy's resistance. The great friendship between the Soviet and Czechoslovak peoples was born and grew strong in the flame of a joint struggle for common ideals and goals.

FOOTNOTES

1. Mar Avn G. A. Vorozheykin, representative of Hq SHC, coordinated the combat operations of the air forces of the Second, Third, and Fourth Ukrainian fronts.
2. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], Fund 244, List 3000, File 1213, sheets 50-60.
3. Ibid., pp 59-60.
4. Ibid., List 2980, File 97, Sheet 646.
5. PRAVDA, 8 May 1969.
6. TsAMO, Fund 236, List 2673, File 2609, sheets 57-64.
7. Ibid., Fund 240, List 2770, File 1935, sheets 14-15.

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COMBAT TRADITIONS IN THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 52-56

[Article, published under the heading "Combat Traditions," by Maj Gen V. Loktev: "Fighting Friendship of Missile Crewmen"]

[Text] The life of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces is today taking place under the badge of inspired and intensive labor to implement the historic decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress. The following moving words by L. I. Brezhnev, spoken at the congress, sank deep into the heart of each and every serviceman: "Today the ranks of defenders of the homeland contain the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. They have not experienced the harsh trials which fell to the lot of their fathers and grandfathers. But they are faithful to the heroic traditions of our army and our people."¹

The succession of combat traditions.... This life-giving relay of deathless military valor and glory has become one of the outstanding features of the ideological-moral life of our missile crewmen.

The Strategic Rocket Forces are the youngest branch of the Soviet Armed Forces. They are slightly more than 20 years old. But our missilemen preserve the finest military customs and standards of behavior developed by preceding generations. Many missile units have inherited the fighting traditions of divisions and regiments which gained fame in battles against the enemies of the homeland. For example, the first Strategic Rocket Forces unit was established on the base of the Red-Banner Regiment of the legendary Katyushas, which fought its way from Stalingrad to Berlin. Another unit traces its genealogy to a famed cavalry regiment of the 1st Cavalry Army. "From Blade to Rocket" -- this is the title of a film dedicated to this unit, and the fighting blade of Mar SU S. M. Budenny, which he presented to the missilemen, is carefully preserved in the museum as a symbol of the succession of combat traditions.

The colors, decorations, and honorary designations of regiments and brigades which distinguished themselves in battles for the homeland have been passed on by succession to many missile units. Permanently entered in their rolls are the names of Heroes of the Soviet Union Gds Sr Lt A. A. Kosmodem'yanskiy, Gds Capt I. I. Novozhenov, Lts G. K. Nesterenko and G. A. Pechkovskiy, Sr Sgt A. I. Krasil'nikov, and many other fearless patriots.

Of particular significance in the arsenal of priceless combat experience of the heroes of past years inherited by our missilemen is the tradition of military comradeship, mutual assistance and combat friendship of servicemen, and this is understandable. Missiles are a fundamentally new type of crew-served weapon. This weapon as perhaps no other weapon requires that crews perform smoothly, as one man. Decisive significance here is assumed by extreme smoothness and precision, truthfulness, a feeling of fellowship, willingness to come to each other's aid, and the ability entirely to subordinate oneself to the common interests of performance of the combat mission, regardless of all difficulties and dangers. This is why the remarkable examples of military comradeship displayed by Soviet servicemen in the flame of past battles are particularly significant to our missilemen.

The names of platoon commander Jr Lt A. A. Pokal'chuk and deputy political commissar P. L. Gutchenko were permanently entered onto the rolls of a certain missile unit. In August 1942 the 95th Rifle Regiment, in which they were serving, crossed the Don and, engaged in heavy combat, seized an important bridgehead on the right bank near the village of Kletskaya. During one of the assaults, a machinegun fired point-blank from an enemy earth-and-timber emplacement at the platoon of Jr Lt A. A. Pokal'chuk. Taking heavy casualties, the men went to the ground under the hail of fire. Party member P. L. Gutchenko succeeded in crawling up to the emplacement and in throwing two grenades, but the machinegun was not silenced. He then rose to his feet, flung himself over the firing port and blocked it with his body. The platoon continued the assault, but the fascists succeeded in pushing aside the hero's body, and the death-dealing lead once again proceeded to take its toll. But A. A. Pokal'chuk had now reached the emplacement. He threw himself over the firing port... and the enemy machinegun fell silent. The men dashed forward, and the fascists were unable to withstand their furious attack. How could "these Russians" be stopped if they were capable of halting the hail of lead with their own bodies? These and numerous other facts from the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War confirm V. I. Lenin's prophetic statement: "Strong belief in the just cause of a war and awareness of the need to sacrifice one's own life for the benefit of one's brothers raises soldiers' spirit and compels them to endure unprecedented burdens."²

These two feats performed by Soviet patriots merged into a single burst of unprecedented heroism for the sake of accomplishment of a combat mission and saving the lives of comrades in arms. The division newspaper wrote at that time: "Communist Gutchenko and Komsomol member Pokal'chuk laid down the path to victory with their lives. We shall never forget them!"

The deed accomplished by these heroes lives in the heroic deeds of today's servicemen. On a freezing December night in 1966 Engr-Lt Vladimir Grigor'yevich Basov was alerted by an alarm signal. Running over to the installation, he saw that a piece of equipment had malfunctioned due to a freak accident. Men's lives were in jeopardy. Engineer-Lieutenant Basov ordered all the men to take shelter and, at the cost of his own life, corrected the malfunction and averted a catastrophe. For courage and valor displayed in the performance of his military duty, by ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 29 March 1967, Vladimir Grigor'yevich Basov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star. A Moscow street was named after him. The hero's Komsomol

card bears the following inscription: "He died saving the lives of his men." Almost a quarter of a century separates the deeds of P. L. Gutchenko, A. A. Pokal'chuk, and V. G. Basov, but time is powerless to extinguish the eternal flame of the great comradeship of Soviet servicemen.

One can also cite other examples of faithfulness by missilemen to the tradition of military comradeship and mutual assistance. They will always remember the name of courageous officer Maj Yevgeniy Ivanovich Grivans. On 16 January 1981 he was instructing recent recruits in throwing live grenades. Things were proceeding as normal, when suddenly one of the men dropped a grenade from which the pin had been removed. Everybody froze, expecting an explosion. But Ye. I. Grivans acted swiftly. The commander leaped toward the grenade and fell on it before the eyes of his confused men, saving their lives. A sense of duty and the great force of military comradeship and brotherhood led Communist Grivans to perform this deed. By ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 20 May 1981, this brave officer was posthumously awarded the Order of the Red Star.

A fine tradition of collectivism, combat cohesiveness and mutual assistance is being forged out by the very nature of the military labor of missile crewmen. This is particularly graphically manifested during performance of alert duty, which in the Rocket Forces means performance of a mission of particular importance.

The ritual of commencing of alert duty by missile crewmen is solemn and festive. The crewmen stand in precise formation. The unit's sacred colors are marched out. The crisp words of the following order ring out: "For defense of our homeland -- the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics -- commence alert duty!" This is the point beyond which begins performance of duty on the front line of guaranteeing the security of the homeland and the achievements of socialism. There reigns here an atmosphere of the highest responsibility, discipline and demandingness, constant vigilance, total composure and complete self-sacrifice on the part of each and every man. The attention of the crew members is maximally focused. They are prepared at all times to come to the assistance of one another and to take the place of a comrade.

In these conditions the content of the terms military comradeship and combat friendship of servicemen becomes deeper and more capacious, and a new level of monolithic cohesiveness of army collectives is attained. It is for good reason that missilemen express the essence of their military labor in the saying: "Missile service is collectivism and friendship."

The highest indicator of the combat cohesiveness of missile crewmen is their actions during preparations for and execution of a combat training missile firing. In this activity the result of many months of efforts on the part of each serviceman and the collective as a whole is tested according to the very highest criterion, within just a few minutes. Figuratively speaking, all this is compressed into one brief movement by the commander, who presses the "Fire" button. And the fact that missile crewmen traditionally carry out practice missile firings exclusively with a mark of excellent and good is the best proof of their unity, genuinely military comradeship and combat friendship.

These qualities of missile crewmen were highly praised by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, on a visit to several missile units. They thoroughly examined the process of combat and political training of personnel, inquired into matters of the daily life and duties of missile crewmen, had warm conversations with enlisted men, noncommissioned officers, officers, and the members of the families of military personnel, and inspected housing, classrooms, Lenin rooms, and combat glory museums. In response to the paternal concern, valuable advice and good wishes of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev and Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, the missile crewmen stepped up the campaign to increase troop vigilance and combat readiness and the monolithic cohesiveness of military collectives.

The endeavor on the part of missile troops to preserve and further build upon the tradition of military comradeship and collectivism is vividly manifested in the course of socialist competition. Take, for example, the missile unit under the command of Lt Col I. Shelestov, initiator of socialist competition in the Strategic Rocket Forces. The following military personnel initiatives are being extensively pursued in this unit: "Not one lagger alongside"; "Today the excellent-rated individual, tomorrow -- the excellent-rated collective"; "From master proficiency-rated individual on the crew to a crew of master proficiency-rated personnel"; etc. If one considers the very essence of these initiatives, one inevitably arrives at the conclusion that their deepest foundation contains the powerful spirit of collectivism, comradeship and mutual assistance on the part of servicemen, a common striving forward, proceeding from the essence of our socialist system, Communist ideology and morality. And it is not surprising that this unit serves as a model of firm friendship among servicemen, their close combat cohesion, and genuine military comradeship. For several years in a row now it has maintained the rating of excellent. The men successfully carried out their ambitious socialist pledges in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress and once again were initiators of socialist competition in the Rocket Forces for a worthy honoring of the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR.

The life-giving collectivism of socialist competition is also expressed in the fact that the achievements of these trailblazers is becoming the common property of personnel throughout the rocket forces. Their know-how is being aggressively adopted in all missile units and subunits and is helping them advance shoulder to shoulder toward new successes in military labor.

We know that service in the Rocket Forces is not easy. It involves considerable difficulties in mastering and operating the complex combat equipment, heavy stresses of alert duty, etc. Not every serviceman, especially at first, quickly becomes accustomed to the rigorous duty conditions of missile crew service. Here too the tradition of military comradeship, friendship and mutual assistance is very helpful. For example, servicemen in the second year of service frequently at their own initiative take one or two recent recruits under their wing, reveal to them the "secrets" of expertise, share their know-how, and help them master the complex but honorable job of missile crewman.

Considerable attention is also devoted to selection and placement of personnel in subunits and on combat crews on the basis of their individual features, inclinations, taking into account the actual relations forming among them in daily routine and off-duty activities. This much more rapidly unifies military collectives, where close comradely relations are established among personnel. They remember their military service their entire life and thank commanders, political workers and comrades for the knowledge and skills acquired in the military, which help them work successfully after discharge into the reserves. For example, here is what brothers Leonid and Nikolay Koltusha wrote in March 1981 in a letter to their unit commander. These brothers decided upon discharge into the reserves to choose a career in the militia: "With a feeling of great respect we thank our commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations for the excellent school of military life, for the fact that it helped us to our feet, to get our bearings in life, provided good political and physical conditioning, and skills in civic work. We are proud of the fact that we served in an excellent-rated unit. We ask those serving in the same unit not to lose this excellent rating and further to build upon the excellent traditions of our combat collective of missilemen."

Succession and continuous enrichment of the traditions of military comradeship, just as all others, is a natural process of the moral life of military collectives. But it does not develop spontaneously. Of determining significance here are the purposeful activities of commanders and political workers in unifying military collectives and incorporating into their lives the requirement of regulations that "military comradeship be valued, that one help comrades with word and deed, keep them from committing unworthy deeds, and rescue them from danger without regard for one's own life...."³ The foundation for achieving this goal is indoctrination of the younger generation in a spirit of selfless love for the homeland, total dedication to the Communist Party and continuous readiness to carry out at any time one's patriotic and internationalist duty.

Indoctrination of servicemen in a spirit of military comradeship and combat friendship is a multifaceted and complex task. It demands that commanders and political workers constantly improve their pedagogic knowledge and methods skills, a great ability to teach others, to work individually with people, continuously to feel the pulse of the internal life of the collective, and promptly to take into consideration and guide its public opinion. Subunit commander D. Pliyev can serve as an example of this. He knows his men thoroughly, their attitudes and aspirations, and deeply respects them. The men of this subunit live a rich intellectual life. An atmosphere of mutual demandingness, respect and good will in interpersonal relations has been created in this collective. D. Pliyev himself is always composed, capable, and fundamentally demanding, but at the same time he is close to and accessible to his men. He is ready and willing at all times to give paternal advice to a young serviceman and to come to the assistance of those who are experiencing difficulties in their military service. Before coming to a decision, this commander does not consider it shameful to listen to the opinion of the collective and to take counsel with the activists. And it is not surprising that subordinates unite behind such an officer in a cohesive and friendly fighting family. The highest praise for the activities of D. Pliyev as a commander-in-doctrinator is the fact that the subunit under his command has earned the high rating of excellent for 10 years in a row now.

Experience shows that a primary role in strengthening relations of collectivism and comradeship in the military environment is played by harmonious and coordinated work on the part of commanders and political workers, unity and cohesiveness of the body of officers and warrant officers of the unit and sub-unit as the immediate organizers of the process of training and indoctrination of personnel. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev points to this aspect of life in the military: "When one is among military personnel, it is pleasant to hear and feel how the efforts and work of commanders and political workers have coalesced.... And how gratifying it is to see that firm military and party friendship exists among our military cadres, when commanders and political workers work together.... Our great strength, the solidity and monolithic character of our army lie in this unity and friendship."⁴

In unifying bodies of officers and warrant officers, principal emphasis is placed on raising their ideological-theoretical level, professional training and moral conditioning. Extensively utilized toward this end are Marxist-Leninist and political training classes, general meetings, lecture series on pedagogic and psychological knowledge, exchange of experience in training and indoctrination work, plus other work forms.

Formation and development of the tradition of military comradeship and combat friendship of servicemen is promoted to a significant degree by concrete party-political work aimed at unifying military collectives. It is grounded on the demands of the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work." Here is one of them: ensure "further strengthening of the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. Increase the fine traditions of the army and navy, service in which is an outstanding school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship."⁵ Lectures, reports, talks, specific-topic evening activities, debates and readings on problems of Communist morality, Leninist standards of mutual relations in the socialist society, friendship and military comradeship, military ethics, the legal and moral foundations of collectivism of Soviet servicemen are extensively held in military units for this purpose. An effective role is also played by diversified forms of indoctrination of personnel in a spirit of internationalism and friendship of the Soviet peoples and the brother socialist nations. This work has become particularly activated in connection with preparations for celebrating the 60th anniversary of establishment of the USSR. Strengthening of relations of comradeship and fighting cohesiveness of servicemen is also fostered by encouraging and rewarding harmonious and unified collectives which have achieved high results in carrying out assigned tasks, by presenting them with testimonials, certificates, challenge pennants, etc.

We should particularly like to mention the role, in formation and development of the tradition of military comradeship and combat friendship, of get-togethers between war veterans and personnel of the units under whose banners they fought. This tradition is manifested particularly graphically and effectively for young servicemen at such get-togethers. Indeed, what is it which compels gray-haired individuals, regardless of age and state of health, to take what is sometimes a long journey in order to get together with the fellow soldiers of their youth? It is a compelling feeling of combat friendship, military

brotherhood, strengthened by jointly shed blood in struggle against the enemies of the homeland. And when combat veterans embrace one another, not hiding their tears, and reminisce about those difficult war years, young servicemen gain a particularly sharp and deep understanding of the great significance and powerful motive force of the tradition of military comradeship and brotherhood in arms. This is why such get-togethers are organized as often as possible in the Rocket Forces. This work form was utilized especially actively during the period of preparation for and celebration of the 40th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow.

A large role in strengthening and development of the tradition of military comradeship is played by party and Komsomol organizations and by the personal example of Communists and Komsomol members, who affirm the spirit of strong friendship and mutual assistance, high principles and mutual demandingness in relationships among servicemen.

From blade to rocket -- this is the road which has been traveled by the Soviet Armed Forces in their evolution. People have changed together with them, as have the combat collectives of servicemen. But Communists remain, just as in the past, the principal cementing force in our army and navy. On the foundation of implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the role of party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives and centers of daily ideological indoctrination work is steadily increasing. And this in large measure promotes strengthening of the unity and cohesiveness of collectives of missile crewmen and their mobilization for successful accomplishment of the tasks assigned to the Soviet Armed Forces by the party's Central Committee and USSR minister of defense.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 66.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 41, page 121.
3. "Ustav vnutrenney sluzhby Vooruzhennykh Sil Soyuza SSSR" [Internal Service Regulations of the USSR Armed Forces], Voenizdat, 1973, pp 7-8.
4. L. I. Brezhnev, "Na strazhe mira i sotsializma" [Guarding Peace and Socialism], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 217.
5. "O dal'neyshem uluchshenii ideologicheskoy, politiko-vospitatel'noy raboty. Sbornik materialov" [On Further Improvement of Ideological and Political Indoctrination Work. Collected Materials], Moscow, Politizdat, page 21.

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VIETNAMESE COMMENTS ON FAILURE OF CHINA'S EXPANSIONIST PLANS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 61-66

[Article, published under the heading "In the Armies of the Socialist Countries," by Maj Gen Le Thanh, military, air force and naval attaché at the embassy of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in the USSR: "Collapse of Beijing's Expansionist Plans in Southeast Asia"]

[Text] On the morning of 17 February 1979 hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers, supported by tanks and artillery, launched an attack along the entire border between Vietnam and China. This signaled the commencement of aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Three years have passed since then. But many people still are seeking an answer to the following question: Why is it that China, which calls itself a socialist country, committed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam?

Beijing ruling circles mobilized a vast propaganda edifice in order to deceive world public opinion and to make the world believe that Vietnam had seized and occupied Kampuchea, allegedly on instructions by the USSR, and had unleashed a war against China, and that Beijing had no other recourse but to respond with a counteroffensive in order to defend its people and its country from the Vietnamese and to teach Vietnam a lesson.

What is actually the truth, and how was all this in actual fact? The truth is that the Beijing leaders had long dreamed of transforming China into a mighty world power and of gradually implementing great-power, hegemonist and expansionist plans. Mao Zedong himself declared in 1956 at a plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: "China must be transformed into the most front-ranking country in a cultural, technical, technological, and industrial respect. It is essential that within several decades China become the number one power on earth."¹ Later, in September 1959, Mao stated at a meeting of the Central Committee Military Commission: "We must conquer the world; this is our goal."²

At the end of the 1950's the Beijing leaders began engaging in incredible efforts to develop nuclear weapons; a mass movement which has gone down

in history as the "Great Leap Forward" began in 1958, and today the plan of the "four modernizations" is in the process of execution, a plan aimed first and foremost at modernization in the military area, in order to accomplish China's great-power, hegemonist schemes.

Beijing's ambitions are limitless, but they are not bolstered by economic and other capabilities. Therefore the Chinese hegemonists decided to proceed toward their desired goal stage by stage. And expansion in Southeast Asia became the first step on this journey. Penetration into this area was most convenient for Beijing. This region adjoins China, which favors the movement of millions of Chinese soldiers without extensive utilization of means of transportation. Maoist groups and organizations, which are totally dependent on the Beijing leaders and which support their policy, are operating in a number of countries in this region. In addition, many Chinese (Overseas Chinese) reside in the countries of Southeast Asia, people who, as Beijing sees it, can be employed as a fifth column.³

Mao Zedong clearly spelled out the expansionist aims of China's leaders at a meeting of the Central Committee Politburo of the Communist Party of China in August 1965. He emphasized that "we must acquire Southeast Asia, including South Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, and Singapore, by any means. This region is rich in raw materials, contains great mineral resources, and all expenditures will be repaid with interest. Following the seizure of Southeast Asia we shall be able to consolidate our power in that region and successfully stand up to the Soviet-East European bloc; the wind of the East will prevail over the wind from the West."⁴

We know that the territory of Vietnam occupies an advantageous strategic position on the path from China into Southeast Asia. And if Vietnam would follow the bidding of Beijing (the latter was counting on this), blindly following in the wake of Beijing's policy, the Chinese leaders could not desire anything better. Plans to seize Southeast Asia could be carried out with less effort and cost. Precisely for this reason Vietnam was selected by the Beijing leaders as the main route of penetration into Southeast Asia. Zhou Enlai stated in Canton in September 1963 at a meeting of representatives of four Communist parties -- Vietnam, China, Indonesia, and Laos: "Our country is a large country, but we have no routes of egress. Therefore we hope that the Vietnam Worker's Party will help us pave the way into Southeast Asia."⁵

But when the people in Beijing saw that following the victory over U.S. imperialism, the Vietnamese people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, had proceeded to carry out socialist reforms in the country's economy with the assistance of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community, and that the government of the SRV had begun carrying out an independent peace-seeking policy and was strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union and all socialist countries, the Chinese leaders resorted to a last means -- they unleashed an aggressive war with the aim of seizing Vietnam by force. Initially they utilized the puppet regime of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, which had seized control of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and had turned the country into a military base of Chinese expansionism and hegemonism in Southeast Asia and into a bridgehead for launching a war against Vietnam. Beginning in April 1977

not merely individual subunits were taking part in the aggression on the Southwestern borders of the SRV, but rather combined units equipped with arms and military hardware of Chinese manufacture. Thousands of Chinese advisers were directing combat operations. Under their command and control, the army of the Pol Pot regime was conducting bandit raids on the provinces of the southern part of our country. Gradually the entire 1000-kilometer border between Kampuchea and Vietnam became arenas of combat operations. At some point the aggressor succeeded in invading Vietnamese territory to a depth of up to 30 kilometers, sowing death and destruction wherever he appeared.

On our country's northern border the Maoists arranged and instigated disturbances and created a tense situation not only in the border areas but throughout all of North Vietnam, including territorial waters along our coast.

Beijing launched an extensive propaganda campaign among China's civilian population and military personnel, a campaign aimed chiefly against our country. Vietnam was accused of obediently carrying out all instructions by the USSR and in making preparations to attack China. The entire blame for rupture of friendly relations between Vietnam and China was laid on us. Appeals sounded in China to ready for war against the USSR and Vietnam. Active preparations to invade our country commenced. The Chinese hegemonists intended to enslave Vietnam, utilizing two large force groupings for this purpose: from the north -- the multimillion-man Chinese army, and from the southwest -- the "Khmer Rouge" forces, equipped with Chinese arms and combat equipment and led by Chinese advisers. Beijing was also hoping to utilize for its own purposes Overseas Chinese residing in Vietnam as well as remnants of the former Saigon puppet army who chose not to take the path of reeducation and honest service to the homeland. Every possibility was considered in the plans to seize our country.

The government of Vietnam repeatedly presented initiatives calling for the holding of talks with Kampuchea and the PRC on border questions and on all border incidents. As a rule, however, these proposals were either rejected out of hand or talks produced no results, due to the position taken by Kampuchea and China.

The danger presented by the aggression of the Chinese expansionists compelled the Vietnamese people to take up arms and unite even more closely with the brother peoples of Laos and Kampuchea. The Vietnamese people, who had not yet healed the wounds of the war unleashed by the U.S. imperialists, were forced beginning in April 1977 to wage a difficult war, defending the socialist homeland against a new enemy -- the puppets of the Beijing expansionists. This just war created favorable conditions for the development of a revolutionary movement in Kampuchea against the genocide regime of Pol Pot-Ieng Sary.

The true Kampuchean revolutionaries promptly raised up the masses in a general rebellion against the hated regime of the Beijing puppets and established in the liberated zone a United Front of National Salvation of Kampuchea. On 7 January 1979 the revolutionary armed forces of Kampuchea, working in close coordination with the insurgent population, under the direct guidance of the United Front of National Salvation of Kampuchea, liberated Phnompenh, the

Kampuchean capital, with the assistance of troops of the Vietnam People's Army,⁶ and by 17 January 1979 had liberated virtually the entire country from the Pol Pot regime and the Beijing expansionists. This was an unpleasant, hard, bitter lesson for Beijing.

Seeing that the principal military base of the Beijing reactionaries in the center of Southeast Asia had been wiped out and the strategic force on Vietnam's southwestern borders routed, China hastily proceeded to make direct preparations for an aggressive war against our country. Unleashing this war in February 1979, the Maoists intended quickly to destroy the troops guarding the border, to seize part of the territory of the frontier provinces, to present a direct threat to Hanoi, and to force Vietnam's command authorities to redeploy northward troops from Kampuchea and from the Hanoi area. By these actions Beijing was attempting to save remnants of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary army from final defeat, so that they could continue threatening our country from the northwest.

In addition, Beijing was pursuing such aims as the following: to incite to action persons of Chinese extraction and former government employees and military personnel of the Saigon puppet regime in order to create chaos, panic and disturbances in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; to demonstrate once again to the United States and other imperialist reactionary forces that China was essentially an ally of the aggressive NATO bloc in the East and a striking force in the ranks of adversaries of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, the other countries of the socialist system and all progressive forces. And since this was the case, assistance to Beijing in carrying out the plan of "four modernizations" was worthwhile and essential. Later, following failure of the aggression against Vietnam, no other than Deng Xiaoping frankly stated: "Victory or defeat in this war is not the most important thing. We (China -- Auth.) have struck a blow so that they (the U.S. imperialists -- Auth.) might see."

From a military standpoint the plan of attack boiled down to putting the Vietnamese forces into a pincer with drives from the north and south (from Kampuchea), defeating them in detail and subjugating Vietnam.

In actual fact, however, the opposite happened. Not one scheme of the Beijing strategists was carried out, and not one goal was achieved. As Western observers later emphasized in their commentaries, it was not China "which taught a lesson to Vietnam; Vietnam taught a lesson to China."

China threw enormous forces into the aggressive war against Vietnam, forces which in numbers greatly exceeded the U.S. forces which took part in the Korean War (1950-1954) as well as the Chinese force which launched an aggression against India in 1962. The Chinese troops which invaded Vietnam exceeded in numbers the U.S. expeditionary corps in South Vietnam at the very height of the U.S. aggression against Vietnam.⁷ China established an overwhelming superiority over the Vietnamese troops guarding our country's northern border. This enormous invasion army, however, not only was unable to destroy our forces but was itself defeated, sustaining heavy casualties: more than 62,000 officers and men of the Chinese army met an inglorious demise on the soil of Vietnam, and hundreds were captured or surrendered, including commanders at the division echelon and lower. Vietnamese troops destroyed more

than 50 percent of the aggressor's tanks and armored personnel carriers and large numbers of artillery pieces and mortars. Encountering stubborn resistance, the Chinese army advanced extremely slowly. The NEW YORK TIMES reported: "From a purely military standpoint, the Chinese suffered defeat just due to the slow rate of advance." On 5 March 1979, following 17 days of aggression, the Beijing strategists were forced to announce the withdrawal of troops from Vietnamese soil, thus acknowledging the failure of their venture.

While Chinese troops were engaged in battle with Vietnamese forces, having advanced several kilometers in certain sectors, in Kampuchea the people and armed forces of that country, together with units of the Vietnam People's Army, were mopping up remnants of the Pol Pot army, which had taken refuge in the jungle.

Commencing aggression against Vietnam, the Beijing leaders finally had thrown off their mask and exposed their true countenance as expansionists and hegemonists, acting in the guise of revolutionaries, claiming to be fighters for socialism, but in actual fact fighting against socialism.

An enormous role in victoriously repulsing the onslaught of the Maoists was played by comprehensive assistance to Vietnam primarily by the Soviet Union and the other nations of the socialist community, and support by all the world's progressive forces. The USSR Armed Forces gave the Vietnamese People's Army great assistance and support.⁸ The newspaper NHAN DAN stated: "...The Soviet Union proved by its firm declaration and practical actions that it was with us from the very outset and constituted the mightiest support for our struggle."⁹

The governments of many of the world's countries, the leaders of national liberation movements, Communist and worker parties and organizations, peace-loving and democratic forces, and all progressive mankind raised their voices in support of Vietnam and angrily condemned China's actions.

The situation was developing differently from the plans of the Chinese leaders. Beijing obviously had not expected such a stormy reaction. An international emergency conference of solidarity with Vietnam, held in Helsinki in March 1979, noted in its declaration that fighting Vietnam was backed up by an enormous, invincible army in the person of world public opinion. The declaration made by the Soviet Government stated: "The invasion by Chinese troops into Vietnam, which just recently repelled external aggression, cannot leave one single honorable person in the world or one single sovereign nation indifferent."¹⁰

The aggressive, antipopular essence of the Beijing leaders reached the consciousness of a certain segment both of military personnel and of broad segments of the people. The deputy chairman of the Military Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, for example, acknowledged: "The war against Vietnam aroused hostility toward the war on the part of cadre workers and soldiers of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. After the war we gave all participants two weeks leave and gave them 20 yuan each, so that they could visit their home towns and tell the residents about our victory in this war."¹¹

The reactionary Beijing clique suffered both a military and a political defeat in its aggression against the SRV. However, it still has not given up its plans of weakening and annexing our country, penetration and expansion in Southeast Asia, and subjugation of the countries of this region.

Defense of the socialist homeland is the primary and sacred mission of our army. And this demands more than ever before that we devote all our energies toward building a regular, modern, well trained People's Army, establish powerful reserves, and strengthen national defense, in order to offer a worthy rebuff to any aggressor, to defeat him in the very first battles, and reliably to defend the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The Vietnamese revolution achieved great victories, but in order that socialist Vietnam become a flourishing country, we still must surmount great difficulties and obstacles. And the main obstacle at the present time is the anti-Vietnam policy of the reactionary Beijing leaders, who are closely aligned with the policy of world imperialism. Comrade Le Duan, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, stated at the opening of the 1st Session of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Seventh Convocation, on 25 June 1981: "At the present time Beijing, with the support of its patrons, the U.S. warmongers, is waging what amounts to a total war for the annihilation of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. It is applying pressure, resorting to acts of provocation, and is encroaching on our territory with the aid of armed force. It is engaged in psychological warfare and is resorting to espionage in order to sow seeds of enmity within our people and to undermine our security. It is pursuing a policy of economic blockade, sabotaging production, and disrupting the stability of our market. It is doing everything it can to slander and discredit Vietnam in the international arena. The Beijing expansionists are recruiting traitors and their hangers-on in each one of the three countries of Indochina and are organizing international reactionary forces to fight the revolution in these countries."¹² In addition, the Chinese hegemonists have stepped up their reactionary actions against India and especially against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The process of drawing together between the policy of the Chinese leaders and that of imperialist countries is continuing at the present time. This closing ranks with imperialism bears the most diversified forms, but an unconcealed anti-Soviet-antisocialist character is inherent in all of them.

But all the feeble efforts on the part of the Chinese hegemonists and their imperialist patrons are doomed to failure. The Vietnamese people and their Armed Forces, under the guidance of the Communist Party, with the support of the Soviet Union and the other brother socialist countries, will succeed in defending their freedom and independence. Comrade (Le Zuan), in a speech at the ceremony at which the highest decorations of the SRV were awarded to Soviet leaders on 3 July 1980, characterizing the close cooperation between the USSR and the SRV, quoted the following statement by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "I want to emphasize quite strongly that in your peaceful socialist work you can continue counting firmly on the support of the party of Lenin and the Soviet nation."¹³

The experience of Vietnam has once again shown that a people which is fighting for its freedom and independence, and on whose side stand the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and all progressive mankind, is invincible.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Pravda o v'etnamo -kitayskikh otnosheniyakh za posledniye 30 let" [The Truth About Vietnamese-Chinese Relations in the Last 30 Years], Hanoi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1979, page 5.
2. Ibid.
3. In 1969 figures on Chinese residing outside of China proper, in the countries of Southeast Asia, were as follows: 3.5 million in Indonesia, 3.4 million in Malaysia, 3 million in Thailand, 2 million in Singapore, 1.1 million in Vietnam, 500,000 each in the Philippines and Laos, 400,000 in Burma, and 440,000 in Kampuchea.
4. "Pravda o...", op. cit., page 12.
5. Ibid., page 15.
6. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Dec 1979.
7. At the culmination point of escalation of the war in Korea, aggressor troops totaled 505,500 men. A total of 270,000 men took part in the Chinese aggression in India, and at the high point of U.S. aggression against Vietnam, U.S. troops totaled 549,500 men.
8. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Dec 1979.
9. Ibid., 11 March.
10. PRAVDA, 19 Feb 1979.
11. Cong Shan, No 4, 1981, page 62.
12. Speech by the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam at the opening of the 1st Session of the National Assembly of the SRV, Seventh Convocation, on 25 June 1981 (NHAN DAN, 26 June 1981).
13. PRAVDA, 4 July 1980.

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SOVIET COMMENTS ON THE 'KATYN AFFAIR'

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 67-73

[Article, published under the heading "Against Bourgeois Falsifiers of History," by Honored Scientist RSFSR, Professor, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Maj Gen M. Monin: "On the History of the 'Katyn Affair'"]

[Text] In April 1943 the Goebbels propaganda kitchen dished out over the radio as well as in the newspapers another portion of exceptionally foul lies in the form of "information," fabricated by the fascist torturers, about the execution by agents of the USSR NKVD in the spring of 1940 of more than 10,000 Polish officer prisoners of war in the Katyn forest near Smolensk.¹ This piece of news from Berlin, which was disseminated throughout the world, was greeted in a differing manner. The overwhelming majority of ordinary people, just as sober-minded politicians and government officials in the countries of Europe and America which were members of the anti-Hitler coalition, familiar with the beastly nature and habits of German fascism and its faculty for perpetrating all kinds of vile acts and forgeries, reacted to the report from Berlin with indignation and contempt.

But unfortunately there were certain highly-placed officials and bourgeois newspapers which seized upon these slanderous fascist fabrications, utilizing them to escalate, together with the Hitlerites, the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign. They included first and foremost the Polish emigré bourgeois-landowner government in London, headed by W. Sikorski. Feeling no necessity to turn to the Soviet Government for explanations, as was required by the elementary rules and standards of relations between two allied countries, it immediately hastened to assist the fascist provocateurs, raising a hue and cry over the radio and in the newspapers in the same spirit as the Hitlerites. On 16 April the Ministry of National Defense, and on 18 April the government itself published statements containing slander against the Soviet Union pertaining to its involvement in execution of the Polish officer prisoners of war. These statements also contained a request to the International Red Cross that it send representatives to the site, in the Katyn forest, to "investigate."

The Hitlerite leaders also immediately seized at the idea of using the International Red Cross to investigate the "Katyn affair," knowing that it would be carried out under the control of the German military authorities and with the participation of "witnesses" specially selected by them, and thus would play into the hands of the fascists.

In view of the common cause on the part of the German and Polish sides, the Soviet Government stated in its note of 25 April 1943 to the emigré Polish Government: "The fact that a hostile campaign against the Soviet Union was begun simultaneously in the German and Polish press and is being conducted at one and the same level leaves no doubt about the fact that there is contact and agreement in the conduct of this hostile campaign between the enemy of the Allies -- Hitler -- and the Polish Government."²

Such a step by the Polish emigré government toward our country, the peoples of which, shedding their blood in a difficult struggle against Hitlerite Germany, were fighting for the defeat of the common foe of the Russian and Polish people, could not be considered other than as a treacherous attack on the Soviet Union. And the government of the USSR assessed it precisely as such. In view of the fact that the "government of Poland, which has adopted a policy of agreement with the Hitlerite Government, has in fact given up its alliance relations with the USSR and has adopted a position of hostile relations toward the Soviet Union.... The Soviet Government has decided to sever relations with the Polish Government."³

It is quite obvious, and facts fully confirm this, that the emigré government, separated from its people, and under the pressure of its most odious, pro-fascist members, such as General K. Sosnkowski, quite deliberately joined in the fascist campaign of slander against the USSR, for that government knew more than anybody else what the German-fascist invaders were perpetrating in occupied Poland and with what savagery they were dealing with the Polish population, and especially its most progressive segment, which had risen up to fight for the liberation of their homeland from the hated enemy.

Polish emigré circles also knew full well what vile devices were being utilized by German-fascist propaganda, which stooped to any fabrications and the most shameless lies, which gave it the most infamous reputation throughout the world.

What is the true history of the events in the Katyn forest? It was presented in official Soviet documents of 1943-1944,⁴ in documents and materials of the Union of Polish Patriots (UPP) in the USSR⁵ as well as in the Soviet press and in the UPP newspaper published in the USSR, WOLNA POLSKA. Unfortunately in recent years, especially in the period of stepped-up anti-Sovietism in Poland in 1980-1981, attempts have been made in certain foreign countries to "revive" the events in the Katyn forest with a strong anti-Soviet thrust; and to interpret them in conformity with the Hitlerite version of 1943, in order once again to cast a shadow on Soviet-Polish relations, to weaken and darken the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Polish People's Republic.

Documents and materials published in the press attest to the fact that prior to the treacherous attack by Hitlerite Germany on the USSR, there were in fact in the Katyn forest, called Koz'ya Gora by local residents, three camps for Polish prisoners of war, who were being employed in highway construction. These camps were located 25-45 km west of Smolensk, along the Vitebsk highway. After the German-fascist forces reached the Smolensk area, the administration of these camps endeavored to evacuate all prisoners of war to the heartland.

But there were no railcars available, due to the enormous railcar requirements of the forces at the front. In addition, as was confirmed by S. V. Ivanov, who in July 1941 was serving as acting chief of operations of the Smolensk division of the Western Railroad, "we were unable to move cars onto the Gusino line, where most of the Polish prisoners of war were located, since that line was by that time under fire."⁶

Thus, due to the emergency circumstances which had developed, for reasons over which the Soviet authorities had no control whatsoever, they were unable to evacuate the Polish prisoner of war camps, including part of the camp security force and camp employees, who were Soviet citizens. Also indisputable is the fact that the Polish prisoners of war were alive and well right up to the seizure of the Smolensk area by the Hitlerite forces, and were not executed in the spring of 1940, as the Goebbels slanderers claimed.

A special commission to investigate the events in the Katyn forest, consisting of highly respected individuals (Academician N. N. Burdenko, chairman; famed writer Academician A. N. Tolstoy, the Metropolitan Nikolay, Lt Gen A. S. Gundorov, chairman of the All-Slav Committee, plus others), conducted a thorough investigation at the site of the execution of the Polish officer prisoners of war. In order to establish the truth, this commission, in the presence of all its members, opened graves, in which they found 11,000 bodies in Polish uniforms. An official forensic medical board of experts conducted a detailed examination of the bodies, as well as documents and other physical evidence taken from the gravesites. In addition, testimony was taken from more than 100 witnesses from the local populace. All these materials as an aggregate made it possible precisely to determine the time and circumstances of the mass executions of Poles by the fascist murderers.

Witnesses M. A. Sashneva -- elementary school teacher in the village of Zen'kovo, N. V. Danilenkov -- member of the Krasnaya Zarya Kolkhoz of the Katyn Rural Soviet -- and many others testified that following the arrival of the fascist occupation forces they encountered Poles who had either escaped from the camps and taken refuge with local peasants or while they were working on the highway in groups of 15-20 men each. The commission obtained from the witnesses testimony to the fact that in August-September 1941 the occupation authorities rounded up in the villages and forests Poles who had escaped from the camps. Many of those who were questioned by the commission related that they had been forced, by threats and beatings while in Gestapo custody, to give testimony, as demanded by the fascist authorities, that the Polish officers had been executed in 1940 by the Soviet authorities (testimony by P. G. Kiselev, a peasant residing at a farmstead near Koz'i Gory, by I. V. Savvateyev, Gnezdovo station duty employee, by Ye. L. Ignatyuk, Smolenskaya Oblast NKVD Administration garage employee, plus others):

The special commission also established that the fascist authorities, in perpetrating this anti-Soviet act of provocation, had taken steps in advance to remove from the clothing of the Poles they had murdered all documents dated later than April 1940, that is, the time at which the Bolsheviks had allegedly shot the Polish officers. They also had removed from the gravesites all physical evidence which could expose the fascist falsification plot. A group

of 500 Soviet prisoners of war was specially brought to Katyn from Camp 126 to perform these tasks. All of them were subsequently shot in order to eliminate witnesses. Thus the Hitlerites perpetrated one more vile crime, executing the Soviet prisoners of war as well.

The commission also learned that in the spring of 1943 the fascist authorities had hauled to the gravesites in the Katyn Forest the bodies of Polish prisoners of war whom they had executed elsewhere, hoping to conceal the evidence of their crimes and to increase the number of "victims of Bolshevik atrocities."

The final scene in this vile performance by the German-fascist occupation forces in Katyn, which was intended to give their act of anti-Soviet provocation the appearance of certain plausibility, involved "excursions" to the opened graves by the residents of Smolensk and its environs, as well as specially selected "delegations" from European countries under German occupation or in a state of vassalage to Germany.⁷

The materials at the disposal of the Special Commission enabled it to certify with incontrovertible clarity that the Polish prisoners of war who had been residing in the three camps west of Smolensk and performing road construction work prior to the outbreak of the war had remained there following the arrival of the German-fascist occupation forces at Smolensk, up to and including September 1941; in the fall of 1941 the German occupation authorities conducted mass executions of Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest. These criminal actions were perpetrated by a German military establishment concealed under the designation "Headquarters of the 537th Construction Battalion," which was headed by Oberleutnant (Arnes) and his colleagues, Oberleutnant (Reks) and Leutnant (Khott).

The forensic medical examination confirmed without question that the executions had taken place in the fall of 1941. A pistol shot into the back of the head was employed in executing the Polish prisoners of war -- a technique which was employed by the fascist butchers in the mass murders of Soviet citizens at Orel, Voronezh, Krasnodar, Smolensk, and other cities.

The Special Commission completed its investigation with the fully substantiated conclusion that, "in executing Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn Forest, the German-fascist invaders were consistently implementing their policy of physical annihilation of the Slavic peoples."⁸

This is the true story of the "Katyn affair." With the aid of the aggregate of materials obtained by the Special Commission, "the entire loathsome chain of German-fascist acts of provocation, murders and falsification, which together comprise the 'Katyn affair,' has been fully revealed," stated the newspaper PRAVDA in an editorial entitled "Appalling Crime by the Hitlerite Monsters in the Katyn."⁹ The attempt by professional provocateurs to slander the Soviet authorities and to pin on them heinous acts perpetrated by fascist criminals from so-called "Headquarters of the 537th Construction Battalion," who were acting under direct orders from Berlin, was a complete failure. With publication of the findings of the Special Commission, the entire world was able to become firmly convinced of the entire monstrosity of the crimes perpetrated by

the Hitlerite invaders against the Polish people, whom Hitler had decided to wipe out entirely.

Soon after publication in the Soviet press of the official report of the Special Commission to investigate the circumstances of the execution of Polish officers in the Katyn by the German fascists, a delegation of officers and men of the Polish 1st Corps in the USSR, headed by its commander, Gen Z. Berling, visited the Katyn Forest to pay their last respects to the officers who had been murdered by the Hitlerites.¹⁰ Addressing the delegates of the corps before the graves of the Polish officers who had been executed by the Hitlerites, corps deputy commander Maj (later promoted to brigade general) Aleksandr Zavadskiy stated: "The Katyn Forest is another crime by the Germans against the Slavs. But this Hitlerite act of provocation was a failure. Nobody believed their phony fabrication. Some Poles in London, who supported the bloody calumny of the Hitlerites for their own predatory conspirator purposes, have nothing in common with the Polish people. The Russian people helped us find the truth, and they will help us convey this truth to Warsaw. We shall wreak vengeance on the enemy until we destroy him entirely!"¹¹

Angry political rallies were held in the units of the Polish 1st Corps in the USSR, at which enlisted men and officers swore to gain vengeance over the fascist murderers for their crimes. The resolution passed at a political rally in one of the units of the corps expressed the indignation of all personnel over the monstrous crimes perpetrated by German fascism, as a result of which 11,000 Polish officers and men were murdered only because they were Poles. Pointing out the fact that the emigré government in London had acted contrary to the view of the anti-Hitler coalition, deliberately supporting this act of fascist provocation against the USSR, the officers and enlisted men wrote in their resolution: "We condemn this pernicious policy, which has brought harm to the Polish cause throughout the world, which has been and continues to be an obstacle to unification of the Polish people in the struggle against the German occupation forces."¹² A collection of funds began spontaneously in the corps for building "Katyn Avenger" tanks and for erection of a memorial to the victims of fascist terror tactics.

Polish partisans also voiced their protest against the anti-Soviet actions on the part of the Polish emigré government. At a political rally held on 1 May 1943 by the detachment under the command of R. Satanowski, an Appeal to the Polish People was adopted, in which the vicious act of provocation by fascism, taken up by Polish authorities, on the supposed execution of Polish prisoners of war by Soviet authorities, was declared to be a fabrication. The text of the Appeal read as follows: "In order to prevent the unification of all the resources of the people in the liberation war of the peoples of Europe against fascism, the Hitlerites are treacherously stabbing in the back the great Russian people, who are waging a Patriotic War for the freedom of their homeland and for the freedom of the Polish and other oppressed peoples. At a time when our heroic Russian brothers are shedding their blood on the fields of battle, the Sikorski Government has not only betrayed them but has become their enemy.... But the Polish people are familiar with the countenance of bloodthirsty, treacherous fascism and will never make a deal with the fascist murderers of the Polish people. The Polish people will wage an uncompromising war of liberation."¹³

Thus the true Polish patriots, who fought with weapon in hand against the German invaders, resolutely disassociated themselves from the emigré government in its playing into the hands of fascist propaganda.

Mass demonstrations by the worker masses against the actions on the part of the Polish reactionary emigré community, which had joined forces with the Hitlerites in its unrestrained anti-Sovietism, spread over England in the spring of 1943. The workers at the Birmingham Aircraft Works passed a resolution which stated: "We condemn the actions of the Polish Government which is headquartered in our country and consider that its unwarranted accusations against the Soviet Union are an attempt to undermine the unity of the United Nations."¹⁴ Resolutions condemning the Polish authorities in London were adopted by aircraft plant workers in (Ostin) and Bristol, by railway workers in the town of (Kerkoldi) (Scotland) and Bradford, by branches of the union of machine builders in London and Luton (the county of Bedfordshire), Hereford, (Stens) (Middlesex), and Sheffield. They demanded that the British Government interdict the fascist activities of the Polish authorities and stop assisting in the propaganda disseminated by the Polish press and radio.¹⁵

Many British and U.S. bourgeois newspapers also expressed their dissatisfaction with the conduct of official Polish emigré circles. The TIMES published a noteworthy statement. "Surprise and regret are simultaneously evoked by the fact that precisely those who have themselves experienced all the treacherous consequences of the Goebbels propaganda machine," the newspaper stated, "have fallen into the trap set for them. It is hardly likely that the Poles have forgotten the book which was widely disseminated during the first winter of the war and which reported, with all details and evidence, including photographs, on atrocities perpetrated by the Poles against peaceful German residents of Poland. These fantastic fabrications could have helped them properly assess accusations of a similar nature leveled against others."¹⁶ The British newspaper REYNOLDS NEWS realistically assessed the events connected with the Nazi propaganda attack concerning Katyn, comparing these Goebbels propaganda maneuvers with the burning of the Reichstag.¹⁷

Of course many people in Great Britain and the United States did not take a critical position toward the Polish emigré government regarding the "Katyn affair." There were those who either directly, or more frequently indirectly justified the actions taken by the Sikorski Government against the Soviet Union, and who as a rule blamed the USSR for the rupture of Soviet-Polish relations. Such statements were made by reactionary members of the British Parliament, members of the U.S. Congress, and appeared in bourgeois newspapers and magazines of right-wing orientation.

In spite of the fact that Soviet-Polish relations were ruptured through the fault of the Polish emigré community, the Soviet Union's policy toward Poland and its future remained unchanged. The Soviet Union unswervingly pursued a policy of peace and friendship with the Polish people and adhered to the view that following military victory over the German-fascist invaders, there should exist a strong and independent Poland. At the beginning of May 1943 I. V. Stalin, replying to questions put by a correspondent for the newspapers NEW YORK TIMES and TIMES by the name of Parker, clearly and unequivocally formulated this position of the Soviet Government. I. V. Stalin replied as

follows to a question about the principles on which relations between Poland and the USSR should be based after the war: "On a foundation of firm good-neighbor relations and mutual respect or, if the Polish people so desire, on the basis of an alliance in mutual assistance...."¹⁸

The Soviet Government proceeded precisely in this fashion, consistently carrying out its liberation mission in the Great Patriotic War. In relation to Poland it firmly adhered to a course of policy which corresponded to the interests both of the Soviet and Polish people. With the comprehensive support of the USSR and its glorious Armed Forces, which played a decisive role in the defeat of the German-fascist invaders and which liberated Poland from almost 6 years of Nazi oppression, the Polish people, under the leadership of the Communists, taking power into its own hands, established a genuinely independent, socialist state. Its friendship and cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist countries constituted important factors in the security of the Polish People's Republic and peace throughout Europe.

All attempts by the enemies of Soviet-Polish friendship to disrupt it, utilizing toward this end the vilest means, including the long since exposed fabrications produced during the last war, are condemned to inevitable failure. The brotherhood of the Soviet and Polish peoples in labor, supplemented by their brotherhood in arms, possesses a firm foundation -- socialist internationalism -- and proceeds from profound awareness by both peoples of their vital needs. And this means that Soviet-Polish friendship is indestructible. This was restated at the Ninth Extraordinary Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, held in July 1981: "Our alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union remain the cornerstone of Polish foreign policy and of our national policy," state the congress documents. "This alliance is grounded on principles, each of which corresponds to the interests of the independence and security of Poland within its present borders."¹⁹

FOOTNOTES

1. See IZVESTIYA, 16 April 1943.
2. "Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoy voyny. Dokumenty i materialy" [Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union in the Period of the Patriotic War. Documents and Materials], Vol 1, Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1946, page 347.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., pp 301-303; "Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-pol'skikh otnosheniy" [Documents and Materials on the History of Soviet-Polish Relations], Vol 7, 1939-1943, Moscow, Nauka, 1973, pp 353-372, 419-421; "Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SShA i Prem'yer-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945 gg." [Correspondence Between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Presidents of the United States and Prime-Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945], second edition, Vol 1, Moscow, Politizdat, 1976, pp 145-156; Vol 2, pp 58-61.

5. "Dokumenty..." ibid., Vol 7, pp 373-374, 388-390, 426-428.
6. PRAVDA, 26 January 1944.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Incidentally, the delegates who went to Katyn included artillery battalion cannoneer Ya. Moroz and combat engineer battalion khorunzhiy Klimchak, who after September 1937 had themselves spent some time in the special camps at Katyn and who after their release (Ya. Moroz on 12 June 1940, and Klimchak in March 1941) had corresponded with their friends who remained in the camps at Smolensk. Ya. Moroz, for example, received the following letter from a friend of his, Captain Olszewski of the 25th Ulan Regiment, dated January 1941. Their testimony also refutes the slander put out by the Hitlerites to the effect that the Polish officers had been shot by NKVD authorities in the spring of 1940 (see PRAVDA, 31 January 1944).
11. PRAVDA, 31 January 1944.
12. PRAVDA, 8 February 1944.
13. "Dokumenty...", op. cit., Vol 7, 1939-1943, page 366.
14. Central State Archives of the October Revolution, Fund 4459, List 1, Unit of Storage 1266, Sheet 47.
15. Ibid., sheets 47, 52, 53, 57.
16. THE TIMES, 28 April 1943.
17. REYNOLDS NEWS, 18 April 1943.
18. PRAVDA, 6 May 1943.
19. TRYBUNA LUDU, 21-22 July 1981.

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COMMENTS ON CONCEPTS OF MAN-MILITARY EQUIPMENT RELATIONSHIP

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 74-79

[Article by Docent, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Engr-Col A. Pupko:
"Critique of Bourgeois Concepts of the Correlation Between Man and Military
Equipment"]

[Text] As we know, the present stage of historical development is characterized by a sharp struggle between scientific Marxist-Leninist and bourgeois ideologies. This struggle reflects the principal conflict of the contemporary era -- between capitalism and socialism. The ideologues of imperialism, who to please their class are attempting to distort the mechanisms of societal development, have selected the root problems of military affairs as one of the targets of their falsification activities. Ideological acts of sabotage by bourgeois theorists, for example, are directed toward theoretical substantiation of the arms race policy being pursued by the ruling circles of the capitalist society, a policy aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. As we know, since the Reagan Administration came into power in the United States, the apologists of imperialism have been attempting to explain away the new round in the arms race with the phony excuse that it is necessary to combat the "Soviet military threat" and "international terrorism," terms applied to defense measures taken by the socialist community, the solidarity between the socialist nations and the national liberation movement, international assistance to peoples fighting for their liberation from colonial oppression, etc.

History attests to the fact that, upon achieving military superiority, imperialist nations have always instigated unjust, predatory wars, both local and world wars. And the present course of policy of the Reagan Administration proceeds from the very essence of U.S. imperialism and its traditional reactionary policy, which is grounded on hegemonism and ideas of so-called "American exceptionality," which assigns to the United States the role of "the world's most powerful country, with special responsibilities."

Contemporary bourgeois ideologues are attempting to elaborate theoretical concepts which justify imperialism's striving toward an arms race, toward development of increasingly more sophisticated weapons and military equipment. The greatest activeness in this regard is displayed by that current of

contemporary bourgeois philosophy designated "military-technological determinism," the representatives of which develop concepts which absolutize the role of military technology in the affairs of society and from this position attempt to resolve the problem of the relationship between man and military hardware in combat, a problem which is quite pertinent at the contemporary stage.

As we know, a genuinely scientific approach to solving this problem is possible only from the position of Marxist-Leninist theory, which acknowledges the organic unity and interdependence of man and military equipment in the process of accomplishing the specific tasks of armed combat. It is pointed out in the writings of the founders of Marxism, for example, that unity of man and military equipment forms the foundation of organization of the army and defines the specific features of conduct of combat operations. "...The entire organization of armies and their employed mode of waging combat," wrote F. Engels, "and, together with this, victories and defeats, are dependent on ...human material and on arms, consequently -- on the quality and quantity of population and on hardware."¹

Stressing the exceptional value of such an approach to analysis of the interrelationship between man and military equipment in armed combat, V. I. Lenin noted: "Not one Social Democrat... having learned from Engels, a great expert in this matter, never doubted... the immense importance of military hardware... as an instrument employed by the masses and classes for resolving great historic clashes."²

The fundamental tenets of Marxism, from which proceeds the necessity of an intelligent combination of human material and military hardware in order to achieve victory, were comprehensively developed in new historical conditions by V. I. Lenin. "The very best army," he wrote, "and people who are the most dedicated to the cause of the revolution will be immediately annihilated by the enemy if they are inadequately armed, provisioned, and trained."³

At the same time the founders of Marxism pointed out that the leading, determining element in this organic unity is man, who utilizes diversified military equipment for the sake of achieving specific social goals. "...Men, not muskets," emphasized F. Engels, "will win battles."⁴

Acknowledgement of the exceptional significance of the character, and particularly the moral-political qualities of the fighting man for achieving victory in the war of today constitutes one of the basic theses of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army.

The thesis on the inseparable dialectical interrelationship between man and military equipment in armed combat, advanced by the founders of Marxism-Leninism, with man playing a determining, predominant role, was reflected in the most important principles of Soviet military organizational development and in CPSU activities pertaining to ensuring the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of the Soviet Armed Forces. "Our party," stressed CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, in an address at a reception honoring service academy

graduates, "proceeds from the Leninist teaching that, no matter how great the technical equipment of an army, man, possessing a consummate mastery of equipment, remains the principal, determining force in war. This is especially important now, in the age of nuclear missile weapons, when the fate of a war will be determined by personnel possessing a mastery of weapons and combat equipment, conditioned morally and physically, and totally dedicated to their homeland, party and people."⁶

Thus, approaching the question of the correlation between man and military hardware in armed combat, representatives of Soviet military theoretical thought, while not minimizing the role of military hardware, recognize that at any level of its development, man is the deciding, determining force in war. It is precisely this Marxist-Leninist position which is the principal position for a critical analysis of contemporary bourgeois military-theoretical concepts on the problem of the relationship between man and military hardware, for proving their antiscientific and reactionary character. We should note first and foremost the reactionary social role of such concepts, which attempt to substantiate the necessity of an arms race with the aim of utilization of the latest types of military equipment and weapons for the purpose of pursuit by the imperialist nations of an aggressive foreign policy toward the socialist countries and in the struggle against the national liberation movement. Toward this end their authors attempt to create deliberately false theoretical presentations, directed primarily toward absolutizing the role of military equipment in warfare and a corresponding downplay of the role of the fighting man. Precisely such views were quite widespread in bourgeois military theory at all stages of its development, with only the form of argumentation changing, absolutizing the role of a given type of military hardware in achieving victory. As a result there appeared the concepts of "tank," "air," "automated," "push-button" wars, etc. For example, soon after World War I, in the course of which the adversaries employed much complex military hardware, one of the authors of such theories, famed bourgeois theorist G. Fuller, proclaimed that the best army was a single person "capable of pushing a button... and thus bringing into action machines invented by the best scientific minds in peacetime."⁷ Subsequently U.S. theorist K. Knorr declared: "War has become today more than ever before a business rather of machines than men."⁸ Such views began to be propagated in the 1960's, in a period of a rapid process of automation in all areas of military affairs. Automated troop control systems became quite widespread. Substantiating attempts to eliminate men from the domain of armed combat by replacing him with automatic equipment, U.S. sociologist I. Krumpelt wrote: "In the future automatic arms will become higher beings; they will replace our will, resoluteness, courage, and we ourselves will be under their control."⁹

Illusions of creating "electronic generals" and "cybernetic strategists" became quite widespread among bourgeois military experts under the influence of such theoretical views, as did all kinds of models of "automated wars," in which one could allegedly gain victory without sending soldiers to the front. At a meeting of the U.S. Army Association, for example, General Westmoreland, former commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam, stated that soon "the army will have at its disposal a comprehensive fire control system which will be based on the

latest advances in the field of intelligence, communications, automatic data analysis, and automatic weapon guidance.... Acquiring the capability of virtually guaranteed annihilation of an enemy, we shall be freed of the necessity of committing our own ground forces, since direct participation by such forces in repelling an adversary will lose its former significance."¹⁰

We should note that the dissemination of such notions served as a sure indicator that the aggressive forces of imperialism, preparing for new military adventures, are unable to give their soldiers lofty moral incentives and ideas which would inspire them to accomplish "military feats." Precisely this circumstance is an important social cause of the appearance and widespread dissemination of such theories, which in the final analysis are aimed at eliminating the influence of man and the worker masses on the course and outcome of war. As we know, in analyzing the military policy of imperialist nations following World War I, V. I. Lenin wrote that "following the great imperialist slaughter, all governments in the world began fearing a truly popular army...."¹¹ Precisely for this reason some capitalist nations, the United States in particular, have presently shifted to the mercenary method of forming an army, which in this case is more easily transformed to a professional, caste army, and it is easier to brainwash and transform its personnel into a unique appendage of the weapons and military equipment they employ.

The dangerous character of military-theoretical concepts of the relationship between man and military hardware elaborated within the framework of "military-technical determinism" and aimed at achieving military-technical superiority over the socialist community was especially graphically manifested in the arms race initiated by imperialism in the postwar period, to which the socialist countries were compelled to respond by increasing their defense might.

Today as well the U.S. Government is the initiator of a new round of escalation in the arms race. "The primary goal in coming years," writes USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, "/has been declared by the present administration to be the attainment of U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union/ [in boldface]. Toward this end, military expenditures next year just for the Department of Defense will increase by more than 40 billion dollars, and will total 226 billion! In the coming five years (up to 1986) the United States intends to spend 1.5 trillion dollars, that is, almost as much as it has spent on its armed forces in the last 12 years."¹²

Achievement of military technological superiority over the socialist community is the focus of all efforts by the people at the Pentagon. "We shall spend all that is required," declares U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, "to increase U.S. military might and to attain superiority over the Soviet Union." "Ohio" class nuclear-powered missile-armed submarines are being built, the MX intercontinental ballistic missile is being developed, as are new strategic bombers, strategic cruise missiles, and Pershing II ballistic missiles in order to achieve this goal, and the Shuttle space system and other weapons are also being developed for military purposes. Thus the theoretical concepts of "military-technical determinism" are embodied in the fabric of the military technical policy of contemporary imperialism, which is aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.

The problem of training the personnel of bourgeois armies is today being resolved in the light of these concepts. Desperate efforts are being undertaken today as never before to brainwash soldiers and transform them into an obedient appendage of military technical systems.

Bourgeois ideologues place particular hope in this aspect on the indoctrination of a so-called "soldier of a technical type," a characteristic feature of whom is the role of a blind appendage of military equipment. This means a callous attitude toward war aims, blind obedience to one's commander, and transformation of warfare into performance by personnel of specified technological functions pertaining to operating military technical systems.

As is indicated in contemporary military theory literature, "a standardized system of mass amorality of the soldier of the bourgeois army makes it possible to prepare military personnel to perform the role of a robot assassin, who is willing to kill at the first word by his commander, or at least who readily undertakes such a task."¹³

Particular optimism is aroused on the part of supporters of such theories by the fact that the further development of military technology is leading to steady movement of the soldier away from the immediate battlefield, due to which he supposedly loses real contact with the violence being perpetrated and fails to see the victims of violence, which is transformed, as it were, into "conditional murder," into a certain abstraction. Seeking to justify this point of view, the advocates of this trend write: "One of the specific features of nuclear missile warfare will apparently consist in the fact that it will signify the absence of any identification of decisions and actions with the specific individuals responsible for their adoption and execution. It will be impossible to encompass and concretize in a personal act the killings and physical destruction carried out on such a mass scale and at global distances by means of pushing a button."¹⁴

We should note that contemporary bourgeois theorists attempt to bolster theoretical conclusions of this kind with corresponding factual material. During the war in Vietnam, for example, U.S. military researchers, who included sociologists, psychiatrists, etc, conducted special studies among U.S. Air Force pilots for the purpose of studying their moral state in the process of participation in mass murders of civilians. These investigations resulted in a conclusion of a so-called "moral numbness" or "moral impenetrability" of aircrews -- the total absence of moral feelings over the evil they were perpetrating and an absence of pangs of conscience for the destruction of peaceful cities and towns and for the deaths of innocent people. "American pilots," wrote U.S. psychiatrist Robert Lifton on this subject, "do not possess sufficient imagination and moral vision in order to be fully aware of precisely what they are doing on combat sorties. They do not actually see the ground, and particularly do not see the people or the targets which they are bombing.... They see themselves as truck drivers delivering goods over long distances. The war for them is completely depersonalized."¹⁵

In the opinion of U.S. military theorists, today's U.S. officers who organize the mass killings of civilians "are not like the murderous lieutenant Kelly.

They perform their assigned missions in a purely technical manner. If pursuant to an order they have issued a delivery of artillery fire or an airstrike sometimes kills children wandering past some sensor together with their water buffaloes, they personally are not transgressing the law or violating the demands of conscience: an error is always blamed on the information source or computer. And no court martial would ever bring charges against a computer or unmanned helicopter."¹⁶

A thorough analysis of the principal points existing in contemporary bourgeois military ideology and concepts on the problem of the relationship between man and military equipment enables one to conclude that its advocates are encouraging a continuous intensification and expansion of the arms race, are objectively holding the position of an apologia of the aggressive policy of imperialism, and are impeding international détente.

* * *

Thus placing man in contrast to a technical device, absolutization of the role of military equipment in warfare, and an undisguised apologia of the endeavor to achieve military technological superiority over the socialist community are characteristic of the authors of contemporary bourgeois concepts of the relationship between man and military equipment. Grounded on antiscientific methodological positions, contemporary bourgeois military theorists demonstrate on the one hand an inability to reflect the actual objective mechanisms of societal development, in particular the evolution of military affairs, and on the other hand their class affiliation with the most reactionary forces of contemporary imperialism, which are planning a thermonuclear world war and toward this end are escalating another round in the arms race.

A critique of bourgeois concepts of the relationship between man and military equipment in warfare acquires particular pertinence in light of the points of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, which were further developed in the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress. As we know, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, characterizing the present level of the Soviet Armed Forces, noted: "A solid fusion of a high level of technical equipment, military expertise and indomitable morale -- this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces."¹⁷ Consequently, the personal quality of Soviet servicemen, their high degree of conviction, conscientiousness, discipline, and the ability fully to utilize the combat capabilities of the weapons entrusted to their care are acknowledged to be an essential element of combat potential. A Communist ideological outlook, proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism, embodied in the spiritual resources of army and navy personnel, play a decisive role in present-day conditions. "The uncompromising nature of a war, if the imperialists succeed in starting one," notes Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, "will demand the highest mobilization of the spiritual resources of the army and navy, courage and self-sacrifice on the part of each and every Soviet serviceman."¹⁸

The Marxist-Leninist concept of the relationship between man and military equipment in warfare plays an important role in ensuring constant combat readiness on the part of the Soviet Armed Forces to repel an aggressor attack. As we know, the enormous efforts and material expenditures of the Soviet people for technical equipment of the army, for improving military personnel skills and development of indomitable morale, which is presently being carried out in the process of profound study and implementation of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, are concentrated in combat readiness as at a focal point. An important element in this process is the struggle against bourgeois ideology on various root problems of military affairs, including the problem of the relationship between man and military equipment in warfare.

FOOTNOTES

1. K. Marks and F. Engel's, "Soch." [Writings], Vol 20, page 175.
2. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 10, page 340.
3. Ibid., Vol 35, page 408.
4. Marks and Engel's, op. cit., Vol 15, page 225.
5. Footnote omitted.
6. L. I. Brezhnev, "O kommunisticheskom vospitanii trudyashchikhsya. Rechi i stat'i" [On Communist Indoctrination of Working People. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, page 79.
7. Dzh. Fuller, "Tanki v velikoy voyne 1914-1918 gg." [Tanks in the Great War, 1914-1918], translated from English, Voenizdat, 1923, pp 254-255.
8. K. Knorr, "Voyenny potentsial gosudarstva" [The Military Potential of the State], translated from English, Voenizdat, 1960, page 61.
9. BREAKTHROUGH TO PEACE; No 4, 1966, page 67.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 15 December 1969, page 13.
11. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 41, page 195.
12. PRAVDA, 25 July 1981.
13. R. Bernes, "Peshki" [Pawns], Voenizdat, 1974, page 76.
14. Z. Zinberg and G. Fellman, "Violence: Biological Need and Social Control," Baltimore, 1970, page 229.
15. Cited in: V. V. Denisov, "Sotsiologiya nasiliya" [Sociology of Violence], Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, page 154.

16. INDOCHINA CHRONICLE, 15 October 1971, page 1.
17. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, Politizdat, 1981, page 66.
18. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 9 July 1981.

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BOOK REVIEW: UZBEKISTAN IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 84-86

[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by Docent, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Col P. Balashov: "Uzbekistan in the Great Patriotic War"]

[Text] An addition has been made to the literature on the Great Patriotic War. The first volume of a three-volume monograph entitled "The Uzbek SSR in the Years of the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)"¹ has been published.

In unleashing a war against the Soviet Union, the fascist leaders assumed that massive surprise attacks by the Wehrmacht and the stresses of war would cause discord within the family of Soviet peoples and would undermine the capability of the Soviet Union to resist. But the enemy had miscalculated. The friendship among the peoples of our multinational state proved to be indestructibly strong. "The unity of the Soviet people," stated L. I. Brezhnev in his report entitled "On the 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," "found its most convincing expression in heroic deeds in defense of the socialist homeland. The alliance and friendship of all our country's nationalities and ethnic groups withstood the great test of the Great Patriotic War."²

The volume in question is distinguished by pertinence and originality. In its preparation the authors drew upon materials which reveal the activities of the Communist Party and Komsomol, the worker class and the kolkhoz peasantry, scientists and workers in the arts, and the performance of this republic's industry and agriculture. The authors have made extensive use of documentary materials from the Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, the Party Archives of the Uzbek Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee, the Central State Archives of the National Economy of the USSR, and synthesizing materials from archives in Uzbekistan, Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, and the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Many documents are being offered to the scholarly community for the first time.

Discussion of the principal events begins with a presentation of the peace-seeking foreign policy of the Soviet Union on the eve of the war, Uzbekistan's

contribution toward strengthening our country's military and economic potential, and activities by the Uzbekistan Communist Party in the area of Communist indoctrination of the masses. The constant tension of the international situation of the world's first socialist state, which found itself in capitalist encirclement, faced it with the necessity of taking effective measures to strengthen its defense, simultaneously with a persistent campaign to preserve and strengthen peace (page 30).

Industrial enterprises were being constructed at an accelerated pace in our country's eastern regions, including Uzbekistan.

Such facilities as oil refineries in Ferganskaya, Andizhanskaya, and Surkhandar'inskaya oblasts, new coal mines in the Tashkent and Surkhandar'ya areas, GES and TETs, textile mills and many other enterprises are known throughout the country.

This republic's agriculture achieved considerable success in the prewar years. For example, a sharp increase in the harvested cotton crop in Uzbekistan and in other republics of Central Asia enabled our country, beginning in 1938, fully to eliminate the import of cotton from abroad. Grain production was also steadily growing.

An important role in providing industry with fuel during the period of temporary enemy occupation of the Donets coal basin was played by the Angren coal mines and the Tashkent-Angren rail line.

The authors reveal on the basis of considerable factual material the activities of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan KP(b) [Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] in reorganizing this republic's economy on a war footing, as was demanded by the 29 June 1941 directive issued by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) and the USSR Council of People's Commissars. On the very first days of the war the republic's military commissariats received more than 14,000 requests to be sent to the front. At meetings of party activists in Tashkent and other cities, at factories and plants, on kolkhozes and sovkhozes it was stated that the Uzbek people would defend their homeland, its honor, freedom and independence to their very last drop of blood. "To achieve this," stated U. Yusupov, Uzbekistan KP(b) Central Committee secretary, "it is essential, first of all, tirelessly to prepare combat reserves for the Red Army; secondly, to put into operation evacuated plants as quickly as possible and to provide the army in the field with the essential arms, ammunition, clothing, and provisions" (pp 66-67). The working people of Uzbekistan responded to the appeal of Communist Party with tireless labor, 10-12 hours a day. P. M. Makov, a worker at the Plant imeni October Revolution, stated at a political rally: "Victory is won not only in the theater of military operations. Victory is forged in factory shops and at machine tools. Victory is engendered by selfless labor. On behalf of the work force of the locomotive shop, I request that the Soviet Government permit us to work 12 hours" (page 67). These and other examples of responses by the working people of this republic to the Communist Party's appeal are a vivid indicator of the boundless affection of the Soviet people for their beloved homeland and party.

The authors do a good job of showing the heroic labor of the Uzbek working people for the sake of victory over the fascist invaders. Evacuated plants were set up on empty construction sites and resumed production before the walls and roofs of the shop buildings were erected. As a result of the intensive labor on the part of local workers and workers who had evacuated together with their plants, by the end of 1941 approximately 50 evacuated enterprises had resumed production in Uzbekistan, and by the end of the first half of 1942 all plants relocated to this republic were working at full capacity (page 70). The industrial output growth rate exceeded the highest prewar figures (page 71).

Also of interest to the reader will be the problem of mobilization of the republic's agriculture for meeting the needs of the battle front and the home front. Here, just as in industry, the role of the Communist Party was decisive. The wartime situation demanded increased party influence in the village. Following rearrangement of party cadres within kolkhozes and sovkhozes and reassignment of individual Communists from rayon centers to kolkhozes and sovkhozes, new primary party organizations were established in this republic. In July 1941 there were 170 new rural party organizations in Uzbekistan.

The authors have also done a good job of showing the selfless labor of kolkhoz peasantry in various branches of agriculture in carrying out tasks assigned by the party and government. Growing of a new crop -- sugar beets -- was initiated in this republic. The total number of cattle, sheep, and goats steadily rose during the war years, as did agricultural production figures.

The authors discuss fairly comprehensively in this volume the activities of scientists, workers in culture and the arts, medicine and education. Just as all our country's working people, they worked under the slogan "Everything for the front! Everything for victory!"

Considerable attention is devoted to the problem of strengthening the link between the home front and battle front, training of reserves for the Red Army, patron activities, mass defense measures, and concern for the families of men at the front, evacuated workers, wounded servicemen and disabled war veterans.

The reader's attention is drawn by materials on the military labor of the sons and daughters of the Uzbek people on the battle fronts of the Great Patriotic War, on the heroism and valor displayed by them in the struggle against the fascist invaders, and on the activities of this republic's party and soviet agencies in forming and training reserves for the army in the field.

But a positive evaluation of this volume does not mean that it does not contain certain deficiencies. The authors could have more fully discussed Uzbek servicemen who fought on the battle fronts of the Great Patriotic War, and they could have utilized for this purpose materials from the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In the course of presentation of interesting factual materials on the contribution of the Uzbek SSR to the cause of defeating the Hitlerite occupation forces, they should have more fully exposed the lies and juggling of facts on the part of bourgeois falsifiers, who distort the nationalities and international policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union. Some numerical data (industrial and agricultural production, voluntary contributions to the victory fund, etc) should have been presented in the form of tables in order to achieve greater clarity of presentation.

On the whole this volume will be highly useful to all those who study the contribution of the union republics to the defeat of the German-fascist invaders during the Great Patriotic War.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Uzbekskaya SSR v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny (1941-1945 gg)," Vol 1. "Uzbekistan in the first period of the Great Patriotic War (1941-Nov 1942)," Tashkent, Izd-vo FAN Uzbekskoy SSR, 1981, 408 pages.
2. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leninskim kursom" [Following a Leninist Course], Vol 4, Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, page 60.

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BOOK REVIEW: THE NAVY IN THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 82 (signed to press 22 Jan 82) pp 86-87

[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by Honored Scientist RSFSR, Professor, Doctor of Naval Sciences, Vice-Adm K. Stalbo: "The Navy in the Last War"]

[Text] Izdatel'stvo "Nauka" has published a book by A. V. Basov,* which synthesizes the experience of operational-strategic employment of the navy in the Great Patriotic War. It is packed with factual material obtained from many files and naval archives as well as the writings of Soviet and foreign authors. It reveals in detail the organizational-technical and theoretical principles of building and development of our homeland's naval forces on the eve of and during the Great Patriotic War.

Examining questions pertaining to theory, the author reaches a correct conclusion that the problems of strategic employment of the navy in the war were elaborated less fully than were the other components of Soviet art of naval warfare. We cannot agree, however, with the statement that in the prewar years there was no study of the problem of defending external sea lines of communication and organization of possible teamwork and cooperation with the naval forces of our allies. Of course the latter question was not being worked out in detail, since at that time it was not clear what countries would be our allies and whether we would even have any allies at all.

The author reveals the measures by Soviet naval command authorities to prevent enemy surprise attacks on our naval forces. We must also note in this connection that the German-fascist navy initiated aggressive actions against the submarine forces of the Soviet navy in the Baltic a week before the treacherous attack on the USSR. Combat employment of the naval forces of fascist Germany was limited as soon as the war began. Germany's navy was being preserved for subsequent stages in the struggle for world domination.

The plans of the Hitlerite command authorities, however, to wipe out the Soviet Navy by seizing its bases with Wehrmacht ground troops proved to be unsound (page 99). The course of the armed conflict was forcing the fascists more and more extensively to employ their navy in the war against the USSR. In the third period of the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Armed Forces were conducting large-scale strategic operations along the entire Soviet-German

* A. V. Basov, "Flot v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne 1941-1945. Opyt operativno-strategicheskogo primeneniya" [The Navy in the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. Experience of Operational-Strategic Employment], Moscow, Nauka, 1980, 304 pages.

front, the Hitlerite navy was being employed primarily in support of ground forces (page 101).

The author correctly notes that the nature of operations in the Great Patriotic War also determined the specific features of operational-strategic employment of the Soviet Navy, the principal missions of which were joint operations with other branches of service and combat arms aimed at routing German-fascist troops operating in coastal areas (page 117).

The author synthesizes the actions of the fleets in the initial period of the war, in the course of strategic defense, and in the course of strategic offensive operations in coastal sectors of operations. In these operations ground forces worked in close coordination with coast and shipboard artillery, with the aviation and air defense means of the fleets and flotillas. Sometimes naval artillery would be included in an overall fire plan of coastal large strategic formations, while naval infantry would be incorporated into combined-arms units and large units. Naval aviation, air defense and communications facilities would be employed according to a unified plan. Operational and tactical amphibious assault forces, which played an important role in completing the defeat of enemy forces, were landed in a number of operations (East Prussian, Petsamo-Kirkenes, Manchurian, Kuril, Southern Sakhalin, and others). As a rule their employment was coordinated with active operations by ground forces, aviation and naval forces.

The author does a good job of presenting strategic materials on our naval actions in these operations, but his analysis is somewhat hastily formulated, which naturally has an effect on the depth of the author's conclusions and recommendations.

The author divides the problem of naval control and command during the Great Patriotic War into two separate parts:

operational-strategic command and control of fleet and flotilla forces in the course of combat operations;

direction of navy organizational development.

The first of these were handled along the following chain: Stavka [Headquarters, Supreme High Command]-People's Commissar (Commander) of the Navy-Fleets (Flotillas), as well as the following: Stavka-Front-Fleet (Flotilla).

Direction of naval organizational development proceeded as follows: State Defense Committee-Council of People's Commissars-People's Commissariat of the Shipbuilding Industry, with the active participation of the People's Commissariat of the Navy and Main Naval Headquarters at all stages -- from planning to acceptance of new warships and armament.

The author's efforts to discuss the problem of operational-strategic employment of naval forces in the Great Patriotic War unquestionably merit a positive evaluation. Numerous readers, navy people in particular, have welcomed the publication of A. V. Basov's book. At the same time wishes are being expressed

that the author continue his research, which will unquestionably assist commanders and political workers in the training and indoctrination of naval personnel in present-day conditions with utilization of the experience of the last war in organization and conduct of naval combat operations.

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BOOK REVIEW: ROLE OF SPECIAL PROPAGANDA IN PAST WAR

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[Article, published under the heading "Criticism and Bibliography," by Lt Gen (Ret) A. Shevchenko: "With the Weapon of the Word"]

[Text] The problems of political work to counteract enemy propaganda and to demoralize enemy troops were constantly being addressed by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party he established. Successful resolution of these problems was one of the reasons for the collapse of the plans of the Entente, which was endeavoring to strangle the young Soviet Republic. V. I. Lenin stated in February 1920 that "by means of agitation and propaganda, we have taken away from the Entente its own troops."¹ Extensively utilized for this purpose during the civil war and especially the Great Patriotic War was a carefully selected special propaganda staff, possessing a high degree of political, specific area studies, and linguistic training. Experts, provided with the requisite equipment (field printing equipment, public address facilities, ground and air means of distribution of propaganda materials), trained revolutionary-minded prisoners of war for agitation and explanation work among enemy troops beyond the forward edge of the battle area. A book by Maj Gen (Ret) M. I. Burtsev deals with these little-known matters.²

This considerable quantity of interesting, previously unpublished material will unquestionably arouse reader interest.

Discussing the role and place of special propaganda in the combat operations of the Soviet Army and navy, the author emphasizes that it was not some isolated activity but was always conducted in a close unity with the combat operations of Soviet forces. And the more heavily they hit the enemy, the greater was the effectiveness of our special propaganda in the fronts, armies, and combined units. Attesting to the enormous significance of this form of political work from the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War is the fact that on 25 June 1941 the Central Committee Politburo of the ACP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] issued a decision to establish a Soviet office of military-political propaganda "for the purpose of concentrating direction of all military-political propaganda and counterpropaganda among enemy military personnel and civilians" (pp 34-35). The Seventh Department of the Main Political Propaganda Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the corresponding

seventh departments of the political directorates (political departments) of the fronts and armies became this office's working agency.

The scale of special propaganda was described well by D. Z. Manuil'skiy, a high official of the party and Comintern and member of the Central Committee of the ACP(b): "Work to demoralize the enemy's troops is the business of the party, and consequently the business of all military councils and command cadres, all political agencies, not only of the seventh departments" (page 169). Naturally the main efforts in this work were concentrated on propaganda among military personnel of the Wehrmacht and the civilian population of fascist Germany. Nor were the armies and civilian population of Italy, Romania, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Slovakia forgotten (page 41). The principal means of achieving success in special propaganda, as stated by A. S. Shcherbakov, candidate member of the Central Committee Politburo and party Central Committee secretary, who took over as head of the Soviet Information Bureau at the beginning of the war, was truth. He emphasized that "Our strength lies in truth... In hitting the enemy with truth and only with truth. Truth constitutes a guarantee of our invincibility" (page 103). The leadership role of our party's Central Committee, which always flawlessly determined policy both in ideological work as a whole and in political propaganda among enemy troops, was traced particularly forcefully precisely in these matters.

Based on a wealth of factual materials (letters, diaries, fascist bulletins, newspapers, magazines), the author shows the transformation of the political state and morale of the German-fascist army under the effect of the intensifying blows inflicted by the Soviet Armed Forces and stepped-up Soviet political propaganda.

Considerable attention is devoted to showing work with prisoners of war and their participation in anti-Hitler propaganda. Soldiers, and later officers and general officers of the enemy's army, taken prisoner or voluntarily defecting to the Soviet Army, saw with their own eyes that the Soviet Army strictly observed the provisions of the Hague and Geneva conventions on prisoners of war. They recognized the falsity of Goebbels propaganda, which viciously slandered the Soviet people and their Armed Forces. The fascist propagandists kept silent on the direct focus of Soviet citizens on the fact that "Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German State remain."³

Activation of our propaganda promoted the growth of antifascist attitudes among prisoners of war and a desire on the part of many of them to make what contribution they could to the struggle against fascism for a free, democratic Germany. Soviet Army command authorities gave them the opportunity to address by radio and public-address loudspeaker their fellow countrymen across the battle lines. Printed materials telling of the treatment of prisoners of war in the USSR were disseminated beyond the battle lines and behind enemy lines. Many German antifascists, working together with Soviet servicemen and partisans, conducted propaganda and fought with weapon in hand against the Hitlerites. The most valorous of these were awarded Soviet medals and declarations, while F. Schmenkel was posthumously awarded the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union. L. I. Brezhnev stated in this connection: "Comrade Schmenkel and other German antifascist heroes fearlessly went to their deaths in the struggle against the foul tyranny of Hitlerism, because they firmly believed in Germany's bright socialist future" (page 116).

The capture of German general officers by the Soviet Army and the enlistment of some of them in the antifascist struggle played an important role in exposing Hitler and his clique. Participation in the anti-Hitler movement by Field Marshal Paulus, former commander of the 6th Army, his "Appeal to the Wehrmacht," as well as leaflets and appeals by 45 other former corps, division and regimental commanders sent across the front lines "to the army and the German people" explained the criminal policy of the fascists, who were continuing the bloodshed.

The author presents interesting data on assistance by the Comintern to propaganda among the enemy's troops. He writes with heartfelt warmth about G. Dimitrov, W. Pieck, W. Ulbricht, P. Togliatti, D. Manuil'skiy and other Comintern officials whom he had met on official matters. Together with major Soviet writers and German antifascist writers (M. Sholokhov, K. Fedin, N. Tikhonov, I. Erenburg, I. Becher, W. Bredel, E. Weinert, F. Wolf, and others), they made a worthy contribution to the ideological struggle with the enemy.

One reads with fascination the pages on the role and activities of anti-fascist schools established in the central region and on the principal fronts. The finest representatives of the antifascist movement studied at these schools. The schools turned out politically trained anti-Hitlerite fighters of former Wehrmacht enlisted men, officers and general officers who had expressed the desire to take the path of active struggle against fascism. The majority of the graduates of these schools acquitted themselves in a worthy manner in the postwar years. Col Gen (G. Kessler), Maj Gen G. Rentsch and Rear Adm F. Scheffler, for example, held and continue to hold important posts in governmental and military agencies of the GDR, while those who today reside in the FRG are actively participating in the activities of the CPG and progressive public organizations. Joint efforts by Soviet and German Communist propagandists promoted growth in antifascist consciousness among prisoners of war. Active builders of a socialist society in the GDR subsequently developed from this milieu.

We know that bourgeois propaganda, especially in the FRG, in the postwar years has expended considerable money and resources on presenting in a deliberately false, slanderous light the treatment of prisoners of war in the USSR and to make this question an object of anti-Soviet political opportunism. A 20-volume falsifier study entitled "On the History of German Prisoners of War in World War II" was published, for example, in Munich. This work lacks the slightest scholarly foundation and aims at rehabilitation of fascism, justification of the atrocities committed by the Hitlerites, falsification of the history of the war, and the kindling of anti-Sovietism. The lie about the "horrors," "sufferings," and "deprivations" of prisoners of war in the USSR has been aggressively taken up and is being disseminated to this day by the reactionary bourgeois press.

In the book "Enlightenment," the author recreates a true picture of the treatment of prisoners of war in the USSR and tells of their daily lives, labor, and interests. This book constitutes not only incontrovertible proof of humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war but also deals an appreciable blow against the insinuations of the liars, slanderers, and adherents of

"psychological warfare" in the West, who are attempting to step up their attacks against the Soviet Union and the brother socialist countries.

Also of considerable interest are materials on ultimatums issued by USSR command authorities to encircled enemy forces and the garrisons of surrounded cities, as well as on delivery of such ultimatums by Soviet truce envoys to fascist command headquarters.

In the final chapter the author discusses the work done by the special propaganda organization among the civilian population of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Far East. The author shows the great humanism and international character of the army of the socialist state, which brought liberation from the occupation forces to the peoples of 12 nations of Europe and Asia.

The entire book is well-structured. The presentation in historical sequence of the course of combat operations against the Hitlerite invaders and the Japanese militarists is nicely combined in this book with a description of the organization and conduct of political work among enemy troops and civilians.

The value of this book would be even greater, however, if the author had succeeded in revealing more deeply matters pertaining to political work among the civilian population on the enemy's territory in the concluding period of the Great Patriotic War, especially in the Far East, as well as political work to demoralize the troops of the satellites of Hitlerite Germany. We cannot say that the author's statements, repeated in each and every chapter, on one and the same methods and forms of agitation work against the enemy's troops are justified. We should also note the fact that the book is overloaded with excerpts from agitation documents. This makes the reading more difficult.

On the whole, however, the book deserves high marks. The author has synthesized the great amount of experience amassed by political agencies of the fronts, armies and combined units in organizing special propaganda against the enemy's troops during the civil war and the Great Patriotic War. It will definitely be of use to commanders, military political workers, and faculty members of military educational institutions in preparing for classes on combat and political training.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 40, page 125.
2. M. I. Burtsev, "Prozreniye" [Enlightenment], Voenizdat, 1981, 320 pages.
3. I. Stalin, "O Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza" [On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union], Moscow, Politizdat, 1950, page 46.

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